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ABSTRACT
AUTHORITY IN POLITICS:
AN INVESTIGATION OF THEIR PLACE
IN RATIONALIST AND INTERPRETIVE THEORY
February 1, 1983
Michael T. Gibbons, B.A., University of Massachusetts
Ph.D., University of Massachusetts
Directed by: Professor William E. Connolly
The dissertation is an examination of the relationship amongst
theories of authority, theories of rationality, and theories of
language in rationalist and interpretive theory. Peter Winch and
Hans-Georg Gadamer are taken as representative of interpretive theory;
Martin Hollis and Jurgen Habermas are taken as representative of
rationalist theory. The thesis argued is that neither the
interpretive nor rationalist theorists examined satisfactorily address
the problem of political authority . Winch and Gadamer make the
mistake of interpreting all forms of authority as instances of
epistemic authority. Hence, both overestimate the consistency of
authority with freedom of choice and action and underestimate the
coercive potential of the exercise of some forms of authority. Of
the
rationalist theorists examined, Martin Hollis fails to recognize
the
extent to which rational evaluation of social roles and
personal
identity is language dependent and Habermas overestimates
the
independence that his theory of universal pragmatics would
provide
rational discourse. All four thinkers have an
apolitical dimension to
VI
their interpretation of social life.
A theory of democratic authority can, however, be developed from a
notion of the common good and an expressivist theory of language.
Moreover, the latter also provides the basis for strong evaluation,
hence providing the common ground for both a strong form of human
agency which the rationalists seek and legitimate political authority
which interpretive theorists defend.
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CHAPTER I
THE BOUNDS OF AUTHORITY:
LANGUAGE, PERSONAL IDENTITY AND REASON
Philosophy, Sociology and Understanding
At the beginning of The Idea of a Social Science Peter Winch
claims there are some fundamental misunderstandings amongst social
scientists about the nature of their own enterprise. These misunder-
standings flow from misconceptions about both the nature of philosophy
and the nature of social science. Briefly put, the view of social
science and philosophy that Winch wishes to attack, and which he attri-
butes to both early and contemporary empiricists, claims that knowledge
of reality can only be gained through experimental methods and observa-
tion. Proponents of this view hold that philosophy has only a limited
role in the investigation of reality, i.e. the clarification of
particular conceptual confusions. Language is one of the tools used
by scientists but it is often defective, imprecise, vague and scienti-
fically unreliable. It is the role of the so-called underlaborers,
i.e. philosophers, to clean up this particular tool of science, to
eliminate the defects of ambiguity, imprecision, etc. so that the true
masters of knowledge, i.e. scientists, can proceed with their
work.
Winch rejects this account of the relationship amongst knowledge,
language and philosophy. Philosophy, he argues, has a
much broader
role than what is prescribed by the underlaborer view.
It is the role
of philosophy to elucidate the very concept of reality.
This is not
1
2to deny the importance of science in investigating particular
phenomena. But this is quite different from determining what is to
count as part of reality itself. This latter question falls within
the bounds of philosophy: "...the philosopher is concerned with the
nature of reality as such and in general For it is not an
empirical question at all but a conceptual one. It has to do with the
force of the concept of reality.
This discussion of the concept of reality involves questions about
its nature, how reality is intelligible, and what possible contact the
human mind could have with reality. Because, Winch argues, there is
no clear separation between the world and our language, the answer to
such questions necessarily involves an investigation of the very
nature of language, a task that goes considerably beyond the solution
of isolated conceptual problems. The world is available to us only
through our language and the concepts we use. "The concepts we have
settle for us the form of the experience we have of the world.... The
world is_ for us what is presented through those concepts. That is not
to say that our concepts do not change; but when they do that means
2
that our concept of the world has changed too."
If the philosphers' concern is an investigation of the concept of
reality as such, and if part of that problem involves a discussion of
how reality could be intelligible, then it follows for Winch that
epistemology occupies a central role within philosophy. Philosophy is
concerned not only with language and the concept of reality but it is
also concerned with contributing to "our understanding of what is
involved in the concept of intelligibility, so that we may better
3understand what it means to call reality intelligible."^
Winch's views on epistemology also have a bearing on the study of
social life. Human behavior is, for Winch, a reflection of man's
understanding of reality and the world around him. "A man's social
relations with his fellows are permeated with his ideas about
reality. Indeed, 'permeated' is hardly a strong enough word; social
relations are expressions of ideas about reality."^ it is here that
philosophy merges with the study of social life. For to demonstrate
how an understanding of reality is possible one must necessarily "show
the central role which the concept of understanding plays in the
activities which are characteristic of human societies, "in this way
the discussion of what an understanding of reality consists in merges
into the discussion of the difference the possession of such an
understanding may be expected to have make to the life of a man; and
this again involves a consideration of the general nature of a human
society, an analysis, that is, of the concept of a human society."^
This latter question, the nature of human society, is itself a
philosophical question that has been usurped by empirical sociology,
claims Winch.
Rules and Meaningful Behavior
As we mentioned Winch argues that there is an extremely close
relationship between language and social reality. For Winch our
language, concepts and ideas in part constitute our social life. This
in itself would be sufficient to make language a focus of the study of
human action. But Winch takes his argument one step further. The
relationship that language has to non-linguistic activities magnifies
the importance of language for the study of social life, "it is
because the use of language is so intimately, so inseparably, bound up
with the other non-linguistic activities which men perform that it is
possible to speak of their non-linguistic behavior also as expressing
discursive ideas. Given this intimacy between language and social
action, the investigator of social life must be concerned with forms
of activity that have meaning or symbolic content, or, borrowing from
Weber, "we are concerned with human 'behavior' if and in so far as the
agent or agents associate a subjective sense with it.""^ The social
scientist then is concerned with that behavior which has meaning for
the participants, i.e. that which is rule governed. Winch puts it
very strongly: "i have claimed that the analysis of meaningful
behavior must allot a central role to the notion of a rule; that all
behavior which is meaningful (therefore all specifically human
Q
behavior) is ip^o facto rule governed."
This concept of rule-governed behavior does not include only that
behavior in which rules are clearly formulated and consciously
applied. Such a notion is too narrow from winch's point of view.
There must, of course, be standards by which one can determine whether
or not action is in accordance with a particular rule but "the test of
whether a man's actions are the application of a rule is not whether
he can formulate it but whether or not it makes sense to distinguish
between a right and wrong way of doing things in connection with what
9he does." The idea of there being a right and wrong way of going
about things means that the concept of rule-governed behavior is bound
to the notion of a mistake, in other words there must be some
standard by which to evaluate what one is doing. The establishing of
a standard involves developing external checks on one's behavior; it
necessarily in requires a social context. This brings us to two
central features of Winch's concept of rule-governed behavior. First,
all rules are social rules in the sense that they could not be
developed outside the context of human society. Second, they must, in
principle, be discoverable by others.
This view of meaningful behavior as rule-governed and the
relationship between ideas about reality and social relationships lead
Winch to conclude that one cannot explain a way of life or set of
activities within a way of life without reference to the concepts,
ideas and intentions which help to constitute that way of life. One
example that Winch uses is that of voting. One may vote in a variety
of ways. Pulling a lever, making an 'X' on a ballot, raising one's
hand, writing a name down on a piece of paper are all examples of ways
that one might vote. But none of these constitutes voting per se; I
may perform each of these activities and may intend and accomplish
something other than voting, either because I intend something else by
them or because the context within which they are performed will lead
others to understand them differently. The point here is that pulling
a lever, making an 'X', etc., do not constitute voting unless I first
have the concept of voting available to me and, second, that the
voting is understood by others to be part of a process of rendering
collective decisions.
6Winch claims that this view of human behavior makes the
application of scientific methods to social action illegitimate. This
is not to say that there are no regularities within social life. It
does mean that knowledge of such regularities depends on knowledge of
the intentions of the actor, the concepts available to him, and the
way of life within which his actions are implicated. This is
substantially different from the knowledge of regularities in the
physical world. "Understanding" in the study of social action "is
grasping the point or meaning of what is being done or said. This is
a notion far removed from the world of statistics and causal laws: it
is closer to the realm of discourse and to the internal relation that
link the parts of a realm of discourse. "''"^
The rejection of a causal analysis of individual social behavior
does not in itself eliminate the possibility of a scientific approach
to social life. It can still be argued that the study of social
action involves the discovery of general regularities, an empirical
task that makes the study of social life the logical equivalent to the
study of natural phenomena. To this Winch replies:
A regularity or uniformity is the constant recurrence of
the same kind of event on the same kind of occasion; hence,
statements of uniformity pre-suppose judgements of identity.
But . . . criteria of identity are necessarily relati e to some
rule; with the corollary that two events which count as
qualitatively similar from the point of view of one rule
would count as different from the point of view of another.
So to investigate the type of regularity studied of the rule
according to which judgement of identity are made in that
enquiry
In case of social science, the rules that govern criteria of identity
are those employed by the object of the sociologists' study and they
are not a set of criteria developed by the sociologist himself. This
does not mean that the social scientist is prevented from using
concepts to describe social action which are not used by the
participants themselves. What it does mean is that these concepts
must "imply a previous understanding of those other concepts which
belong to the activities under investigation" ."'^ We must be able to
understand the intersubjective rules that govern a way of life or a
society and this takes us beyond the so-called purely 'objective'
understanding of science.
Forms of Life and Rationality
If social life can only be explained in terms of the ideas,
beliefs and concepts that help constitute it, and if these in turn can
only be understood from within the practices that they grow in, it
follows for Winch that the practices of one culture or form of life
cannot be judged logical or illogical, rational or irrational from the
point of view of another. Logic is neither the particular property nor
something independent of specific forms of life: "criteria of logic
are not a direct gift from God, but arise out of, and are only
intelligible in the context of, ways of living or modes of social
life. It follows that one cannot apply criteria of logic to modes of
life as such. For instance science is one such mode and religion is
another; and each has criteria of intelligibility peculiar to
itself ."'^ It is unintelligible to say that "either the practice of
science itself or that of religion is either illogical or logical;
both are non-logical."
It further follows that if the criteria of logic and rationality
arise out of modes of life and can be understood only in the context
of the appropriate mode of life, no single form of life can claim a
monopoly on standards of rationality or criteria of logic. Concepts,
beliefs and practices can only be judged or evaluated in terms of the
context from which they derive their meaning. "Something can appear
rational to someone only in terms of his understanding of what is and
is not rational. If our concept of rationality is a different one
from his, then it makes no sense to say that anything either does or
does not appear rational to him in our sense. ""'"^ We cannot
criticize the concepts, beliefs or practices of another culture in
terms of our own because those concepts, etc. get their sense from the
use that they have in their respective cultures or forms of life. For
example, when we are examining the Azande belief in witchcraft or
their apparent use of ad hoc generalizations to explain why certain
predictions of oracles do not come to pass, it is a mistake for us to
label these things illogical or irrational. To do so is to use our
concept of what is rational to judge another belief and this is an
error: "ideas cannot be torn out of their context in that way - the
relation between idea and context is an internal one. The idea gets
its sense from the role it plays in the system.
""^^
Winch takes his argument one step further. It is not just the
case that a concept or belief gets its meaning from the form of life
within which it is found and therefore can be judged rational only in
relation to the context of that form of life. Judgements about
reality are dependent upon context, i.e. language, as well: "Reality
is not what gives language sense. What is real and what is unreal
shows itself in the sense that language has.... Further both the
distinctions between the real and the unreal and the concept of
agreement with reality themselves belong to our language. ""^'^
Science then cannot judge the reality of God and religion cannot judge
the reality of Galilean astronomy, and neither science nor religion
can judge the reality of Azande magic. And just as one cannot
establish the superiority of any particular concept or standard of
reality, neither can one establish a concept of reality that is
independent of language
.
Winch does not mean that we need to see things exactly the same
way that the participants of a culture or form of life do. The aim is
not to chuck our own concepts in favor of those that we are studying,
but rather to relate alien concepts, etc. to our own: "We must
somehow bring S's conception of intelligibility into (intelligible!)
relation with our own conception of intelligibility. That is, we have
to create a new unity for the concepts of intelligibility, having a
certain relation to our old one and perhaps requiring a considerable
realignment of our categories. We are not seeking a state in which
things will appear to us just as they do to members of S, and perhaps
such a state is unattainable anyway. But we are seeking a way of
looking at things which goes beyond our previous way in that it has in
some way taken account of and incorporated the other way that members
18
of S have of looking at things." In other words, we have to
extend our categories, concepts, meanings and conception of
10
rationality and intelligibility to include those categories, etc. of
the culture or form of life that we are studying.
A Rationalist Critique (Of Sorts )
Mollis' critique of Winch is tempered by a sympathy for what Winch
is trying to achieve, namely to show that human action requires a
different structure of explanation and different criteria of identity
than do the phenomena of the natural world. Mollis even admits that
rules play a role in shaping social behavior and that explanation in
terms of rules is at first glance convincing: "The concept of a rule
is intoxicating. It gives us a neat and workable notion of social
context. It lets us express systematically those images which are so
appealing - that the world is a stage, that roles form a stock, that
interaction is a game, that reality is negotiated, that norms create a
constraining order. Only because there are rules does the actor have
19
the moves to make, cards to play, tokens to exchange."
Nonetheless Mollis argues that any explanation in terms of rules, and
Winch's account in particular, fails in its attempt to provide a
coherent alternative to naturalistic-causal models of explanation.
Generally speaking. Mollis' criticisms fall into three closely related
categories:
(1) Explanation in terms of rule-governed behavior is not a
sufficiently strong form of explanation. In particular Winch's
criteria of verifiability are incoherent and his account of
rule-governed behavior is absurd.
(2) Winch's position regarding rationality and reality is mistaken
and would make the study of social life impossible.
(3) Explanation in terms of rules relies on a metaphysic of human
nature that Mollis labels Platic Man and as such leaves no room for
autonomous human action.
Human nature and social theory
, in his book Models of Man Martin
Hollis argues that all social theories can be grouped into one of two
categories distinguished by their metaphysical assumptions about human
nature. These assumptions about human nature carry implications for
the mode of explanation, the view of rationality, the type of
self-identity, and the possibilities for political practice that a
thinker can entertain. "Every social theory needs a metaphysic, I
shall contend, in which a model of man and a method of science
complement each other. There is no shirking questions of quasi fact,
of normative analysis and of praxis."
The two competing metaphysics of human nature see man as either
passive or active. Passive conceptions of human nature are most often
found in those social theories which model themselves after the
natural sciences in trying to explain social life in terms of causal
laws. Such theories are not limited to one discipline in the human
sciences. Explanations in terms of sociobiology, socialization
processes, or stimulus-response are examples of theories that assume a
passive conception of man according to Hollis.
Such theories rob man of his autonomy. His choice of action is
not his own but is determined for him by biological factors,
12
socialization techniques and social structure, or the manipulation of
external environment. His choices as to who he is and what he will do
are not his own. "His identity is thrust upon him by contact with a
central value system, induction into socio-economic relationships, his
drives and disposition, the mechanics of his unconscious or ge etic
progrmming."21 ^ each case his self and social identity, his
beliefs and action are not the result of his own autonomous, rational
choices but are determined for him either naturally (sociobiology) or
through an external social world (e.g. behaviorism), in such theories
men are only 'spuriously individuals'. Lacking a strong notion of
self-identity, men are constituted by either their natural drives or
the external factors of the social world or some combination of the
two.
Such a view of human nature tends toward a manipulative form of
political practice. For such a view sees human beings as "essentially
programmed creatures and their output is a function of their input,
with or without intervention of whatever is between, itself presumably
in any case the product of earlier inputs and its own feedback.
Programmed creatures can be manipulated by selecting the input or
adjusting the programmed - hence talk of social engineering."22 And
again in discussing Plastic Man elsewhere Hollis says, "Apart from any
random factors, the creature portrayed behaves predictably in given
conditions and can be manipulated by engineering the apt
23
conditions."
Ho:)llis clearly objects to this manipulative approach to political
practice and use of social theory. He maintains that even though few
13
societies offer the opportunity to exercise as much autonomy as he
would like to see, the task of social theory is, nevertheless, to
inform political practice in such a way that the opportunities to
exercise autonomy are increased.
The alternative to those forms of social theory whose explanatory
value rests upon a metaphysics of human passivity is a form of social
theory that assumes an active role for human beings. Mollis calls
this active view of human nature Autonomous Man. Autonomous Man is
the author of his own beliefs, ideas, actions and identity; he is the
product of neither laws nor of social environment. His actions are
always rational in that the reasons he gives for his actions are the
best possible reasons that one could have for acting in a particular
situation. In short. Mollis is arguing for the assumption of an
autonomous subject as the basis for social explanation. "There must
be a self whose activity is sufficient explanation of some social
behavior. In calling him Autonomous Man, we are demanding a subject,
self, the I_ of 'The I and the Me' , perhaps given more independence
than G.H. Mead intended." Autonomous Man is a subject who is in
control of his life, whose reasons for acting are his own,
reflectively arrived at, yet objectively rational. Challenges to
those social theories that rest upon a passive conception of man must
provide not only a coherent form of explanation but a role for the
active self as well.
Rule governed behavior and explanation . According to Mollis there are
several reasons why rule-governed behavior, and Winch's version in
14
particular, fails to provide a complete, coherent alternative form of
explanation to those social theories that assume a passive view of
man. First, though rules may help us to identify certain actions or
behavior they do not tell us why that particular rule and not some
other is being followed. "There is an initial gap between saying that'
the rule constitutes the action and that adding that it explains the
action. To close the gap we must at least accept sets of rules, under
some such title as 'culture,' 'value systems,' or 'forms of life;' as
the data of last resort. Actors can still change a rule or decide to
break one, but only if the changing or breaking of one rule is
explained as the following of another. Otherwise the claim of rules
to be the final category lapses. "^^ Mollis then argues that the
question that still remains is why does the actor choose to follow
this form of life (say become a monk) rather than another (become a
libertine) or choose to adopt one value system rather than another.
Winch's brand of rule-governed behavior is particularly guilty of
failing to address this last question from Mollis' point of view.
Winch, as Mollis reads him, sees rules as public. This eliminates the
possibility of a man following a private rule; one cannot follow a
rule unless one already has external standards that enable him to
identify when a rule is broken. If the social scientist wishes to
study social behavior he should begin with the institutions that
embody the rules. In summarizing Winch he says: "all rules whatever
are to be explained by reference to social institutions. Neither
reality nor individual behavior is a given: both depend upon
institutions Actions are to be explained by reference to the
15
motives or purposes for which they are done and motives or purposes,
in turn, by reference to the institutions that make them
intelligible. Thus a man's purposes do not determine this way of life
but, rather, his way of life determines his purposes. For a way or
form of life gives him a pattern of reasons for action as well as a
conception of reality." ° Mollis realizes that Winch believes
actors do have some choice. A man may choose to follow one rule
rather than another, or, for example, make one move in chess rather
than another. However, the array of alternatives is determined by the
institutions of a society and the rules embodied in them. In the end,
explanation rests with an account of these institutions and not with
individuals.
Hollis claims that if his reading of Winch is correct, Winch's
prescriptions for social science threaten social explanation with
infinite regress. For if we ask why an actor follows nne rule rather
than another, the explanation must be in terms of another rule, and
the explanation of that in terms of yet another, and so on.
In Mollis' words, "the individual can only experience external
standards of correctness if he already has rules for interpreting what
is said to him.... If these rules for interpreting what is said also
require external criteria, then the individual will need further rules
27
for interpreting these external criteria and so ad infinitum."
Winch's response, that explanations must end somewhere, is purely
arbitrary, claims Mollis, and evades precisely the guestions that
Winch is claiming to address. Mence Winch has failed "to dismiss the
view that 'institutions' are composed of individuals following rules
on which they (individuals) are in principle the final court of
28
appeal." m failing to do so Winch has also failed to provide us
with a compelling alternative to explanation in terms of individuals.
Not only is the notion of rule governed behavior an insufficient
or incomplete form of explanation, but any explanatory value that it
can have is obtained only at the cost of including precisely what
Winch wishes to reject, i.e. a notion of causality. To say that one
engages in this or that behavior because of this or that particular
rule or way of life does not exclude the possibility of one arguing
that the connection between the way of life and the rule in question
is causal. In fact it is possible to argue that the way of life is in
fact a necessary condition for behavior to be identified as the type
that it is. In short, rules "do not exclude causal connections and do
not amount to an explanation without them."^^
Mollis' third objection to Winch's prescriptions for explanation
in the social sciences are that Winch makes the importance of
quantitative techniques dependent upon the explanation in terms of
rules. The findings of econometrics, demographics, antnropometry
,
etc. are significant only if they are explainable in terms of, or
coincide with, a rule followed by the participants. This is too
restrictive a concept of social significance for Mollis. There are
many correlations and regularities that are significant but are not
reducible to or explainable in terms of a form of life. Rates of
unemployment, inflation, demographic changes, correlations between
personal habits (say smoking) and health (e.g., lung cancer) are
significant findings regardless as to what the institutions and rules
17
of society say. As Alasdaire Maclntyre has put it, the social
scientist is interested not just in what people do but in what happens
to them as well. And what happens to them is not always explainable
in terms of their own concepts and beliefs.
Related to this point is Mollis' final objections to Winch's
account of rules as explanation, winch, says Mollis, will grant that
an explanation of a type of behavior is valid only if it is recognized
as so by the participants of that way of life. Explanations of
behavior which are at odds with the explanation given by the
participants must be rejected. The participants are the last court of
appeal when it comes to the validation of an interpretation and
explanation of their behavior. This puts Winch in a peculiar
position, argues Mollis. If the participants agree that an
explanation of their behavior offered by an observer is correct only
after a long process of argumentation and persuasion, is it not the
case that the explanation was significant or correct even before it
was admitted to be by the participants. If it is, continues Mollis,
then there must exist some criteria of truth or validations that are
independent of the consent of the participants. "The growth of
knowledge and progress of enquiry requires that what the scientist
knows in the end was true all along. He must be entitled to
presuppose some criteria of truth and to impute social significance,
even though his subjects are unaware of what he claims to
discover. "^'^ The social scientist must be able to assume an
epistemologically privileged position. Without that privileged
position Mollis fears social science will be stymied in its
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accumulation of knowledge.
Rationality and reality. Hollis also takes issue with winch's
prescriptions for evaluating the rationality of beliefs, actions and
social practices. The reader will recall that Winch claims that there
is no single, objective standard of rationality that the investigator
can use to judge social practices in different cultures or forms of
life. Standards of rationality grow out of forms of life and
therefore depend upon social practices. Hollis takes this to mean
that Winch is claiming that the very rules of logic are themselves
malleable and that different social relations could very well promote
or engender different standards or rules of logic.
Hollis will have none of this epistemological and ontological
relativism. To hold such a position would make social science
impossible. In order to understand another culture or way of life we
must establish a bridgehead into that language, i.e. discover some
utterances in the alien culture the meaning of which we can identify
with utterances or proposition in our culture. Minimally this means
that they and we must share the same reality, i.e. our propositions
must be about the same things in the world. In addition we must share
the same standards of truth and falsity, for we must know what
propositions about the shared reality they will consider correct and
which propostions they will condsider false. Finally, they must obey
the fundamental rules of logic, i.e. the rules of identity,
contradiction and inference. These rules of logic enable us to
determine the coherence and consistency of statements. This is what
constitutes the minir^al rationality that all cultures must ascribe to.
It is not even a question of trying to discover whether or not we
have the same standard of rationality and the same reality as other
cultures or ways of life. Standards of rationality and reality are
not things that can be tested for. We have to assume the same
standard of rationality and the same reality in order to even
translate a proposition from their language to ours. Standards of
rationality and reality are in fact a priori assumptions that the
social scientist is obligated to hold if he is to begin studying
another culture at all.
In sum, without similar standards of rationality and reality we
would be faced with a vicious circle. In order to understand the
language of another form of life we must know their standards of
rationality and reality. But since those standards of rationality and
reality are language bound, according to Winch, we cannot know these
standards until we know their language. The only way into the vicious
circle is to assume that we share the same rationality and reality.
Without that assumption the study of other forms of life cannot even
begin.
The Rationalist Alternative: Ideal Explanation
Mollis claims that there are three dimensions to the structure of
explanation which the social theorist must provide. Every form of
explanation must have a social context or stage, a theory of human
nature (an actor), and an explanatory link that connects the actor to
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the stage. These elements of explanation cannot be joined
arbitrarily. Some views of human nature would be incompatible with
some types of social context as well as some types of explanation. To
change one of the elements in a previously consistent and fully
developed explanatory model requires that one change each of the other
elements as well, or otherwise risk leaving inconsistencies and gaps
within the model. Thus, a theory of explanation that claimed to
support an active conception of the man, but the social context (or
explanatory link) of which required passive actors would, in all
likelihood, supply us with, at best, inconsistent and incomplete, or
at worst contradictory, explanations of social action.
Social rules and normative explanation
. As an ideal form of
explanation Mollis proposes a form of role theory that he calls
normative explanation. Normative explanation accounts for human
behavior by exlaining it in terms of duties, obligations or
requirements that are attached to the particular set of roles
available to the individual whose behavior is to be explained. These
roles provide the social identity of individuals and are the source of
reasons for action. Schematically, normative explanation looks
something like the following:
(1) The agent occupied a position with roles Ri-.. Rj
requiring action A;
(2) The agent knew that Ri... Rj required A;
(3) Conditions (1) and (2) were the agent's reasons for
doing A.^^
This is what Mollis takes to be the elementary form of
explanation. But explanation in terms of roles is only a beginning
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and does not yet supply us with an alternative to those forms of
explanation whose philosophical anthropology is a passive conception
of man. if we let the concept of a role function as an explanaudum
then what we end up with is a passive conception of man and we fail to
answer the question of why the agent chose that particular role to
follow and not some other. m addition we need to account for the
existence of the roles themselves. To leave explanation at the level
of roles is to treat roles as pre-given characters of a play. We need
to ask questions of who authors the play and is responsible for the
existence of those roles/characters. That is, the roles themselves
are to be accounted for, are part of the explanans. in other words,
to explain the action of an individual in terms of the reasons
legitimized by the norms of the role occupied does not answer the
questions of whether those reasons are the real reasons that moved the
individual, "in terms of the actor and character, then, we still deny
that the actor's motives are the character's reasons since the
character has reasons supplied by the play without reference to
matters off stage. Nor do we accept that the character's reasons are
the actor's motives since this, although holding for a passive homo
sociologicus, leaves no room for autonomy Normative explanation,
instead of being a full first step in a two step explanation, is half
an answer to the only question. In strong actionist eyes the actors
are as responsible for the context as they are for deciding what to do
in it."^^ What must be supplied now is an actor who can
autonomously create and choose amongst the social roles in a society
.
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Autonomy and personal identity
. Mollis argues that this latter
dimension to social explanation requires a strong notion of personal
identity, i.e. an individual whose ideas, beliefs, motives or reasons
for acting are his own and not those that he is supplied by virture of
the social position he occupies. The social theorist who offers an
explanation in terms of reasons must make the case that the reasons
given are actually those of the actor and not those that we assume go
along with the positions occupied. This means that the autonomous
individual must be separable from the character he plays on the social
stage.
However, two related though slightly different dilemma's face the
social theorist trying to reach the terrain beyond that supplied by
roles. When we say that the autonomous individual must have an
identity beyond that identity supplied by roles we must be wary of
falling into the trap of positing the existence of pre-social,
atomistic individuals who constitute society through some version of
the social contract. Additionally, by arguing that we must insure
that the reasons we offer in the explanation of an action are actually
the actor's reasons we are positing the existence of an individual
outside of the characters he plays or social roles he occupies. There
is then an individual who exists outside of the social context by
which we know him. But in separating the character from the actor in
this manner we raise the questions of how we can in fact know what
motives and reasons the individual entertains.
Mollis wishes to avoid both of these pitfalls since he believes
that the self is a social self. But he also wishes to avoid
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identifying the individual with his social positions and roles, for
this results, he feels, in a weak form of actionism, i.e. a plastic
view of man, and no room for individual autonomy. The route by which
he tries to solve this dilemma is the following: "Taking the hint
from political theory, we can propose an ambitious thesis about
autonomy. An autonomous man acts freely by definition. He acts
freely, only if he has good reasons for what he does (and no better
reasons for doing something else) . He has good reasons only if he
acts in his ultimate interests. His ultimate interests derive from
what he essentially is. What he essentially is depends partly on what
is essential to his being any person and partly on what is essential
to his being that particular person. The thesis will be defended in
latter chapters but its ambitions are vain unless the concept of 'what
he essentially is' is, so to speak, load bearing. I shall try to show
next that the load requires strict criteria of identity for persons,
criteria which let the self stand outside the construction.""^*^
To walk the line between an oversocialized view of human nature
that would leave no room for an autonomous subject, and the notion of
an autonomous albeit pre-social atomistic individual, Hollis believes
there is only one possible move to make, Tliere must be times when the
actor acting as a character on the social stage is in fact acting in
his ultimate or real interests. In other words there must be a time
when the real interests of the actor and his responsibilities, duties,
actions or interests of his social position(s) coincide. "It must
sometimes be true that what the character has good reasons to do, the
actor eo ipso also has good reasons to do. Necessarily the autonomous
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actor must be himself in some of his characters.
This in itself does not completely solve the problem according to
Mollis. For now we must ask how we know what the real interests of
the actor are. The dilemma Mollis thinks we face is something like
the following. Either they are interests that he has outside of
society as would a Robinson Crusoe that so many theorists are fond of,
or his real interests come part and parcel with his social positions.
Mollis responds by arguing that even though the interests of the actor
are acquired in his relations with others, the actor can reflect upon
the social positions that he assumes and determine which of those
positions are expressions of his essential self and hence consonant
with his ultimate interests. "My own view is that,..., real interests
are acquired within a social contract. The initial choice of
positions, non-rational in prospect, can be rational in retrospect or
if irrational in retrospect can be rationally corrected. A man can, I
think, have good reasons to be glad today that he got married
yesterday without thereby having to have had good reason yesterday to
be glad at his impending change of state... at any rate, we can at
least secure strict identity by making autonomous men define
themselves as characters when the individuating actions are
essentially those of a character the agent has rationally become, we
get strict identity of persons." Mollis admits that an individual
could never reflectively evaluate all of the social roles that he
occupies at once. To do so would require the possibility of the
individual placing himself outside of society altogether and this
Mollis denies is possible. It is possible, however, for an individual
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to critically evaluate his different roles/positions separately and to
decide after the fact that the duties, obligations, responsibilities,
etc. that constitute or are attached to that position are expressive
of the individual's real interests.
Objective rationality. Mollis now has a stage (a set of roles that
CO
-titute a social context) and an actor (an individual who
reflectively evaluates the social positions that he occupies), what
is still required is an explanatory schema that connects the actor to
the stage. The schema that Hollis offers is a theory of rational
action. Such a schema is the most complete form of explanation for,
as Hollis claims in several places, "Rational action is its own
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explanation.
"
Given Mollis' other two elements in his theory of explanation, not
just any theory of rationality will do. Forms of subjective
rationality where individuals act consiste tly with what they believe
to be the case, whether those beliefs are true or false, are too weak
from Mollis' perspective. Such a standard of rationality fails to ask
whether the beliefs on which the individual acts are themselves well
founded or rationally held. Hence, there is the danger that virtually
all action would be judged rational and the concept of rationality
robbed of its explanatory value. "The result is again to make all
action rational and so to rob us of any hope that a man's real reasons
will, under certain conditions, yield the explanation of his actions.
By saturating the description, we empty the explanation, in readiness
for a causal account of wants and beliefs. Subjective rationality is
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not strong enough to sustain a notion of autonomy
Neither is the notion of Zweckrationalitat a sufficient account
rationality. Zweckrationalitat, though not wholly silent about means
and ends, is in some respects too narrow. Because of its bias towards
instrumental action it judges certain acts as non-rational (e.g.
ritual) while at other times failing to judge the ultimate goals
towards which action is directed. From Mollis' point of view a
complete account of rationality must be able to judge the rationality
of ends as well as means to those ends, "if the ultimate ends are
irrational or non-rational then, ...the means cease to be rational.
This is not to deny that utilitarian and instrumental accounts of
rational action can be used in causal explanation, without assigning
rational goals. But autonomous man is relying on the slogan that
rational action is its own explanation and he must be found ultimately
rational goals."^'''
What is needed, according to Mollis, is a theory of rationality by
which we can determine whether or not the actions of an agent are
expressive of his real interests, objectively determined. The key to
the argument is that rationality is not just a measure of
consistency. "Rational action can follow on false belief or misplaced
desire but only when the belief is rationally held or the desire
rationally supported. Objective standards are being invoked, even
though we have to be what they are. So there is no escaping a notion
of real interests. Autonomous men are moved not by mere desire but by
desire for what is truly, self-expressive. The twin effect is to
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dethrone instrumental and promote expressive rationality." An
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individual's action is to be judged rational if it is an expression of
some set of real interests that are consistent with the actor's social
identity, the latter of which the actor reflectively determines is
consonant with his personal identity.
Summary
.
In short the account goes like this. A person reflectively
decides that certain characters or social roles are expressive of what
he essentially is. These roles have real interests that can be used
to judge the rationality of the goals that the individual chooses as
well as the means to these goals. The choice of real interests will
be determined, in part, by the ability of the individual to understand
his situation accurately and thereby decide what action is rational.
In a sense rational action is a skill. Having adopted a particular
social identity as expressive of my personal identity, the ends that I
choose or action that I engage in can be evaluated as either
supportive or non-supportive, expressive or non-expressive of that
social identity.
As we mentioned befo
, Hollis claims this standard of rationality
must minimally consist of (1) the law of identity, (2) the law of
non-contradiction, and (3) a minimal law of inference. Without these
minimal rules we could never judge the consistency of statements. In
addition, we must assume that those whose behavior we are evaluating
share much of the same world that we do. If they perceive everything
differently than we do we would have no basis for interpreting what is
being said at any given time.
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The Interpretive Rejoinder
in response to Mollis' critique of Winch i will focus on four main
points. First, I shall try to aigue that Mollis' arguments for a
private rule and language are unconvincing and that his own account of
personal identity and rationality belie this account of the
possibility of such a rule. Second, I think Mollis' reading and
criticism of Winch's arguments concerning rationality and reality
ignore important parts of Winch's argument. Third, I shall try to
demonstrate that Mollis' own theory of explanation is not as strong an
alternative to causal explanation as he believes. Finally, I will
argue that his theory of explanation and social theory pose their own
threat to individual autonomy.
Private language and social beinqs
. In discussing the possibility or
impossibility of a private language it is perhaps helpful to begin by
eliminating what is not at issue. Quite obviously no one has ever
proposed that an individual or group of individuals could not develop
some secret language or code that could be used to communicate
meanings between individuals and that would, in practice, be available
to a limited number of individuals. A whole range of human activity,
from children's games to military intelligence work, involves such
private languages and rules. Similarly, no one is arguing that a
normally socialized individual in temporary isolaton (e.g. the privacy
of one's study) or not so temporary isolation (a person lost at sea or
marooned on an island) would be unable to develop rules to follow or
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Change his language to incorporate new experiences, etc. What is at
issue is whether or not: a) one would have to have been brought up in
a social setting in order to be able to act in a manner that we would
describe as rule following, i.e. whether it makes sense "to suppose
anyone capable of establishing a purely personal standard of behavior
if he had never had any exprerience of human society with its socially
established rules. and b) these private rules or language are in
principal learnable by others who could then judge whether or not the
rule is being correctly followed.
I will not pretend to offer a definitive solution to the questions
of the possibility of private rules. What I will try to do is a) show
that Mollis' account of the possibility of private rules is
unconvincing, b) show that things he says elsewhere regarding personal
identity and rationality belie his position regarding the possibility
of private rules, and c) demonstrate that even if we grant the
possibility of such rules they would be of no use in explaining human
action.
Language, rules and Robinson Crusoe
. As a grounding for his
criticism of Winch that purely private rules are not only possible by
necessary for explaining human behavior Mollis, like others, uses the
example of an isolated Robinson Crusoe. There are, however, several
oddities about Mollis' argument that are indicative of the difficulty
of making a convincing argument using the Robinson Crusoe example.
The first point to make is that, as will be remembered from the
original story, DeFoe's Crusoe was an Englishman who was shipwrecked.
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Far from being an individual
-outside- of society, he brought all the
trappings of English culture with him (e.g. a strong concept of
private property, an imperialistic attitude toward the single native
who befriended him, etc.). Obviously this individual, who already had
a language, a culture, a way of life, in short, who knows what it
means to make a mistake and to follow social rules, cannot be the same
Crusoe that Mollis speaks of. DeFoe's Crusoe, having been raised in
English society, knows what it means to have socially established
criteria of correctness even if he temporarily has no one present to
check what he says or does at any particular moment. We must assume
then that the Crusoe of whom Mollis speaks is Mollis' own invention;
he was never taught a language for he was never raised in the presence
of others. (The question of how he got where he is and exactly how he
was raised must for the time being remain a mystery.)
Mollis claims this mysterious figure would be able to establish
and follow private rules that would constitute a private language in
spite of his never having had any prolonged human contact. Abandoned
at the pre-linquistic stage of infancy, this individual has
nonetheless grown up to entertain several ideas that go into the
concept of rule following. Minimally, he must have concepts of and
standards for identity and differentation. He must have an idea of a
correct or incorrect way of going about things, i.e. he knows what it
means to make a mistake and to correct it. Finally, he doesn't just
name things but he develops a language . By a language we mean more
than just a vocabulary. For example, Crusoe's language would have to
distinguish sensations from feelings and, in general, distinguish
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descriptions of inner feelings from external objects.
There are, however, several characteristics of our language which
cannot be used to describe Mollis' (Crusoe's) private language.
First, Crusoe cannot be said to be self-conscious of his language in
the same sense that we are self-conscious of ours. Our notion and
practice of self-consciousness is framed with reference to other
individuals. When we become self-conscious or reflective about our
language, it is often with a mind to how our language will affect or
be understood by others. Mollis' private rules/language cannot be
subject to the same reflection that our language is, since there are
no 'others' for Crusoe to be conscious of.
Second, the idea of a dialogue that informs our use of language
must be absent from Crusoe's private language. Crusoe's private
language is not the development of shared meanings intended to
communicate; it can at best only be a private record of Crusoe's
reaction to this or that. Crusoe's language is totally at his
disposal in a way that ours is not at oui disposal. Both are
conventional, but Crusoe can make this 'mean' anything he wants while
we cannot, and this effects his ability to check his present use of a
particular concept to see if it squares with his earlier use.
Crusoe's language is more like the language of our dream world than
the language of our everyday life.
Related to this is the absence of a distinction between intended
meaning and received meaning. By definition Crusoe's language cannot
be misunderstood in the sense that ours might be, not just because he
is isolated but because his language is not the developmental process
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or product of a group or way of life.
Third, Crusoe's language contains no peformative utterances that
assume the existence of another. Commands and questions, both
directed at an other, are not a part of Crusoe's language. In
addition, Crusoe's language cannot be used to manipulate, intimidate,
persuade, propagandize or discuss.
Now what must strike one as peculiar at this point is Mollis'
choice of terms to describe his Crusoe's actions. He (Mollis) does
not find it odd to use our notions of language and vocabulary to
describe ausoe's. But in light of the extremely different nature of
Crusoe's 'language' it cannot be taken for granted that Mollis can
describe this language with the same vocabulary that is used to
describe ours. Mollis simply assumes that whatever it is that Crusoe
is doing is indeed a language. But from Winch's point of view this is
precisely what is in question. In effect Mollis fails to address
whether or not a language can be construed simply as a sign system
used to designate or identify phenomena in the external world, or
whether a language actually involves more than this, e.g. expressing
intentions, feelings, and sensations. The former is a fairly simple
system of corresponding signs and phenomena; the latter involves a
vocabulary and a grammar, a depth if you will that requires the
language to develop within a community of language users. The sign
system of a single user could not, for instance, make the distinctions
between intended meaning and construed meaning. Because others do not
exist for whom the intended meaning could be misconstrued, the
distinction would never come up and would make no sense to the
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Defoeian language user. Moreover, one of the questions that arises in
the distinction between intended meaning is the questions of the
sincerity of the speaker. But sincerity is an intention that
presupposes the existence of others; it is an example of how some of
the most basic elements of language are intersubjectively founded.
In light of the array of activities that our language can perform
that Crusoe's does not, it cannot be taken for granted, as Mollis
does, that one can use the terms language, meaning, etc. to describe
the activity that Crusoe performs. To make his case Mollis would have
to show that the activities that our language makes possible, the
relations and concepts that shape the very nature of language that we
use intersubjectively, are not central features of language.
Intention, sincerity, ambiguity, irony, pity, deception, persuasion,
manipulation, dialogue, conversation, question, response, are just
some of the concepts and activities that are absent from Crusoe's
language and without which we would be unable to employ our
language .^^
Personal identity & social identity
. Mollis' own arguments
concerning social and personal identity seem to undermine his
arguments concerning the possibility of private rules and language.
If I am said to be following a personal standard of conduct, i.e. a
rule, one of the things that is implied by such a claim is that I am
potentially self-conscious about having my actions be consistent with
some ^et of ideas or beliefs that I believe to be important guides for
action. This means that I must be able to determine when my actions
are and are not consistent with those ideas and beliefs. I must, in
short, be capable of critical self-examination. I must be able to
reflect upon my actions and adjust my behavior according to the rule I
claim to be following. Additionally, I must be able to examine the
usefulness, propriety or appropriateness of any particular rule if the
occasion warrants it. This means that I must be aware of the context
of my rule following and be able to discern new circumstances or
evidence that might possibly have a bearing on my continuation of a
particular rule, or on the revision of the rule to fit new
circumstances unanticipated in its initial formulation. Such a
picture portrays a being who has not merely learned a trick, or an
individual not merely conscious of his activity, but rather a being
who is, potentially at least, self-conscious, who has the potential
for self-reflection. This is a brief sketch of the strong notion of
personal identity that Hollis claims underlies his social theory and
defense of autonomy.
Hollis also argues, however, that an individual conscious of his
activity in the manner just described cannot develop outside of
relations with other human beings. The self who would possibly
exercise these critical abilities is a social creature:
"Consciousness does not, even could not, operate in a vaccuum and
bodies are just bodies unless relations among them are endowed with
shared meaning. "'^^ If this consciousness is socially developed then
without some relations with others we obviously have no consciousness
and thus no self-consciousness. Hollis takes this to mean that we
could also have no autonomous subjects, for the possibility of the
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latter rests on a strong notion of the self that goes with
self-consciousness. But if this is the case then the status of
Mollis- claims concerning the possibility of a private rule and
language comes in to question. More than that, the implication seems
to be that whatever else Crusoe is he is not an autonomous subject,
for autonomy is characteristic of only those with strong notions of
personal identity and pe sonal identity cannot, argues Mollis, be
developed outside of relations with others.
Intentions, rules and explanation
. Mollis' argument in favor of
private rules faces one additional problem. To claim that an
individual is following a rule is to make a claim not just about the
behavior of the individual but of his intentions and beliefs as well.
It is to say that he could potentially recognize contraventions of
that rule as well as circumstances in which the following of that rule
might not be appropriate. To say that an individual is following a
private rule is to say that he is following some rule guided by
beliefs, intentions, etc. that are in principle unavailable to us. We
would not know what the nature of the private rule was. Indeed, we
would probably not know that he was following any rule at all. For to
be able to say that someone is following a rule, even an unspecified
one, is not only to be able to pick out some regularities in his
behavior but to be able to specify the point behind such a rule; i.e.
it means we must be able to say something of the inte tions guiding
the rule. In order to recognize the action as rule following we would
have to be able to give examples of contraventions of the rule or
specify instances in which the following of the rule would be
inappropriate. Otherwise we would be unable to distinguish the
so-called rule following from mere regularity.
Thus, although we can say that one can imagine (in a very loose
sense, e.g. in the way that we can all imagine a unicorn) an
individual following a private rule, we could never say that this or
that particular individual was following a private rule. To do so
would be to claim that we could recognize some behavior as not random
or mere regularity but as the 'same' as some other behavior from the
actor's standpoint. But to do this would go quite a ways towards
specifying, at least generally, what the rule in question is. In
short, to be able to claim that an individual is following a rule,
private or otherwise, is to be able to specify enough of that rule to
refute the claim that it is a purely private rule. In other words,
however possible it is to 'imagine' someone following a private rule,
we would never be able to point to particular examples without ex-post
facto explanations from the actor in question. To be able to describe
an activity as rule governed is to claim that it is activity governed
by a rule that is in principle discoverable by us and thus a social
rule. Thus, even if private rules can be said to exist in some still
mysterious sense, they are virtually useless in explaining social
action. Yet Mollis at times wants to locate final explanation with
such private rules'.
Rationality and social action . Many commentators on Winch have argued
that Winch's proscriptions for social science constitute an extreme
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fortr, of relativism, in all fairness it must be pointed out that Winch
is in part responsible for what I will aigue is a misunderstanding of
the point he is trying to make. At times he does make statements that
lead the reader to believe that he thinks standards of rationality are
incomensurable: "Something can appear rational to someone only in
terms of his understanding of what is and is not reational. If our
concept of rationality is a different one from his then it makes no
sense to say that anything either does or does not appear rational to
him m our sense." Such statements can lead the reader to infer
that Winch thinks that standards of rationality in different societies
are totally incomparable.
Similar statements concerning reality have led some commentators
to claim that Winch also believes that reality itself is different for
different cultures or ways of life: "Reality is not what gives
language sense. What is real and what is unreal shows itself in the
sense that language has."^^ It isn't just that there is a single
reality differently perceived. The implication seems to be that there
is no single external reality that can be used as a check on a set of
beliefs or way of life. Reality and rationality are relative then.
No single form of either can be used to judge another for there is
virtually nothing that they can be said to share.
Such readings of Winch are not uncommon. Yet I believe that they
ignore important parts of Winch's argument. These are not just
qualifications to the above claims but points that lead one to see
Winch's argument in a substantially different light. I would also
argue that these ignored dimensions render Winch's argument more
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plausible than that of many of his critics, specifically more
plausible than Mollis'.
The reading given above juxtaposes its own view of rationality vis
a vis Winch in the following way. Winch believes, it is said, that
there are no standards of rationality and reality that are common to
all ways of life. Anything, then, can be interpreted as rational, if
anything can be interpreted as rational then the concept is
impoverished; it no longer can play the critical role for which it was
originally intended. "The result is again to make all action rational
and so to rob us of any hope that a man's real reasons will, under
certain conditions, yield the explanation of his actions."^® To say
then that this or that action is rational is to say nothing about it
on this account.
Competing theories of rationality, on the other hand, because they
require that actions, beliefs, etc. conform to the minimal rules of
logic, promise to offer more fully developed concept of rationality
according to their proponents. To say that a belief or an action is
rational or irrational in this sense is to convey a certain amount of
information about the action or belief, (e.g. that it does not
contradict other beliefs, etc.).
This interpretation of the debate between winch and rationalists
is not quite accurate, however, winch does not deny that there are
certain minimal criteria of rationality. Indeed, the concept of
rationality is, for Winch, central to language per se: "Rationality
is not just a concept in a language like any other; it is this too,
for, like any other concept it must be circumscribed by established
use: a use that is established in language. But I think it is net a
concept «hich a language may, as a matter of fact, have and equally
not have, as is, for instance, the concept of politeness. It is a
concept necessary to the existence of any language: to say that of a
society that it has a language is also to say that it has a concept of
rationality."^^
Although the concept of rationality must be "circumscribed by
established use" this does not mean that concepts of rationality in
different languages or ways of life can be totally different, in fact
Winch insists that their use of language must have some features that
are similar to what we would call rational, i.e. to our concept of
rationality. "There need not perhaps be any word functioning in its
language as 'rational' does in ours but at least there must be
features of its members' use of language analagous to those features
of our use of language which are connected with our use of the word
•rational'. Where there is a language it must make a difference what
is said and this is only possible where the saying of one thing rules
out, on pain of failure to communicate, the saying of something
else."^° We could not say that this or that culture has a language
unless there were features of the language that resemble what we would
call rational. But that is not because there is a concept of
rationality that we entertain that is superior to others, it is not a
case of it being our concept of rationality so much as it is a
question of the requirements that any language must meet. The
mistake, from Winch's standpoint, is for us to assume that we have a
monopoly or some special access to this notion of rationality.
This in itself would seem to indicate that Winch has been
misinterpreted by many on the problem of rationality. But Winch
actually takes his argument concerning rationality one step further.
TO say that to have a language is to have a concept of rationality,
and then also to say that there must be similar uses if a language
between different languages that constitute a concept of rationality,
is to say not only must some uses of language be the same but that
different cultures must think about their language in similar, though
not identical, ways. Many of Winch's opponents argue that this
consists of the minimal rules of logic that Mollis outlines. As we
have pointed out Winch is not denying that there must be common
features to languages of different cultures. What he is saying is
that the criteria of logic are by themselves insufficient for making
judgements of rationality: "the forms in which rationality expresses
itself in the culture of a human society cannot be elucidated simply
in terms of the logical coherence of the rules according to which
activities are carried out in that society. For, as we have seen,
there comes a point when we are not even in a position to determine
what is and what is not coherent in such a context of rules, without
raising questions about the point which following those rules has in
society. And again later when discussing judgements of
rationality, "First, as I have indicated, these possibilities are
limited by certain formal requirements centering around the demand for
consistency. But these formal requirements tell us nothing about what
in particular is to count as consistency, just as the rules of
prepositional calculus limit, but do not themselves determine what are
to be proper values of P, Q, etc. We can only determine this by
investigating the wider context of life in which the activities are
carried on."^^
^^^^^ addition to the formal rules of
consistency, know what counts as a particular instance of something.
Before I can say that in an alien culture, persons x, Y and z are
believed to be witches, I must know what it means for someone to be a
witch, what the point behind witchcraft is, and what the rules of
evidence are regarding that way of life.
If the argument to this point has been correct, then far from
offering an impoverished account of rationality Winch's concept is in
fact more fully developed and richer than those who would be content
with merely the requirements of formal logic. The latter fail to take
into account the fact that the formal rules of logic tell us nothing
about the meaning of particular beliefs or statements.
This problem is particularly troublesome for Mollis. His attempt
to establish an objective standard of rationality in terms of some set
of real interests would, I think, undermine his attempt to take into
account the importance of any social context. It will be remembered
that Mollis tries to establish a way of judging the rationality of
goals as well as the rationality of means. If certain goals can be
shown to be expressive of what I take to be my self-identity, then it
is rational for me to adopt and pursue them, in addition we can, in
principle, establish the one best way to achieve these goals, he
claims. But what is not clear still is what he means precisely by an
objective standard of rationality, i.e. how we would determine that
some goals or forms of expression are objectively rational or how such
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goals cculd be truly expressive of something that a person essentially
IS.
For example, it may be the case that in the nineteenth century as
a member of the working class it would have been rational for me to
pursue a way of life in hopes of building, both personally for my own
family and collectively with others for our progeny, a better life for
them. The evidence available at the time would have been convincing
enough to indicate that my sacrifice could result in a better life for
them. As I work to make the economic pie bigger, so to speak, i am
working for the well-being of my offspring and their children. I can
sacrifice now, and rationally so, so that my children will not have to.
Such a vision, though once rational, appears somewhat less
rational today, in a society in which such sacrifices are sometimes
scorned by those in whose name they are made, or if not scorned, in a
society in which it appears that such a sacrifice is unlikely to
secure for my offspring a life free from the pressures and condition
that I presently face, to commit oneself to such a culture of
sacrifice seems self-defeating. In other words, goals, beliefs or
ideas that appear rational in one time and place may appear irrational
at a different time because of the social developments of that
society. Certain types of self-identity will appear rational in one
social setting because, among other things, they are sustainable and
the expectations (i.e., roles, duties, obligations, responsibilities,
etc.) that go along with them are in my power to meet. However a
different social position or historical situation may make the
adoption of those same types of self-identity impossible to sustain or
make it impossible for .e to .eet those expectations that are tied to
it. in the first instance my adoption of that sustainable, attainable
self-identity appears (at least at first glance) rational; in the
second instance my adoption of a self-identity that is unsustainable
or unattainable appears less rational. The import of this point is
that self-identity is more context or socially dependent than Mollis
seems willing to admit. Thus it is not clear how Hollis- objective
standard of rationality would account for the changing conditions of
an individual in the situation described above. It seems that he
cannot simply say that the goals that are rational in one society or
time in history are irrational in another. That implies relative
standards of rationality which he adamantly denies are acceptable.
This dilemma is forced on Mollis because his method for securing what
he believes is a strong rational actor eliminates any historical
dimension from that actor's real interests. I think this is the price
he pays for a notion of
-real interests' with the type of distance he
is pursuing.
On the other hand, someone adopting Winch's structures regarding
rationality could more easily (though not necessarily without
difficulty) explain and account for the fact that what appeared
rational in one contest appears irrational in another. Winch, aware
of the connection between rationality and the possibilities presented
in a way of life, could account for the changes that might take place
between historical periods and thereby explain why a personal identity
and personal way of life that seemed so attractive at one point in
time might seem unsustainable, self-defeating, or irrational at
another point in time. But it is unclear what alternative forms of
explanation and evaluation are available to Winch in the event the
actions of participants fail to live up to their own standards of
rationality. Nor is Winch totally convincing except to sympathetic
readers that his account of rationality is not in the end of form of
relativism, winch does say that the phenomena of birth, sex and death
provide the threads around which we can weave comparisons of standards
of rationality, but he provides no hint as to what this might look
like. The range of beliefs about birth, sex and death found in
different cultures seems to repose the problem of what can be
considered rational or what it would mean to say the beliefs of a
certain culture about birth, sex and death were rationally held.
Rational explanation and cau<^?^1ity. Throughout his writings Mollis
emphasizes that one of his goals is to provide an alternative of sorts
to causal explanation. Explanation in causal terms, though it has its
strengths, namely its single mode of explanation according to Mollis,
lacks a self to appy the explanation to. Because of its deterministic
tendencies, causal explanation denies a place to human autonomy.
However, there remain a variety of ambiguities in both Mollis'
intentions as to what he is proving and his account of his alternative.
First, it is not quire clear what Mollis means when he says he is
offering an alternative to causal explanation. At times one gets the
impressions that causal explanation is to be replaced altogether. One
must accept either Mollis' theory of explanation with its active
conception of man or side with the determinists and their plastic
conception of rnan. ^ere is no ground in the middle, no compromise
between the two modes of man and hence no compromise between the two
types of explanation. He says,
.'in the broadest terms, passive and
active conceptions vie with one another, each requiring a different
model of explanation and each model of explanation presupposing a
(different) view of human nature. "^^ And elsewhere, while
addressing the same issue: "i undertake to show that there can be no
compromise and to propose a notion of the autonomous self together
with its missing mode of explanation."^^
At other times one gets the impression that Hollis sees the two
types of explanation as complimentary. One should try to explain as
much as possible using the model of rational action. When this fails
one can turn then to causal explanation, m this latter case the only
problem with social science is that it has allowed the net of causal
explanation to be cast a bit too far. It isn't that causal
explanation is an illegitimate form of explanation for social action.
It's just that it has been used to describe action that could more
accurately be described by other means. As long as social theorists
recognize the limits of it and the place of rational explanation, no
harm has been done.
I will consider both of these possibilities together. I shall try
to show that in both cases Hollis fails to meet his own requirements
for limiting the scope of causal explanation and its plastic model of
and that according to his own arguments his form of rational
:planation would have very little purchase in explaining social life.
It is part of Hollis' argument that in order for his form of
man
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rational explanation to succeed as an alternative to forms of
explanation that assume a plastic view of man, he must offer a strong
notion Of personal identity. As we have earlier outlined, by a strong
notion of personal identity he means one in which the identity of
actors can not be said to be determined by the social or natural
environment.
Mollis tries to supply a strong notion of personal identity,
without falling into pre-social atomism, by arguing that individuals
can retrospectively evaluate their positions and roles in society and
thereby determine which are expressive of themselves. Having done
this, we can say that an actor has autonomously chosen his own
identity, and we can then evaluate to what extent his actions are
rational in terms of his choice of personal identity. The latter can
be determined objectively, for social theorists will be able to
determine, according to Mollis, the single best course of action for
the individual in question. However, there are several objections
that Hollis must meet before such an account of social explanation can
be convincing.
First, it is unclear just how a theory of human nature will
influence the choice of personal and social identity. At times Hollis
states that human nature must be ahistorical, to say that it changes
with cultures is to fall into a form of relativism that Hollis finds
unacceptable, if human nature is a constant the question that arises
is what is it that individuals reflectively and autonomously choose
amongst. It would seem that a good deal, if not all, of their
personal identity is already determined. If human nature is as
constant as Mollis seems to believe, then only those things that are
consonant with that nature can be expressive of my nature and hence
much of my own personal identity. Such a view is far from the
autonomous individual that Mollis seeks to defend from naturalism.
The second point that Mollis must consider when making an argument
for a stront notion of personal identity is that individuals placed in
different social contexts in which the range of possible
self-interpretations are not identical may make different choices
regarding their roles and choice of social action, if range and
actual choice of self-interpretation varies with different
contemporary social contexts, then it seems that any notion of
self-identity is going to be more socially dependent than Mollis
admits.
For example, it is conceivable that an individual placed in a
society in which personal worth, recognition, security for one's
family, and the availability of life chances were dependent upon
individual achievement and personal wealth would rationally adopt a
personal identity consonant with that environment, particularly if
alternatives were seen as foolishly self-sacrificing, a sign of
weakness, or a sign of inability. On the other hand, in a society in
which unbridled personal ambition and individualism are seen as
evidence of evil, a distorted personality, or a disruption of one's
relationship with family and friends, a significantly different
personal ide'^tity would likely to be rationally adopted by the same
individual. Mollis has no way of explaining this variability of
different identities. Mis notion of objective real interests seems to
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leave little room for maneuver between significantly different
cultures or historical periods.
in other words, reflective evaluation of the alternatives
available to one will not then necessarily yield a single rational
Choice. Rational individuals could disagree, or a single rational
individual could, after different experiences, chose differently, m
each case the choice would be influenced, though not necessarily
determined, by the evidence and range of alternatives avilable.
Mollis seems to recognize this at times, m several places he
Claims that the self, because it is a social self, is the result of
self definition within a range of shared meanings. But this means, at
the very least, that self-inteipretations not available within, or
excluded from any particular web of meanings, are either unavailable
to an actor or irrational if adopted, if this is true then my
self-identity is at least in part constrained by the meaning available
to me in my language. One does not have to agree that language is a
prison-house to recognize that it exerts a limiting effect. But to
recognize this inhibiting influence is to abandon the claim for the
strong notion of personal identity such as Mollis wants as well as to
abandon the strong claim that human nature is a historical constant.
Since Mollis' theory of objective rationality is intimately bound to
this type of strong notion of personal identity, the possibility of
achieving the goal of his form of rational explanation is subsequently
imperiled.
I think that the crux of Mollis' problem is that in order to
connect the strong notion of personal identity to the social roles and
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context that
.a.e that identity a social identity, he needs what has
been described as an expressivist view of language. This
interpretation of language sees language not just as a tool or sign
syste. for designating and identifying the external world. Language
does perform this function. But .ore importantly the expressivist
view of language sees language as the medium through which we become
aware of our ideas, feelings and sensations; it is the phenomena that
makes reflection on those ideas, feelings and sensations possible.
But this view of language insists that language is also a the property
of a community and not the tool or instrument of a private individual
as Mollis believes it can be and needs to be. As we shall see in the
last chapter, it is the expressivist view of language that provides
the type of strong evaluation that would be the hub of Mollis' strong
notion of personal identity; but at the same time it precludes the
private rules and type of distance from language and ways of life that
Mollis insists are the foundation of Autonomous Man.^^
The final objection to Mollis- theory of explanation concerns the
accuracy of Mollis' model of rational explanation as an actual
description and explanation of what actually occurs. At one point he
admits that his choice of Autonomous Man as the metaphysical basis for
rational explanation is not grounded on a claim of what is actually
the case. Me says, "... I propose to take Autonomous Man as not a
description but, so to speak, a prescription, in as much as all
social theories presuppose a view of human nature, an active
conception holds that men are potentially autonomous. Yet not
everyone succeeds in acting autonomously all the time - not all social
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action can be explained negatively. And elsewhere he states:
"I want tc suggest finally and fleetingly that the free social
individual is the .an who creates his own social identity by acting
rationally within a consistent role-set of his own choosing and
becomes what he has chosen by accepting his 'duties' as his duties
Few .en take this course and few societies offer it."" The import
cf such remarks is that Hollis' ideal of rational or normative
explanation seems to have little in common with how men usually act in
social life. If this is the case, if rational explanation is what
Mollis would like tc see rather than what actually occurs, and if
"Whatever is beyond the scope of the ideal is fair game for a causal
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account.", then it seems that much of what occurs in social life
must be explained precisely by that model of explanation that Hollis
seeks to reject, i.e. causal explanation, if m fact few societies
offer the alternative of acting autonomously (and therefore
rationally, according to Hollis), and if few men take that alternative
when it is offered it seems to follow from the way Hollis has set up
the choice of alternatives that his form of rational explanation has
failed to supplant causal variants relying on plastic conceptions of
man. in some respects Hollis has made a better case for his opponents
than he has for himself. For he has said in so many words that one
must choose between the two types of explanation, and yet his, he
admits, describes (at best) only occasional instances of social life.
It would seem to follow from this that one would be better off using a
causal model of explanation exclusively (if in fact there can be no
compromise between the two forms of explanation) or at least using
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causal explanation as the primary form of explanation.
These Shortcomings of Hollis' account of rational action and
explanation can he traced, in part, to the nature of choice that
Hollis seems to believe is available to actors. There seems to be a
tension in Hollis between his recognizing the necessity of at least
some limits to choice and the desire to be able to break those
limits, in the end Hollis opts for the latter. Hence, Hollis. theory
Of Autonomous Man is the actor who not only chooses between
alternatives but who determines the alternatives as well; it is a
theory of radical choice. But surely any order implies some limits,
allowing some possibilities and not others, without such limits it'is
difficult to imagine how Hollis' rational actor's choice can be
anything other than the exercise of pure will. The fact that in the
end this view of man in unsustainable, coupled with the way Hollis
sets up the alternatives between rational explanation and causal
explanation, almost guarantee that causal explanation will appear as
the more convincing alternative.
Real interests and autonomy. As a model of explanation Hollis posts
an actor who has a set of rationally arrived at goals. What makes
these goals rational is that they correspond or are consistent with a
set of real interests that are attached to th actors social roles, the
latter of which is are expressive of the actor's self, in Hollis'
words, a person "has good reasons only if he acts in his ultimate
interests. His ultimate interests derive from what he essentially
is. What he essentially is depends partly on what is essential to
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being any person and partly pn what is essential to his being that
particular person...^O The latter, presumably, are In part the real
interests that are attached tc
.y rcle which I have reflectively
determined tp be expressive pf myself. Thus, pnce I reflectively
decide that being an academician is expressive of my self, it can be
determined what my real interests are regardless of what I may think
them to be. Similarly, to say that I have certain ultimate interests
by the very nature of my being a person, and then to add that this
^sn nature is ahistprical, is to say that It is unaffected by what
my beliefs about myself are.
Mollis admits that the question of real or ultimate interests
Shades into the area of ethics and the Good Society. But he
repeatedly hesitates to enter into a discussion of what that Good
Society looks like, admitting that such a discussion is nonetheless
necessary for a complete social theory
.
in sum, Autonomous Man is the individual who acts rationally, a
person acts rationally by acting in their real or ultimate interests
determined by the roles that are expressive of one's self and an
unspecified, ahistorical human nature. There is a link between
autonomy and real interests: acting autonomously is dependent upon
(consists of) acting to fulfill my real interests.
There are two related objections to this account of real interests
and autonomy. The first is that the nature of this reflective process
that would enable one to rationally determine what is self-defining or
expressive is still very unclear. This is exemplified by the fact
that although he chides winch for making man always subject to public
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rules and supposedly leaving no roo. for distance fro. rules, and
therefore no roo. for personal autonomy, he hi.self states that
-i
confess to believing that there can be no self where all rules are
Played with distance.... In this sense
.an is a social ani.al. But,
given existing social forms to play without distance is to be
passive. The free .an therefore distances himself from the outward
aspects of his roles, while choosing and commiting himself to real
roles whose duties are among his motives...^^ Presumably these
•real' roles are not social roles, otherwise the distance they are
supposed to provide would disappear. But this still leaves unanswered
a myriad of questions about such real roles, without further
elaboration it is not clear how Hollis' autonomous individual has any
more distance than Winch's rule-governed agents.
At times Hollis- version of Autonomous Man looks alarmingly like
Englightenment versions of the human subject and freedom, immune to
religious and cosmologically imposed identity, the subject of the
Enlightenment is self-defining and self-causing. He looks to neither
religious dogma nor to established tradition to find meaning and
purpose for this life; he provides it himself. In its most extreme
version, the Enlightenment subject makes the existence of God
epistemologically dependent upon himself. However, as Charles Taylor
has pointed out, "The self-defining subject of modern epistemology is
thus naturally the atomic subjectivity of the psychology and politics
which grew out of the same movement. "^^ This atomistic view of
psychology and politics with its implicit mechanistic and technocratic
approach to social life is precisely what Hollis seeks to avoid. For
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the latter is as much a threat to Autonomous Man as the
oversocialization that Hollis feels result-, f.om . • •l i ults from explaining human
Classical Enlightenment trap, it see.s he wants the autoncy that the
Enlightenment
.s episte.ologlcal subject has without the atc.istic
'
mechanistic approach to psychology and politics that accompanied it.
TO salvage the strong version of autonomy without having to
transport the baggage of atomism into his social theory Mollis
introduces what he takes to be a strong version of personal identity,
albeit one that is in the end the identity of a social self, yet this
version of personal identity that he settles for rests upon an
approach to language that is more closely allied with the winchian
position than the view of autonomy that Hcllis seems intent on
defending.
As we pointed out earlier, Hollis thinks that his version of
Autonomous Man is imperiled unless rock bottom explanation rests with
some version of private rules that allow the subject to be
self-causing and self-defining. But to avoid the atomism that plagues
some political theories (e.g., the old Enlightenment position) he
imports a theory of personal identity that assumes a social context,
shared meanings, and which is arrived at through reflective evaluation
that can only be partial at any given time. Thus, I can only evaluate
my personal identity in terms of the array of roles and meanings
available to me within a given social context. Even then i can only
evaluate some of my roles or part of my identity in terms of other
roles and meanings at a given time. To be able to evaluate all the
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roles and meanings available to me at once would require that I be
able to place myself completely outside of my social context and
language, and not even Mollis believes this to be oossible.
But this version of personal identity undermines his claim that
explanation must, in the end, rest with some version of private rules
and is amazingly similar to the Winchian claim that all specifically
human behavior is governed by rules that can only be developed in
contact with social life, in fact this view of personal identity
seems to rest upon an expressivist approach to language that
characterizes the Winchian (and similar) positions. But if Mollis is
going to accept the expressivist approach to language and pin his
hopes for a notion of personal identity on it, he will have to revise
his view of the relationship of Autonomous Man to social rules and
language.
But perhaps more disturbing than this incoherent view of autonomy
and personal identity is the threat to freedom that Mollis' account of
real interests poses. When one ties a notion of real or ultimate
interests, which have implications for some broader notion of the Good
Society, with an epistemologically privileged position of the social
theorist, new tendencies emerge that represent a new threat to freedom
and autonomy. Its most extreme version is described by Hegel in the
dialectic of Absolute Freedom and Absolute Terror. There Hegel argues
that the Terror of the French Revolution is the necessary outcome of
the Enlightenment and its view of itself. The Enlightenment sees
itself as a universal rational consciousness that can determine what
is universally just. This is not arrived at by an aggregation of
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particular or individual views or interests. It is arrived at by pure
insight on the part of the universal knowing subject. The universal
knowing subject tries to transform the world according to Its
universal reason. This Hegel calls Absolute Freedom: rational
subjectivity unencumbered by reality outside of itself. It refuses to
recognize the legitimacy of any dissenting view or the truth of any
independent reality.
Practically speaking, this means that all individuals must will
the same thing. The universal rational subject cannot tolerate
different realities of interpretations of reality or independent
structures outside of this universal will. Otherwise the claim to
universality is threatened. That which is at odds with, or those who
disagree with the universal will, are portrayed as representing
particular wills, i.e. they are self-interested, opposed to the
universal or general interest.
But such universality is, according to Hegel, impossible. The
universal, rational will, in order to become actual, must find
embodiment in a single individual or group. But no single individual
or group could ever have the total knowledge that is claimed the
universal will has. Triose who represent themselves as the universal
knowing subject are merely a particular group or faction which usurps
the position of u'^iversal consciousness that excludes others. In
Hegel's words:
Just as the individual self-consciousness does not find
itself in this universal work of absolute freedom qua
existent substance, so little does it find itself in the
deeds proper and individual actions of the will of this
freedom. Before the universal can perform a deed it must
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i^^^ T^°J. individuality and put at
will is only actual in TS',e ^^-T"^^^' '^^^ universal
other individuals and excluded TiTfZ °"^ ''"^"^^
and have only a limltPri ^h=.! • ^
entirety of this deed
not be a deed of the artn»? '^^^'^
Universal freedom thfff universal self-consciousness.
work nor a Seed Ihere !s°feft'f ""^'''^ "^"^^^ ^ P°="ive
it is .erelyte I^^'deltJucUon!,"" '
The result is that this false universal consciousness uses its claim
to universal reason as a justification for concerning others who it
sees as self-interested, i.e. opposed to the interest of all.
Historically, Hegel thinks the teign of Terror was the embodiment of
this. Absolute Terror is the expected (necessary for Hegel) outcome
of Absolute Freedom, i.e. the claim to universal (including moral or
ethical) knowledge.
It is important to reiterate the nature of this claim to universal
knowledge in order to understand the connection to Absolute Terror.
The claim is that the universal interest is objectively rational and
therefore achieved by pure insight, in this sense it is accessible to
all who are not captured by the dogma of religious or politically
motivated claims. Those who take issue with this universal interest
are seen as either dupes captured by the dogma of irrationality (e.g.
church or monarchy) or the knowing perpetrators of that dogma, i.e.
the clergy, aristocracy or other alleged self-interested individuals.
Once the truth is revealed by the universal knowing subject and the
mask of dogma removed and its claims disproved, opponents and critics
of the universal will must appear complicitous in the efforts of those
motivated by particular interests, and therefore morally bankrupt.
Individuals opposed to the universal will can no longer claim lack of
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-o«le.ge as tHe reason
.0. their allege. selMnterests; t.e space
for ignorance has disappeared. They ™.st either support and eo^pl,
wUh the universal will or ad.it their ccpiicit, in the ohstruction
Of the universal wiii and
.ace the political terror that results fro.
the drive to absolute freedom.
NOW I a. not claiming that Hegel's account of the dialectic of
Absolute Freedom and Terror fits Mollis, view of explanation,
rationality and autonomy perfectly. But several of the elements that
are necessary ingredients or conditions for what Hegel calls Absolute
Terror are to be found in Hollis. social theory. Specifically, he
welds an epistemologically privileged position for the theorist to a
theory of objective rationality and ultimate interests. This
combination threatens to bring substantial moral pressure, if not
outright coercion, upon individuals who act irrationally from the
point of view of Hollis' real interests to act autonomously as
determined by Mollis. At the very least it is incumbent upon Hollis
to demonstrate how his account of real interests avoids the tragedy
that Hegel claims the Enlightenment fell into.
TTiis is not to identify Hollis with the extremes of the French
Revolution. It is perhaps more a question of a tension in Mollis'
thought. He seems to want a God's eye view of the world and
alternatives for action that would allow for comprehensive criticism
of the rationality of social actors. At the same time he seems to
recognize that we must start with social roles that are embedded in a
web of relationships and from this attempt to achieve greater, more
complete forms of reflection. But when push comes to shove, he
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sacrifices the latter for the former. Hence, i think he leaves
himself open to the criticism that he falls into the trap Hegel
claimed plagued the Enlightenment.
A theory of authority extrapolated
. Hollis nowhere outlines a theory
Of authority. But we can extrapolate from his view of rationality and
autonomous man. Of the several thinkers we will examine, Hollis comes
closest to the pure Enlightenment view of the relationship between
autonomy and tradition. Although the social roles available to actors
are the raw material of reflection, Hollis believes that actors can
rationally determine their real interests if provided sufficient
distance from those roles. Given this view of the relationship
between autonomy, reason and social roles, Hollis would be led to deny
any claim that authority and a way of life on the one hand and
autonomy and rationality on the other are identical, complementary, or
consistent with each other. Authority, either that of a way of life
and tradition or that of an individual or office, sets limits on the
range of reflection and alternatives for action available to agents.
It is the imposition of an external will, policy or constraint that is
not necessarily consistent with my real interests. Hence, authority
in any form would be antithetical to the very notion of Autonomous Man.
The necessity of authority
. An alternative account of authority and
its relationship to autonomy is available from Winch's account of
rule-governed behavior, winch claims that what distinguished human
society from other types of life is that the former is based on
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communication, speech and mutual understanding. Because of this one
can only give a complete account of human social life by considering
the way in which concepts, ideas and beliefs enter into social
relations. The pivotal role that concepts play in constituting social
action means that it is a rule governed activity. To engage in a rule
governed activity one must be able (at least tacitly) to distinguish
between a right and wrong way of doing things. This right and wrong
way of doing things is never simply determined subjectively. I can
not capriciously use concepts nor capriciously determine the meanings
of my actions. Rather, the possible meanings that a word or action
can have are partly determined by the intersubjective rules that
govern that particular mode of speech or type of activity. To insure
that one's actions conform to these intersubjective rules necessitates
an appeal to authority according to Winch. "All characteristically
human activities involve a reference to an established way of doing
things. The idea of such an established way of doing things in its
turn presupposes that the practices and pronouncements of a certain
group shall be authoritative in connection with the activity in
64question." For example, one who wishes to learn chess will appeal
to the authoritative pronouncements of a chess master regarding the
rules governing not only the mechanics of the game but also how to
conduct the best opening, middle and closing parts of the game.
This account of the relationship of authority to human action
leads Winch to conclude that authority does not stand in an external
(i.e. causal) relation to human action. The relationship of authority
to human action is an internal one. One cannot engage in
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rule-governed (and hence specifically hu.an) activity without at the
same ti.e accepting the exercise of see authority.
.-The acceptance
Of authority is not just something which, as a matter of fact, you
cannot get along without if ycu want to participate in rule-governed
activities; rather to participate in rule-governed activities is in a
certain way, to accept authority ."^^ The relationship between human
action and authority is not contingent; without authority there could
be no meaningful human action for Winch.
Winch's second, and perhaps even more controversial, conclusion
flows directly from his argument concerning the relationship and
necessity of authority to social life, in order to be able make an
autonomous, rational choice one must be able to consider reasons for
and against the actions, belief or idea under consideration. To know
what constitutes a good reason for doing something presupposes a
knowledge of the rules that guide that activity and the point behind
that form of life: "reasons are intelligible only in the context of
the rules governing the kind of activity in which one is
participating."^^ And as was pointed out earlier Winch argues that
the notion of a rule presupposes the existence and necessity of
authority. It follows that if it is only in the context of rule
governed activity that it makes sense to evaluate, accept and reject
reasons; and if this deliberation concerning reasons is itself and
intrinsic part of exercising autonomy or freedom of choice, it follows
then that "it is only in the context of rule governed activities that
it makes sense to speak of freedom of choice, to eschew all rules -
supposing for a moment that we understood what that meant - would not
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be to gain perfect freed™, but to create a situation in „Mch the
notion Of freedo. could no longer find foothold.... the acceptance of
authority is conceptually inseperable fro. participation in
rule-governed activities. It follows that this acceptance is a
precondition of the possibility of freado. of choice. Somebody who
said that he was going to renounce all authority in order to insure
that he had perfect freedom of choice would thus be contradicting
himself ."^^
It is critical that we understand precisely the point that winch
is making here. He is not making the more common argument that
authority is legitimate because it is something we voluntarily agree
to subject ourselves to and that it is this voluntary aspect of
authority that distinguishes it from power, coercion, etc. winch is
making the more radical claim that because human action is
characterized by its rule governedness, it is necessarily subject to
authority and it is only in this context of this authority that one
can exercise freedom of choice at all. in fact, from winch's
perspective, without authority there can be human action at all, free
or otherwise.
From this account of human action and authority in general winch
derives the following conclusions concerning political authority. No
rule governed activity exists in a social vacuum. There will always
be other groups and the actions of each social group has potential
effects on some or all of the other groups. One can go so far as to
say that since the ideas, concepts and beliefs and rules that help
make up a way of life or social group are expressions of ideas about
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realuy (including or particularly social reality, that the existence
Of any one group presupposes the existence of particular other groups
cr other groups in general, since conflict
.ay arise between or
amongst various social groups, there
.ust be a .eans of resolving
these conflicts. It follows that even though one does not .ake a
deliberate choice to accept existing political authority in the way
that one chooses to accept the authority of a chess
.aster, the very
nature of hu.an, i.e. rule-governed activity, requires or presupposes
some political authority: "the fact that one is a human social being,
engaged in rule-governed activities and on that account able to
deliberate and to choose, is in itself sufficient to co^it one to the
acceptance of legitimate political authority. jt is political
authority that interprets the rules for adjudicating between
conflicting groups; political authority determines the right and wrong
way of resolving conflict.
Winch recognizes that it is in politics that there is often
disagreement over the right and wrong way of proceeding or of
resolving conflict. But it is because of this that political
authority is bound by the expectation that it can justify its actions
as the right thing to do. In other words political authority, when
challenged, must appeal to some normative standard. Once those in
political authority cease to justify their actions as being in
conformity with some set of norms that are (at least tacitly)
collectively held, it ceases to function as authority and degenerates
into power or coercion, according to Winch. Winch, however,
eventually repudiates this account of political authority, while at
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the same time maintaining that any account of poiiticai authority must
nonetheless incorporate his more general account of authority.
Critique of the Winchlan Arcn„nt of Authority
in spite of the untenability of Hollis alternative, winch's
account of authority and freedom of choice «ill not, as it stands
provide an acceptable alternative, ^ere are several problems with
Winch's argument that can be traced to the fact that he focuses on
eEistemic authority in his argument and in the examples he gives.
This leads him to assume that the triadic relationship found in
epistemic authority amongst the concepts and ideas that help
constitute a way of life, those who are said to be in authority, and
those over whom authority is exercised holds for all instances of
authority, m effect, winch violates his own Wittgenstienian
strictures in his analysis of authority. Instead of examining the
different uses of authority in different language games (e.g. chess,
education, politics, etc.), he offers a single version of authority
(i.e. epistemic authority) as paradigmatic,
-mus, all instances of
authority can be analyzed in these terms. But just as we cannot take
any single use of the concept game as the paradigm for all games, upon
which all other uses of the term game are parasitic, neither can we
expect that epistemic authority can be paradigmatic for all forms of
life in which the concept and exercise of authority is found.
This focus is the reason why winch makes the unqualified claim
that one who is placed in a position of authority, be it political.
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administrative, judicial, or otherwise, is necessarily
-an authority,'
i.e. has a certain recognized expertise concerning the area over which
he is placed in authority. This leads one to infer that there could
never, in winch's eyes, be an illegitimate exercise of authority,
indeed, it is difficult to see exactly how the question of legitimacy
would even come up. This focus also leads winch to overstate the role
of criticism in the actual exercise of non-epistemic forms of
authority.
Although I believe that Winch's argument corrects a previously
mistaken emphasis, his account of authority rests upon several
unexamined assumptions which, when scrutinized, render his account of
authority unacceptable in its pure form. Specifically, I would argue
that in order for the pure form of epistemic authority to exist six
assumptions or pre-requisites must be met:
(1) The point behind the activity or way of life must not
Itself be in question or challenged. For example, chess
novices do not contest the point behind chess.
(2) At least some of the primary or formal rules (e.g. the
rules governing the mechanics of chess or basketball)
must themselves be available to all or agreed upon by
all, although the less formal rules concerning a better
or best way to proceed might not.
(3) The 'formal test' or procedure for establishing one as
'an authority' must be relatively clear in that it is
generally known what the test consists of and the
criteria for establishing that authority are not
themselves contested severely.
(4) The criteria by which 'an authority' is determined are
themselves internally related to the activity in
question.
(5) Because epistemic authority is bound up with systems of
ideas, and because systems of ideas must be subject to
discussion and criticism, it follows that there must
66
be a multiplicity of authorities for there fn hp onpure epistemic authority at all inr 7/ to be any
or group of indiviH.mic h!; ^ individual
system Sf deaf or on the nrnn"°"°P°^^°" ^ particular
right and wrong w^Vo^' inTa^t'tl^^s^^^^^^^^^^^^
tSe correc?ness of the?.^nf ''''' ^^^^K
particular system°'of'^'deas!"°''''''''' -
(6) Those subject to a particular authority are not
po^er' n i);fruenci°''
-nipulation or'^ot^'e^Terms of
ra"panicul^"a"tivUy.'^ '''''''' ^^^^^^^^^ ^° -^^^e
When each of the above prerequisites is met we can be said to have
a pure case of epistemic authority, in other words, the
pronouncements of those in authority are taken as authoritative
because it is presumed that those in authority do in fact have greater
knowledge about the right and wrong way of going about things and
because the shared background to the enterprise gives others the
opportunity to subject those claims to some degree of critical
scrutiny (an authority is recognized ) . in such a case it can be said
that one who is
-in authority is also
-an authority and that the
exercise of such authority is consistent with the exercise of freedom
of choice. The stronger claim can also be supported, i.e. that this
sort of authority is a prerequisite for freedom of choice since it
provides the background conditions against which choices are formed.
But his set of idealized conditions does not always pertain, when
one or more of the conditions is not met, the claim to superior
insight or knowledge, though it may still be present, recedes and
other criteria become more prominent. For example, during the early
stages of the Viet Nam War, those in political authority in the United
States justified U.S. policy in Southeast Asia as being in the
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national security of the U.S., national security which those is
political authority knew best how to determine and protect. As this
Claim became the object of criticism, the Justification for the war
eventually shifted to the President's authority to commit troops to
combat situations because of the powers vested in the President as
Commander-in ^ief of the anned forces by the Constitution, m the
first instance the Justification based on the claim to know what was
in the national interest was most prominent. But when this
Justification failed to convince an ever growing segment of the
population and the Congress as well, the more legalistic (though
Constitutionally questionable) Justification was offered.
In addition, the role of criticism and the relationship between
authority and freedom of choice may change. Ttiis is not to say that
the epistemic dimension of authority ever disappears altogether. My
argument is the more limited claim that other bases for authority
become more prominent under these conditions. To support this claim I
would like to focus on several examples of social life in which
someone is said to be -in authority and use these to demonstrate the
defects of Winch's argument.
The myopic approach to authority that Winch takes leads him to
make the claim that anyone who is 'in authority' is 'an authority'.
This can mean two things. Winch can be arguing that one who assumes
or is placed in a position of authority somehow becomes 'an authority'
on something, presumably the mode of activity or way of life that they
are said to be 'an authority' on. Or Winch can mean that a person is
only 'in authority' when he is acting as 'an authority.' Those who
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are placed in positions of authority but are not in fact 'an
authority, do not really exercise authority but exercise power,
coercion or influence. (The distinction between authority on the one
hand, and power, etc. on the other is important for winch. The former
is internally related to human action, the latter stands in external
i.e. causal, relation to it.) The first claim is empirically false.
It is not the case that all who assume positions of authority
necessarily become authorities on that particular way of life or
activity. The second claim attempts to account for authority by
definitional fiat. It is a moment of nominalism that strains against
Winchian enterprise as a whole. For it is one of Winch's claims that
to understand a concept we must understand how it is used within
particular form of life. An examination of several examples of
relationships in which authority is said to be exercised will indicate
that Winch's claim concerning the epistemic basis of all authority
needs to be modified.
The workplace and authority
. Within the workplace certain actions and
statements of owners and managers are taken by their employees as
authoritative. Decisions concerning what will be produced and what
techniques will be used in the manufacture of those products are
generally recognized by employees to be the domain of managers. At
the same time workers often dispute the wisdom or knowledge of
management concerning how the product might best be produced or
improved upon, in effect, workers often deny that management has any
monopoly on the right way of producing the good. This denial on the
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part Of workers has several dimensions to it. First, management and
workers perceive the activity of work differently, while there may he
some overlap concerning the point of their enterprise, both parties
alsc^in part, perceive the workplace as having different instrumental
uses. Hence, there is less than total agreement between workers
and managers on the point or purpose behind the workplace. Secondly,
all the criteria for determining who will and will not be placed in a
position of authority are not internally related to the activity in
question. Managers are often hired less for their knowledge of the
right and wrong way of producing this or that good than for their
ability to control wage demands, increase profits, etc. Finally, many
social theorists would argue that the structure of modern capitalist
economy is such that the threat of unemployment and the lack of
alternatives concerning the organization of production makes the
participation on the part of workers in the economy less than
voluntary. The choices available to them are severely restricted.
They do not voluntarily participate in the production process in the
way that one voluntarily takes up chess.
In spite of the fact that conditions (1), (A) and (6) that we
established for epistemic authority are not met, it would be
inaccurate to describe the relationship between managers and workers
as one of merely power or coercion. Workers do recognize the
authority of managers in the workplace but not because of any
epitemological privilege that managers are thought to have but rather
because managers are in the position of ownership or represent those
who are. Hence, although managers may not be recognized as 'an
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authority, by workers they are nonetheless recognized as being
authority' by them.
family life and authority
. The second example is taken from the
family, undoubtedly most people entertain ideas about the right and
wrong way to raise children. Yet in modern American society it cannot
be said that there is a single set of identifiable rules that each
parent must conform to similar to what we might find in a less
complex, more ritualized culture. Not just the techniques, but the
goals of child rearing are themselves not widely agreed upon.
Nonetheless, except in the most extreme cii.:umstances (e.g., actual
threats to the child's welfare that can be classified as violations of
more general crimes), even when we deny the appropriateness of the
techniques, knowledge or even motives of a particular parent
concerning childrearing, that parent's authority to -bring his/her
children up as he/she sees fit- is still accepted and recognized.
This recognition of authority certainly does not rest on a recognition
of their knowledge of the right way to bring up children, in fact
their authority may be defended by some who nonetheless view the
parents in question as poor parents.
In such a situation the legitimacy of the parents authority in
rearing their own children is based on their position as natural
parents. This is not to say that we deny altogether that they might
have some correct knowledge about how to rear their children; but to
the extent that we claim this privileged position for them we do so
not so much because of some formal test but because of the fact that
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thay occupy a certain (biological) position with respect to their
particular children.
Legal authority
.
The final example is taken fro. the American legal
system, in most instances in the United States judges are appointed
by elected officials. Though no formal criteria exist concerning the
expertise or knowledge of the law, it is generally expected that
nominees to such positions will have foi^al training in law and will
have been engaged in some occupation with the law or government
indicating a greater knowledge of law than the average layman might
have. However, in a number of areas in the United States judges are
not appointed and subject to the above expectations, but are elected
themselves by popular vote, in many of these elections the
requirements or expectations concerning formal legal training of the
candidates are nill. At best only a very limited case could be made
that the voters require any expertise concerning the law.
Nonetheless, the pronouncements of elected judges are taken to be as
authoritative as those of judges who have somehow demonstrated their
legal expertise. In such cases the mere occupation of the position is
taken as sufficient warrant to recognize the judge as in authority
regarding the law. This is not to say that knowledge of the law as a
determinant of authority disappears altogether. Such judges are still
expected to act in accordance with the law. But it is to say that the
requirement of superior knowledge as the legitimation of one's legal
authority has slipped into the background and the occupation, via
election, of formal position is thrown into relief.
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It would see. then that Winch's account of authority is unable to
account for how the concept of authority is actually used in various
form of life. For some social theorists this would pose only a
minimal problem. But because Winch believes that in order to
understand a particular concept or idea one ,„ust examine the place
that it has in a particular culture or way of life, this represents a
serious problem for him.
An additional problem with Winch's focus on epistemic authority,
the legitimacy of which is dependent on its being potentially subject
to critical scrutiny, is that it overestimates the facility with which
criticism may emerge. First, the focus on pure forms of epistemic
authority tends to ignore the exclusive nature of some tyes of
authority, in the case of pure empistemic authority, all who can
demonstrate knowledge of a particuar activity are said to be an
authority on that subject matter or activity. Hence, in chess there
is no theoretical limit to the number of persons who might be said to
be authorities on chess. The existence of the one authority on chess
(or the English language, philosophy, American politics, etc.) does
not exclude the possible existence of other authorities. It may even
be the case that those who are recognized as authorities differ in
their pronouncements on a particular subject. For example, there may
be different interpretations of the strength of the Presidency in
American politics, each requiring that the other interpretation(s) be
at least partly wrong. We might still recognize each inhterpretaton
as a reasonable, defensible interpretation of the Presidency in spite
of their disagreement, and not repudiate the one as an authority
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because of our acoeptance of another's interpretation.
However, there are .any oases where the exercise of authority is
exclusive, and the acceptance or recognition of one authority
precludes the recognition of others, importance of this point is
that in those areas of life that include multiple authorities (e.g.
Chess, academic life, etc).) the potential for criticise is great.
Winch takes this possibility for criticise and subsequent
Justification to be an important part of authority. It is crucial in
establishing its compatibility with freedom of choice as well as the
basis for distinguishing it from power, coercion or manipulation.
This is not to say that those who occupy exclusive positions of
authority do not need to Justify their actions. it does mean is
that Where exclusive forms of authority exist, i.e. where the
knowledge required for the right to declare what is the right way of
going about something is available to only one or a limited number of
people, the possibilities for those over whom authority is exercised
to critically evaluate whether or not a particular action is correct,
Just, appropriate, etc., are likely to be more (even extremely)
limited than in those areas where there are a multiplicity of
authorities, while the importance of critically evaluating that
exclusive authoriti^ possibly greater .
In such cases we tend to recognize the pronouncements of those who are
epistemologically privileged as authoritative because they are the
pronouncements of the epistemologically privileged, rather than
because they measure up to some standard of criticism that we have
concerning a way of life. Because the possibilities of criticism in
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such circumstances are U.ited, the possibilities of those In
authority trading on their authoritative positions to disguise «hat
are actually exercises of power or manipulation are greater. I do not
think that
.inch would disagree with this last point. But his account
Of authority tends to undeiplay it.
Winch's account also tends to obfuscate the meaning of concepts
that are derivitives from the term authority, i.e. authoritarian and
authoritative, for which criticism plays a less important role, when
we speak of someone's attitude as authoritarian we mean that the
individual is prone to place the actions and pronouncements of those
in authority above critical examination and discussion. The
authoritarian individual defers to those who are 'in authority' simply
because they are 'in authority'. Similarly, when we take someone's
statements to be authoritative we often mean that we accept those
statements as accurate, true, lawful, etc., without critically
examining their accuracy, truth or legality. The use of both terms
implies the suspension of judgement; a failure, refusal or inability
to engage in a critical examination of authority and a willingness to
accept that authority as legitimate without immediate justification.
While it is true that when we take a statement, action or decision as
authoritative there is often an assumption that the authority in
question is legitimate and could be justified, the use of the term
implies that critical examination has not taken place and is thought
to be unnecessary, even if only temporarily. And to describe
someone's attitude as authoritarian is to imply that one has accepted
the exercise of authority in areas of life where such acceptance is
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illegitimate or when critical examination of particular actions or
statements should have emerged but did not.
This emphasis on the possibility of critical examination and
subsequent justification threatens to collapse the concept of
authority with that of persuasion, it is true that those in authority
are sometimes put on the defensive and are pressed to justify their
decisions, statements or actions. And I would agree with winch that
the possibility of such criticism and justification is one of the
things that distinguishes authority from naked power. Nonetheless, if
those in authority are continually pressed to offer justification for
their authoritative decisions, etc., it becomes unclear how their
position is any different from those not holding positions of
authority who seek another's compliance with their decisions, etc.
'
Indeed, if an authority were always pressed for justification, we
would be tempted to say that that individual or institution had lost
his/her/its authority.
Authority and Freedom of Choice
The focus on epistemic forms of authority and the subsequent
overestimation of the possibility of critical examination lead Winch
to overstate the compatibility of authority with freedom of choice.
To say that the exercise of freedom of choice is compatible with, and
even depends upon, the exercise of some authority is quite different
from saying that the exercise of any authority is always compatible
with, or never a restraint on, any freedom of choice. I take Winch to
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be saying the former. But at times his language, as well as his
discussion Of political authority, can lead the reader to infer the
more extreme claim that every exercise of authority is always
compatible with freedom of choice. This latter claim, quite
Obviously, cannot be sustained. I might recognize the actions of a
particular individual or institution as authoritative and legitimate
even when those actions are a restriction on my freedom, i might, for
example, recognize the authority of the Federal Reserve Board to set
interests rates even if it means that, in a particular instance, such
action makes it impossible for me to buy my own home. Indeed, it
seems to be a crucial aspect of political authority, at least, that I
recognize the legitimacy of its restrictions on my freedom at
approprite times.
Winch tacitly recognizes the difficulty his discussion of
authority has accounting for restrictions on freedom of choice in his
account of political authority and his subsequent rejection of that
account. His repudiation of his own account of political authority is
itself ambivilent. He agrees with Hume, at one point, that the
authority of the state stands in an external (and therefore causal?)
relation to other social institutions. This leaves one to wonder
whether he would revise this earlier claim that authority stands in an
internal relation with social action and freedom of choice. On the
other hand, he claims that any account of political authority must
take account of what he says regarding authority in general. He also
implies that there is something of an internal relation amongst the
state, political authority and the citizen of a political community
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When he says that the state's "force and... authority are what they
the society within which they ae exercised - a concept that enters
into what subjects will and will not submit to from the state; it
manifests itself in the spontaneous life of the society, even though
its existence makes possible the impositon of certain things in a way
that would not otherwise be possible. "^^
I think that Winch's view of the relationship amongst the state,
citizens and political authority is, in part, correct, but it lacks'a
more developed concept of the common good to make it more convincing.
I think, nonetheless, that he underestimates the coercive potential of
political authority. This is not to say that he is completely wrong
regarding the relationship between political authority and freedom,
that the former is at times consistent with the latter. But his
identification of political authority with freedom of choice must be
revised. I would go further and aigue that what winch says about
political authority being tied to a notion of the state, and what
people will accept fom the state, reinforces his claim that authority
has something of an epistemic basis, but that the epistemic
legitimation of authority is only a partial basis of political
authority. If winch were to recognize that at times there is a
non-epistemic dimension to authority he would be able to give an
account of political authority that was both consistent with his
notion of authority in general and recognized the coercive potential
of political authority.
I think winch is right when he claims that the notion of the state
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enters into «hat citizens will and will not sub.it to fro. the state
in this sense political authority does stand in an internal relation
to political action. But this clai. by itself is insufficient to
support a fully developed concept of political authority. Nonetheless
it is the embryo of a more fully developed account of political
authority and its relation to the common good. As a preview of a
position I will try to defend later, I think that Winch's account of
the general concept of authority sheds light on political authority if
one looks at political authority as a triadic relationship amongst
political authority, citizens artf what can be called the common good.
CHAPTER II
,
AUTHORITY, AND PHILOSOPHICAL HERMENEUTICS
The Practical Tntent nf Ftiilosophical HPr^.n.......
It is only recently that the work of Hans-Georg Gadamer has begun
to reach a substantial audience in the Anglo-Z^erican world,
unfortunately, in spite of the increased familiarity with Gada.er,
most of the commentators on his work have come primarily from the
field of literary criticism.^ No political theorist has engaged in
a comprehensive analysis of his work, and only a few have even briefly
addressed his major arguments.^ There is something paradoxical
about this for even though his magnum opus does not appear to be an
explicitly political text on first glance, Gadamer has voiced
political aspirations for philosophical heimeneutics, the term he uses
to describe his enterprise:
I think, then, that the chief task of philosophy isto defend practical and political reason against the
*"
domination of technology based on science. That is the pointof philosophical hermeneutic. It corrects the peculiarfalsehood of modern consciousness: the idolatry of
scientific method and of the anonymous authority of the
sciences and it vindicates again the noblest task of the
citizen
- decision making according to one's own
responsibility
- instead of conceding the task to the
expert, in this respect, hermeneutic philosophy is the heir
of the older tradition of practical philosophy
.3
The explicitly political role that Gadamer claims for
philosophical hermeneutics might come as a surprise to many familiar
with Gadamer
-s work, for he does not at first glance appear to address
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explicitly pciiticai issues. Nonetheless, Ue does see a renewal of a
version of Aristotlean praotioal philosophy as one of the primary
goals of Philosophical hemeneutics, and it is against this goal that
I shall measure his effort.
The Problem of Philosophy and Everyday ' ^^<='
Perhaps the best way to begin describing Gadamer's work is to say
that it is directed at what he believes is the most important question
confronting the modern world, one that is the result of the emergence
of modern science and technology. "It is the question of how our
natural view of the world - the experience of the world as we simply
live out our lives
- is related to the unassailable and anonymous
authority that confronts us in the pronouncenents of science. Since
the seventeenth century the real task of philosophy has been to
mediate this new development of man's cognitive capacities with the
totality of our experience of life."^
Gadamer detects what he believes is a problem in this relationship
between science and everyday life. Science, he argues, has claimed an
epistemological scope and status that exceecfe what is appropriate or
legitimate. Briefly put, the claim on the part of science to an
objective form of knowledge that alone can render unassailable truth
is, from Gadamer 's standpoint, a one-sided view of the nature of
truth; science claims a monopoly on truth and knowledge that cannot be
legitimated.
Gadamer is careful to distinguish his interpretation of the
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proble. Of the relationship between science and other for.s of hu.an
life and understanding fro. what he considers to be an anti-scientific
attitude. He insists that his argument does not atte.pt to dictate to
the sciences, natural or otherwise, what type of research they should
engage in. Neither does he think that his argument has any import for
the methodological disputes within the human sciences. At one point
he says of his arguments in Truth and Method: "This does not prevent
the methods of modern natural science from having application to the
social world. Possibly the growing rationalization of society and the
scientific techniques of its administration are more characteristic of
our age than the vast progress of modern science. The methodological
spirit of science permeates everywhere. And again later, "...it
is not my intention to make prescriptions for the sciences or the
conduct of life, but to try to correct false thinking of what they
are." Such statements resemble Winch's denials of anti-scientism:
"But it should not be assumed.
. .that what I have to say must be ranked
with those reactionary anti-scientific movements, aiming to put the
clock back, which have appeared and flourished in certain quarters
since science began. My only aim is to make sure that the clock is
telling the right time, whatever it may prove to be."^ Both Gadamer
and Winch, it seems, want to be careful not to assume the role of
intellectual luddite.
Nevertheless, Gadamer does believe that the methodological
self-consciousness of the sciences has overestimated the monopoly that
science has on truth and knowledge, and thereby misunderstood the
nature of its own task and its relations to other forms of
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experience. At the very least this has resulteo in the subversion of
other for.s of experience and understanding, argues Gada.er: " the
successes df modern sciences rests on the fact that other
possibilities for questioning are concealed by abstraction...^ This
Cdnceal.ent that has taken place with the unconcealment of science is
critical according to Gadamer, for science can never provide us «ith
the knowledge that we need to answer the most important questions.
"For as triumphant as the march of modern science has been, and as
obvious as it is to everyone today that their awareness of existence
is permeated by the scientific presuppositions of our culture, human
thought is nonetheless continually dominated by questions for which
science promises no answers."^
On the practical side the effects of this misperception of the
relationship of science to other forms of life, though less explicit,
are somewhat more ominous: "...over against the whole of our
civilization that is founded on modern science, we must ask repeatedly
if something has not been omitted. If the presuppositions of these
possibilities for knowing and making remain half in the dark, cannot
the result be that the hand applying this knowledge will be
destructive?"^° Gadamer is not quite clear what form this
destruction will take. At times it appears that he believes it leads
to the impoverishment or a superficiality of human relationships. He
says, "Unavoidably the mechanical industrial world is expanding within
the life of the individual as a part of the sphere of technical
perfection. When we hear modern lovers talking to each other, we
often wonder if they are communicating with words or with advertising
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labels and technical ter.s fro. the sign language of the
.odern
industrial world. It is inevitable that ^e levelled life for.s of
the industrial age also affect language, and in fact the
impoverishment of the vocabulary is .aking enormous progress/'^^ m
other places he intimates that this growth of science could involve
new relationships of power and subordination:
"Each science, as a
science, has the field of its knowledge set out in advance, and to
have knowledge of this field is to have power over it."^^
earlier he says, "But the knowledge of all the natural sciences is
knowledge for domination."!^ it follows that if the methods
employed by the natural sciences inherently involve relationships of
power and domination over the object of knowledge, then the deployment
of such methods in the social sciences or in the social world could
result in new systems of power and subordination there as well.
The crux of the problem, from Gadamer's point of view, lies in the
fact that science does not exhaust the range of genuine experience and
knowledge of the world. Science itself is but one particular way of
approaching the world and obtaining knowledge of it. There are other
possible approaches to comprehending the world, e.g. artistic,
historical and even our everyday attitude toward the world. Though
science may ignore these other forms of experience, knowledge, and
truth, it can never replace them. Speaking of our everyday experience
of the world, Gadamer says, "but we cannot seek to remove or refute
natural appearances by the 'eyes' of scientific understanding. This
is pointless not only because what we see with our eyes has genuine
reality for us, but also because the trulti that science states is
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Itself relative to a particular attitude to the world and cannot clai.
to be the Whole. But it is language which really opens up the whole
of our attitude to the world, and in this whole of language
appearances find their legitimacy just as much as science.-^^ And
again later he states that "The
.objective situation- that science
knows, and from which it derives its own objectivity, is one of the
relativities embraced by language's relation to the world."^^ An
exhaustive account of the notions of truth, knowledge and experience
must go beyond the self-understanding science. It must adjust its
lenses so as to bring into focus the universal, linguistic
constitution of the world.
The Linguistic Constitution of the World
The short-sidedness of the scientific attitude toward the world
and its self-understanding lies in the fact that science overlooks two
constitutive characteristics of the world and our experience of it:
its historicality and its linguisticality
. The first Gadamer
describes in what he calls the principle of effective-history. The
latter in the linguistic constitution of the world. Though we shall
deal with these two characteristics of the world separately, they do
not represent separable aspects of experience for Gadamer. The world,
and our experience of it, is linguistic because it is historical and
it is historical because it is linguistic.
It is important to realize that the shortcomings that Gadamer sees
in the scientific attitude are not its failure to live up to its own
Ideal Of knowledge, but rather inherent in the nature of its procedure
and its identification of objective knowledge with knowledge^ se
unfortunately for science, the world does not have the objective
status that science claims, i.e., objective knowledge ooes not exist
independent of us. The world, claims Gadamer, exists for us as human
beings only in and through language. We have no access to the world
that is not mediated by language.
It is this linguistic experience of world that is absolute,
not the methodologically controlled, objective experience of science
or any other particular attitude toward the world. Echoing the
sentiments of Peter Winch, Gadamer says, "...in language the world
itself presents itself. The experience of the world in language is
•absolute'. It transcends all the relativities of the positing of
being, because it embraces all being- in-itself in whatever reltionship
(relativities) it appears. The linguistic quality of our experience
of the world is prior, as contrasted with everything that is
recognized and addressed as being. The fundamental relation of
language and world does not, then, mean that the world becomes the
object of language. Rather, the object of knowledge and of statements
is already enclosed within the world horizon of language. The
linguistic nature of the human experience of the world does not
include making the world into an object. ""^^ And again later, "For
man's relation to the world is fundamentally linguistic in nature, and
hence intelligible."^^ The world, as we experience it as human
beings, is available to us only through language.
The linguistic experience of the world is not meant to imply that
language is a barrier to be overcome. Cadaver's point is that it is
language that constitutes, mediates and hence ailows accessibility t
the world. "Language is not Just one of .an's possessions in the
world, but on it depends the fact that .an has a world at all. For
.an the world exists as a world in a way that no other being in the
world experiences it. But this world is linguistic in nature.-^^
It is important to emphasize the nature of Gadamer's claim. Though
his claims resemble those of Winch, his fundamental arguments cut
somewhat deeper, positing an ontological status for language:
"Language is the fundamental mode of operation of our being in the
world and the all embracing form of the constitution of the
world. There is nothing beyond language that is more fundamental
to human experience or existence in the worla.
The fundamental, ontological status that Gadamer claims for
language should not be construed as meaning that language is itself
independent of or separable from the world. There is more
interdependence between the two than that: "...language has no
independent life apart from the world that comes to language within
it. Not only is the world 'world- only in so far as it comes into
language, but language, too, has its real being only in the fact that
the world is re-presented within it. Thus the original humanity of
language means at the same time the fundamental linguistic quality of
man's being-in-the-world."^°
An example might be helpful here. As human beings we have need
for flat surfaces that enable us to eat, write, read and do a variety
of other things comfortably. Hence, we have slowly and tediously
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developed that piece of furniture known as a tabie. Though the notion
or the concept of a table is an open one. not Just anything
.ii: count
as a table. The concept of a table is 'closed, enough to allow us to
distinguish tables fro. other types of furniture, including those that
^ay also have flat surfaces (e.g., dressers, etc.). Moreover, the
concept Of a table, properly understood, allows us to distinguish good
from bad, better from worse tables.
This differentiation of various types of furniture is possible
only because of the concepts that we have to describe the oifferent
objects. But beings with a different set of needs would not
necessarily develop the same type of furniture nor the same vocabulary
to re-present that furniture in exactly the same way we do. In
effect, that part of our world that deals with furniture is available
to us only through the concepts that we have of tables, chairs,
dressers, etc. But these concepts could not have developed in a
vacuum; in part we have the concepts we have because of the various
types of furniture that fit our needs. In other words the language of
furniture developed in response to the needs that we have as the
creatures we are and those objects of furniture are available to us
(i.e., describable, useful, makeable, distinguishable, repairable,
variable, etc.) because of the concepts that we have.-^"^
Like Winch, Gadamer denies that this linguistic constitution of
the world implies what has become known as the prison-house of
language. The linguistic constitution of the world does not mean that
we are trapped within the language that we grow up in. On the
contrary, though we can never totally step out of our language, nor
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Change our language in the sa.e
.anner that we ohange our clothes, we
can nevertheless extend our language to include other attituoes and
Views of the world. Our language is always translatable into other
linguistic nature of the world that constitutes our freedom.
crVaturef L'n.f °ther livingeatures, man's relationship to the world
characterized by freedom from habitat This freedomincludes the linguistic constitution of the wo^ld Bothbelong together. To rise above the oressure nf wh.f
comes to meet us from the world means to ha e lanQuane
the world 7s 'f^r'f'' • • ^'^^^^^^^ constitutron' Of'n is a rom meaning that man's relationshio tothe world is imprisoned within a linguisticallv
an
contrary'^wJerlia^ languaged men exist, there is not only a freedom from the
iralsoMd'n' ''^^ ?he habitat
things?. ^1^22
^^^ation to the names that we give
Finally, the language that we inherit, the language that
constitutes our relationship to the world, is historically
determined. We can never escape the fact that our language has
developed in certain ways, that the concepts in it have come to have
the meaning that they have, and that certain ideas pervade that
language. This historicality of our language Gadamer calls the
principle of effective-history.
The Principle of Effective History
One of the errors of scientism, and one that accompanies its
mistaken faith in objective knowledge is that it believes that the
historical circumstances that we find ourselves in are barriers to.
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lead to Misunderstandings of, the objects of our knowledge. This
prejudice against our own history is typifia, by what Gada^er caiis
hrstoricai objectivism, which attempts to shake off the influence of
history Which it sees leading to distortions and misunderstandings of
historical Objects of knowledge. To really understand a text, the
objectivist Claims, we must forget our own values, beliefs, etc. that
have been handed down to us by tradition and influence our
understanding of the past or of a text. We must adopt the ideas and
language of the historical period we are studying, the intentions of
the author, or the world view of the particular era. The latter can
only be achieved by a sort of historical and social amnesia. A second
version, one heard less frequently today, asks us to neutralize the
influence of history by stepping outside of history altogether in
order to objectively understand the text, historical actions, or
historical era we are studying.
Both prescriptions, claims Gadamer, are ill-advised. In the first
place there is no neutral point outside of history from which we can
observe that which we wish to investigate. He says, "There is no such
thing, in fact, as a point outside history from which the identity of
a problem can be conceived within the vicissitudes of the various
attempts to solve it. It is true that all understanding of the texts
of philosophy requires the recognition of the knowledge that they
contain, without this we would understand nothing at all. But this
does not mean that we in any way step outside the historical
conditions in which we find ourselves and in which we understand."^''
If the attempt at an ahistorical neutrality is doomed to failure.
90
the suggestion that we shed dur dwn histdrical circumstances for those
Of the text under consideratidn is epualiy misleading. This approach
still assumes that we can treat the text or text-analogue (i.e.,
historical action, historical era, etc.) as an object that we cln
approach without the influence of our own traoition or prejudices. In
that respect it attempts to sidestep the question of the historicity
of understanding, it assumes that a state of historical amnesia is
possible. In contrast Gadamer argues that "True historical thinking
must take accdunt df its dwn histdricity. Only then will it ndt chase
the phantdm df an histdrical dbject which is the dbject df prdgressive
research, but learn td see in the dbject the counterpart df itself and
hence understand bdth. The true histdrical dbject is net an dbject at
all, but the unity df the dne and the dther, a relatidnship in which
exist bdth the reality df histdry and the reality df histdrical
understanding. A prcper hermeneutics wduld have td demdnstrate the
effectivity df histdry within understanding itself, I shall refer td
this as effective-histdry. Understanding is, essentially, an
effective-histdrical relatidn."^^
The first characteristic df effective-histdry is its
ineliminability. Our histdry always determines what the tdpic and
path df research will be, what questicns we ask, and what will cdunt
as a satisfactdry answer. "If we are trying td understand a
histdrical phencmendn frdm the historical distance that is
characteristic of our own hermeneutic situaticn, we are always subject
td the effects df effective-histdry."^^ We may reflect upcn dur
histdrical situaticn, but we cannct escape it.
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The problem of the objeotivist approach is that it ignores
this effectiveness of history or believes it can be neutralized
through the proper methodological procedures. But in pretending
its immunity to the effectiveness of history it does not transcend
effective-history but only conceals its own involvement in it. "But
looking at the whole situation we can see that the power of effective
history does not depend on its being recognized. This, precisely,
is the power of history over finite human consciousness, namely that
it prevails even where faith in method leads one to deny one's own
historicality."25 ^o set of methodological procedures can over-
come the effect of effective-history. Moreover, belief that
methodological procedures can overcome or make one immune to the
demands of effective-histoiy does not simply result in
self-misunderstanding, it results in error as well: "...we should
learn to understand ourselves better and recognize in all
understanding, whether we are expressly aware of it or not, the
power of effective-history is at work, when a naive faith in
scientific method ignores its existence, there can be an actual
deformation of knowledge ."^^
However, the recognitio- of the presence and influence of
effective history is itself no guarantee that the latter will be
neutralized. Though consciousness of the effects of effective history
can help prevent us from committing the errors of those who deny it or
believe they have overcome it through methodological sophistication,
this recognition does not remove us from its influence. There are two
reasons fo First, "We are always within the situation, and to
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throw light on It is a tas. that Is never entirely completed. This Is
true also of the hermeneutic situation. I.e., the situation in which
we find ourselves with regard to the tradition that we are trying to
understand. The illumination of this situation-effective-historical
reflection, can never be completely achieved, but this is not due to a
lack in the reflection, but lies in the essence of the historical
being which is ours. To exist historically means that knowledge of
oneself is never complete. All self-knowledge means that knowledge of
oneself is never complete. All self-knowledge proceeds from what is
• historically given, what we call with Hegel, 'substance', because it
is the basis of all subjective meaning and attitude and hence both
prescribes and limits every possibility of understanding any tradition
whatsoever in terms of its unique historical quality. ^^^^
we have inherited historically that is the basis for understanding.
Our historical throwness allows certain possibilities and Imposes
certain limits. The result is that there is no standpoint, no high
ground from which to view the entire tradition.
Second, since each new attempt at the understanding of that
tradition is an appropriation and re-making of it, each new attempt at
understanding part of that tradition results in a new understanding,
one different, sometimes subtly different, from the last understanding
of that same tradition.
Gadamer would, of course, deny that the principle of effective
history is reason for despair at the possibility of genuine
knowledge. Only those who still accept the scientific ideal of
objective knowledge as an absolute or as the highest form of knowledge
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will see reason for despondency. But the principle of effective
history does demand an awareness of what is involved in the
understanding of a historical object, i.e., what actually occurs in
genuine hermeneutic experience. Gadamer describes this genuine
hermeneutic experience as the fusion of horizons.
Immersed (submerged?) in history as we are, we always find
ourselves within particular historical situation. Central to the idea
of a situation is the notion of a horizon. A situation, according to
Gadamer, both presents us with possibilities and limits our field of
vision. "Hence an essential part of the concept of situation is the
concept of
-horizon'. The horizon is the range of vision that
includes everything that can be seen from a particular
standpoint. "28 g^, historical situation determines the topography
of our horizon. In addition to presenting, framing, connecting and
throwing certain problems into relief, it also deflects, refracts,
veils and hides other questions. Our historical situation determines
what questions we can genuinely ask, which will seem naive,
unproblematic, irrelevant, or obvious, and which questions we cannot
even yet formulate.
The problem of understanding, then is to extend our horizon to
include that horizon of the text or historical era that we are trying
to understand. Gadamer describes this as the fusion of horizons. But
this phrase does not accurately capture the full meaning of what
occurs in the phenomena of understanding. For this formulation
implies the separation of different horizons, historically remote ana
isolated from each other. But this is not exactly the case. As one
9A
-ght anticipate frc. Gaoa^er's discussion of tradition, there are no
irruptions, cracks, fissures, breaches, breaks or fractures between
the horizon of the present and those of the past. Rather the horizon
of the present is connected to the horizon of the past, within the
horizon of the present there are localities, perhaps on its frontiers,
that are the central viewpoints of the horizon of the past and will
be the central viewpoints of the horizon of the future. There are, in
other words, no historically isolated horizons, rather each of the
separate horizons constitutes the single tradition that we are all a
part of.
Thus, to understand something does not involve transferring
oneself out of one's own historical situation into that of another.
"When historical consciousness places itself within historical
horizons, this does not entail passing into alien worlds, unconnected
in any way with our own, but together they constitute the one great
horizon that moves from within and beyond the frontiers of the
present, embraces everything contained in historical consciousness.
Our own past, and that other past towards which our historical
consciousness is directed, help to shape this moving horizon out of
which human life always lives, and which determines it as
tradition. "^^
Thus, to place ourselves in the horizon of the past does not
involve the historical amnesia that the historicist insists upon in
his quest for objective knowledge. It means extending our horizon to
attain a broader vision of both ourselves and that which we are trying
to understand, be it a text, historical act, or historical era. "This
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Placing of ourselves is not the empathy of one individual for another
nor rs it the applioation to another person of our own oriteria, but
it always involves the attainment of a higher universality that
overcomes, not only our own particularity, but also that of
another.... To acquire a horizon means that one learns to look beyond
what is close at hand
- not in order to look away from it, but to see
it better within a larger whole and a truer proportion."^0 And
again later: "In fact the horizon of the present is being continually
formed, in that we have continually to test all our prejudices. An
important part of this testing is the encounter with the past and the
understanding of the tradition from which we come. Hence the horizon
of the present cannot be formed without the past. There is no more an
isolated horizon of the present than there are historical horizons.
Understanding, rather, is always the fusion of horizons which we
imagine to exist by themselves."'! The fusion of horizons produces
a new standpoint involving the bringing together of two different
points of view.
What Gadamer says about the fusion of horizons and the attainment
of a higher universality, a new standpoint from which to view the
past, the present, and the future, resembles Winch's prescriptions for
those who would study alien cultures. Winch argues that before we can
understand and evaluate the intelligibility of the practices, beliefs
or ideas of another culture we must extend our concepts, particularly
our concept of rationality, to include those of the culture or way of
life we are studying. "That is, we have to create a new unity for the
concept of intelligibility, having a certain relation to our old one
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and perhaps requiring a considerable realignment of our categories
we are not seeding a state in which things will appear to us Just as
they do to
.embers of S, and perhaps such a state is unattainable
anyway. But we are seeking a way of looking at things which goes
beyond our previous way in that it has in some way taken account of
and incorporated the other way that members of S have of looking at
things. Seriously to study another way of life is necessarily to seek
to extend our own
- not simply to bring the other way within the
already existing boundaries of our own, because the point about the
latter in their present form is that they ex hypothesi exclude that
other. "^2 under3t3n^i^g ^^^^^^^ ^.^^ ^^^^^^^ ^^^^^^^
requires a growth and expansion in the ideas and concepts that are
available to us from our own way of life.
Three similarities emerge between winch and Gadamer at this
point. First, both place a burden on the investigator to extend his
concepts or horizon in his efforts to understand a different way of
life or historical era. He cannot simply take his own concepts, way
of life or horizon for granted. A re-examination of what is most
familiar is one of the conditions for genuine understanding.
Second, Winch and Gadamer agree that understanding is not an act
of empathy. We cannot simply place ourselves in another historical
era or culture. Such psychologistic suggestions fail to appreciate
the linguisticality of understanding.
Finally, because understanding requires that we enlarge our ideas,
broaden our concepts, and extend our horizons, and because the world
is available to us only through the language, it follows that every
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act Of understanding is potentially productive of changes in our way
Of l.fe, how we perceive the world, and our relationships to others
TO be sure these changes are rarely, if ever, revolutionary; they are
-ost often subtle and usually unnoticed. Nonetheless, any act of
genuine understanding does result in changes in our way of life or
tradition.
The Rehabilitat.1nn nf PrPjudice. Tr.dit.'nn and Authority
Even though the ontological priority of language does not lock us
in a windowless, linguistic prison, it does nonetheless raise anew the
question of the role that prejudice, tradition and authority play in
understanding. The Enlightenment, and the scientific attituoe that it
spawned, saw prejudice, particularly that originating in faith in
authority and tradition, as a source of error. Indeed, prejudice
resulting from faith in authority was considered by the Enlightenment
to be the antithesis of reason, the failure or refusal to use one's
own reason at all. For the Enlightenment, reason, unencumbered by the
accidents of history or the dogma of authority (be it religious or
political), was to replace the prejudices of authority and tradition
as the ultimate court of appeal concerning claims to knowledge and the
ordering of human affairs. Only be freeing the human mind from the
authority, tradition and the prejudices that they perpetuated could
dependable, i.e., objective knowledge, be had. This prejudice against
prejudices can still be found in mocern historicism, rationalism ana
scientism, claims Gadamer.
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But if the rejection of prejudices supported by the authority of
tradition was necessary for the iiheration and development of
.odern
science, the rejection of ali tradition, authority and prejudice «as a
radrcal. unwarranted excess claims Gadamer. There are three reasons
for this.
The most fundamental flaw in the Enlightenment's denigration of
prejudice, particularly that resulting from authority, and the
consequent pursuit of human reason free of prejudice, is the
impossibility of achieving that ideal. The linguisticality and
historicality of our experience of the world and our existence
guarantee that we will never, can never, escape the influence of
prejudices completely. As Gadamer points out:
"...'prejudice' means
a judgement that is given before all the elements that determine a
situation have been finally examined. "^^ Since, as Gadamer points
out in his account of the linguisticality and historicality of our
experience, we can never have access to all the elements that
determine a situation because we are never totally outside of any
situation; because we can never step outside of our language and
history and treat our situation as an object, it follows that we can
never be free of the prejudices and prejudgements that make up our
situation. Gadamer defines the issue this way: "Does the fact that
one is set within various traditions mean really and primarily that
one is subject to prejudices and limited in one's freedom? Is not,
rather, all human existence, even the freest, limited ana qualified in
various ways? If this is true, then the idea of an absolute reason is
impossible for historical humanity. Reason exists for us only in
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concrete, Historical ter.s, i.e.. u is not its o«n
.aster, but
regains constantly dependent upon circumstances in which it
operates... And the circumstances in which it operates are
determined, in nart at ipocf k ^.up least, by the prejudices we inherit from our
historical-linguistic situation.
The Enlightenment
-s error went beyond merely mistaking the
dlsposibility Of prejudices. Prejudices are not merely barriers to
truth, blinders on our view of the world, or distortions of
knowledge:
...prejudice, certainly does not mean a false judgement,
but it is part of the idea it can have a positive and a negative
value."^5
,133^^^^^^ ^^^^ emphatically,
..prejudices are not
necessarily unjustified and erroneous, so that they inevitably distort
the truth. In fact, the historicity of our existence entails that
prejudices, in the literal sense of the word, constitute the initial
directedness of our whole ability to experience. Prejudices are
Simply conditions whereby we experience something - whereby what we
encounter says something to us.'.^* m short, there are legitimate
prejudices as well as illegitimate ones, prejudices that are
productive of knowledge that enable us to have access to the world.
Indeed, it is only because of these prejudices that we can have
knowledge of the world. They are the fundamental conditions of our
knowledge of the world. Gadamer puts is quite strongly:
..Jhls
recognition that all understanding inevitably involves some prejudice
gives the hermeneutic problem its real thrust.'.^'' Moreover, it is
only the recognition of the essentiality of prejudice that guarantees
the accuracy of understanding of our own historicity. .'The overcoming
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Of an prejudice, this gio5al demand of the Enlightenment, will p.ove
to be itself a prejudice, the removal of which opens the
.ay tc an
appropriate understanding of our finitude, which dominates not only
our humanity, but also our historical consciousness.-^^
The fact that there are both positive and negative prejudices,
prejudices that are productive of knowledge as well as prejudices that
constrain our experience, determines the nature of the problem of
knowledge:
formulate the central question of a truly historica/°
namp?.'''V'''
epistemologically its fundamental questionely where is the ground of the legitimacy of preluSices-^What distinguishes legitimate prejudices from all thecountless ones which it is the undeniable [ask of thecritical reason to overcome. "39
Unfortunately, we cannot determine ahead of time which prejudices
are legitimate, i.e., productive or contain truth. "The prejudices
and foremeanings in the mind of the interpreter are not at his free
disposal. He is not able to separate in advance the productive
prejudices that make understanding possible, from the prejudices that
hinder understanding and lead to misunderstanding. "^° The
legitimacy or productivity of prejudices can only be determined
retrospectively. It is only through the working out of the
forestructure of prejudice through the process of understanding and
experience that we can determine which of our prejudices are
illegitimate, wrong, constraining, and misleading, and which of our
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prejudices are accurate, legiu.ate, correct, iiiu.inating, or
encouraged openness to experience.
The working out of our prejudices to determine their legitimacy is
achieved through the hermeneutic circle. Prejudices provioe us with
what Gadamer calls, following Heidegger, the forestructure of
understanding, i.e., a set of meanings that in part determine the
possible meanings that any text or social action (sometimes referred
to as the text-analogue) can have for us. The forestructure of
understanding both enables and ccnstrains our understanding. Out of
this forestructure of understanding we project a meaning or set of
possible meanings when we attempt to understand a text or social
action. "A person who is trying to understand a text is always
performing an act of projecting. He projects before himself a meaning
for the text as a whole as soon as some initial meaning emerges in the
text. Again, the latter emerges only because he is reading the text
«lth particular expectations in regard to a certain meaning. The
working out of this foreproject, which is constantly revised in terras
of what emerges as he penetrates into meaning, is understanding what
IS there." We project some meaning that will be born out, others
that will prove fruitless, ana still additional meanings may emerge in
the course of our understanding a text. "The process that Heidegger
describes is that every revision of the fore-project is capable of
projecting before itself a new project of meaning, that rival projects
can emerge side by side until it becomes clearer what the unity of
meaning is, that interpretation begins with fore-conceptions that are
replaced by more suitable ones. This constant process of new
projection is t.e
.ove.ent of understanoing and interpretation
This forestructuxe of understanaing and the process of
understanding that takes place do not n,ean that we ciing
dog.aticaiiy to preconceptions or that we su™.arii, reject o.r
previous understanding (assuming either of these courses of action are
actually open to us). The new meanings that emerge and and the
revision of our previous understanding are in
.any respects not at our
disposal to ignore or confirm:
L'a:!ngrc^Lt'ttd"r^?o"od-i^'°"^^;:; """^ ^^^^
we cannot continually
.LunSe.stand" ff,^^^"^^*^^- ^ust asit affecting the meanlnn of tJf h °^ ^ «°rd without
blindly to our own ?SJe-™eanina Tit ^^^^
understand the meaning oranothe? Of TnlllVL'' T^"
fo?get'an''S^? '°
"^-^
- - * e'^usf
id°ea\' A 1° Sat° s"!ste3'!s'?hat""'"5 °-
n^eaning of amtheJ pe son o? hrtexr^eS'^n'"
wltTth^^'hT T ''^""s"^^ ---g^^ith^ he Whole of our own meanings or ourselves ?n refaUon
In a sense the new understanding that leads to a re-evaluation and
revision of the forestructure of understanding is not at our disposal,
it forces itself on us, implies Gada^er: "If a person is trying to
understand something, he will not be able to rely from the start on
his own chance previous ideas, missing as logically and stubbornly as
possible the actual meaning of the text until the latter becomes so
persistently audible that it breaks through the imagined understanding
of it. Rather, a person trying to understand a text is prepared for
it to tell him something."*" Again, this does not mean that we can
abandon our prejedices that constitute our forestructure of
understanding; but neither an we cling to them dogmatically if we are
co..itted to genuine understanding. The dialogue with the partner or
confrontation of the text will lead to a revision of our forestructure
Of understanding, and out of that new projected meanings will e.erge
Thrs constant projection and revision of meaning, this her.eneutic
Circle,
.eans that the understanding we achieve at any given
.o.ent
will always be provisional, subject to further revision. Hence,
notions of objective truth, far from being superior claims to truth,
are the interruption of this hermeneutic movement; they attempt to
freeze what is always subject to movement and are therefore an
abstraction from truth.
The Ubiquity of Authority and Tr^ditinn
Gadamer insists that the problem of prejudices reawakens the
problem of authority as well. The Enlightenment critique of prejudice
was initially tied to its rejection of authority, the latter being the
source of prejudice and hence, from the Enlightenment's standpoint,
human error. But if there can be legitimate prejudices, prejudices
that are the source not of error but of genuine knowledge, then the
Enlightenment rejection of all authority is problematic and the
question of legitimate authority re-merges:
That the prejudices that determine what I think are due to my
own narrowness of vision is a judgement that is made from the
standpoint of their dissolution and illumination and holds
only of unjustified prejudices, if, contrariwise, there arejustified prejudices productive of knowledge, then we are
back with the problem of authority. Hence, the radical
consequences of the enlightenment, which are still contained
in Schleiermacher's faith in method, are not tenable
.45
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The Enughtenmenfs r.U.r. to appropriately address the question
Of authority is not limited to its misunderstanding of the
relationship amongst
authority-prejudice-knowledge.
It extends to a
"Misunderstanding of the relationship between authority and tradition
°n the one hand, and freedo. and reason on the other. According to
the Enlightenment the acceptance of authority and tradition is
diametrically opposed to the exercise of one's reason and freedom.
Accordingly, the totally rational, autonomous subject is one who
rejects all authority and tradition and the prejudices they foster
He allows neither the authority of individuals nor that of tradition
to intrude on the deliberations of reason and exercise of free
Choice. He is. in Martin Hollis' terms, the autonomous man one who is
completely self-determined. Or as Herbert Marcuse unqualifiedly puts
it: "The recognition of authority as a basic force of social praxis
attacks the very roots of human freedom: it means (in a different
sense in each case) the surrender of autonomy (of thought, will,
action), the tying of the subject's reason and will to pre-established
contents in such a way that these contents do not form the 'material'
to be changed by the will of the individual but are taken over as they
stand as the obligatory norms for his reason and will."**
This view of the acceptance of authority as the subjugation of
one's reason and will to that of another misapprehends the essence of
authority, argues Gadamer. Dealing first with the authority of
particular individuals, Gadamer argues, like Winch, that there is an
epistemological basis for authority. Rejecting the equation of the
acceptance of authority with authoritarianism, he says, "But this is
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t t e ,33,,,, „^
^^^^ ^^^^
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that have authority; hut the authority of persons is hased ultimately
not on the suhjectlon and ahdioation of reason, hut on the recoonltio^
and knowledge
- knowledge namely, that the other is superior to
cneself in judgement and Insight ano that for this reason his
judgement takes precedence i p if k . .Mi a , .e. it has priority over one's own
The esscence of authority is not the failure to exeroise one's own
reason or carry out one's own will. Gadamer, like Winch, insists that
authority
"rests on recognition and hence on an act of reason itself
Which, aware of its own limitations, accepts that others have a better
understanding. Authority in this sense, properly understood, has
nothing to do with blind obedience to a command. Indeed, authority
has nothing to do with obedience, but rather with knowledge."*8
Thus, the acceptance of authority is not necessarily a restriction
on freedom and reason but is consistent with their exercise. For it
is no restriction on my reason to recognize the superior knowledge of
another. Moreover, the carrying out of any freely chosen action may
require the recognition of another's superior knowledge and insight
pertaining to that action. Authority, then, is not something that is
imposed but a guide to action that is accepted by the individual who
places himself under the direction of authority. "Thus the
recognition of authority Is always connected with the idea that what
authority states is not irrational and arbitrary, but can be seen in
principle, to be true. This is the essence of the authority claimeo
by the teacher, the superior, the expert. The prejudices they implant
are legitimized by the person himself. Their validity demands that
106
tHis
.a.es t.e™ t.en, in a sense, objective p.eju.ices.
.cr the.
..ing
about the sa.e bias in favor of something that can co.e about through
other
.eans, e.g. through the solid grounds offered by reason."*'
There is a second dimension to the proble. of authority that ste.s
fro. our historicality.
"...na.ely tradition. That which has been
sanctioned by tradition and custo. has an authority that it nameless
ahd cur finite historical being is oar.ed by the fact that always the
authority of what has been transmitted - ano not only what is clearly
grounded
-
has power over our attitudes and behavior. "^O Tradition
is not
.erely a constraint on our behavior that we could choose to
leave behind. We always act within the boundaries of tradition.
unfortunately, fro. Gada.er's standpoint, both the Enlightenment
and the Romantics defined tradition in opposition to reason and
freedom. But whereas the Enlightenment saw the constraint that
tradition imposed on reason and freedom as unnecessary ano harmful,
the Romantics insisted that unbridled reason and freedom woula doom
human society. But neither side denied the inherent opposition
between reason and freedom on the one hand and tradition on the
other. In this sense the Enlightenment and the Romantics were mirror
images of each other, differing only in their respective preferences.
Both missed the essential connection, claims Gadamer, between reason
and freedom, and tradition.
Traditidn does not survive and persist simply out of blind
unreflective adherence to what has always been the case. The
continuation of tradition depends itself on the exercise of reason.
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The fact is that t.a.Uicn is ccnstanti. an element of f.ee.o. an. of
history itself. Even the
.est genuine and sciid tradition does not
persist b, nature because of an inertia that once existed. It needs
to be affirmed, embraced, cultivated. It is, essentially
preservation, such as is active in all historical change. But
preservation is an act of reason, though an inconspicuous one.... At
any rate, preservation is as «h a freely chosen action as revolution
and renewal. That is why both the enlightenment's critique of
tradition and its romantic rehabilitation are less than their true
historical being...51 contrary to there being an antithesis between
reason and tradition, the two are inseperable elements of man's
historical being.
This last point cannot be understated, from Gadamer's
perspective. There is no possibility of exercising reason outside of
tradition. To insist that reason can step outside of tradition
completely is to insist there is an abstract, independent seat of
reason outside of society. No such independent perspective exists,
claims Gadamer. In short, it is tradition that makes reason
possible. There is no place outside of tradition form which we can
examine that tradition: "...we stand always within tradition, and
this is no objectifying process, i.e. we do not conceive of what
tradition says as something other, something alien. It is always part
of us, a model or exemplar, a recognition of ourselves which our later
historical judgement would hardly see as a kind of knowledge, but as
the simplest preservation of tradition. "^^
The inescapability of tradition holds not just for everyday life
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but for the reflective understanding of that life and tradition as
well. What we perceive to de the problems of our age, our interest in
the past, the issues to be investigated, are all determined by
tradition. There is no possibility of an objective approach to the
study Of tradition for such an approach would have no starting pointU would have no contact with the world which it seeks to know and
explore. To study tradition one
.ust let it speak and let oneself be
addressed by it. Hence Gada.er, like Winch, denies the antithesis
between tradition and knowledge. In Gadamar's words, "Our historical
consciousness is always filled with a variety of voices in which the
echo Of the past is heard...53 tradition, then, is the founoation on
which reason must build. Attempts to construct an objective
rationality like that advocated by Martin Hollis, one that is free of
tradition, untouched by historical circumstances, is bound to
flbunder. For the goal of an ahistorical, objective reason is a mere
mirage and formulations of objective rationality must either be so
abstract as to be meaningless or they must implicitly rely on some
unacknowledged tradition.
The example of academic life illustrates Gaoamer's point in
several respects. In order for us to pursue academic life as we know
it we must accept a set of traditional standards regulating the
activities that constitute academic life. These standards and norms
are binding on those engaged in academic life. Norms concerning
plagiarism, a certain etiquette regulating academic conferences, and
standards of criticism are some of the traditions that those involved
in academic life take as authoritative. They are not standards and
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norms that are constantlv scr[itini,=H':iy utin zed or in need of Justification
even though so.e of those standards
.a, occasionaiiy undergo revision
Moreover
.any of these standards of hehavior that are taken as
authoritative within academic life are constitutive of that life If
they were to he discarded or altered significantly, academic life as
we .now it would cease to exist. In short, the traditional standards
(such as those prohibiting plagiarism, of academic life make that way
Of life possible, without those traditions we could not even choose
to engage in academic life as we know it; it would not even be an
option for us.
Consequently these standards and norms are not merely restrictions
on those engaged in academic life. They are, in fact, the necessary
foundations of that way of life, the foundations that make our freedom
to pursue academic life possible. Hence, the elimination of those
traditional standards would make it impossible for us to exercise our
freedom of choice to follow that way of life as we know it.
What is perhaps equally important, though underdeveloped in Truth
and Method, is the extent to which the traditons and standards of
academic life make possible the establishment and recognition of
individuals as authorities within particular academic fields and areas
of specialization. It is only within the contexts of the traditional
standards and practices governing academic life, standards taken as
authoritative for the conduct of that life, that it is possible to
determine who might legitimately be considered an" authority within a
particular field, say on the philosophy of Kant. Moreover, those
particular traditions help determine the nature of those
no
authorUities. According:,, a
..rrerent set or
.ac.g.oun. t.a.itlons
-ght very ^ell establish authorities of a different nature. It is
the authority of academic traditions, in other «oros. that provides
the foundation for the personal authority of the academic in his
particular field or area of specialization.
in turn, these of us seeking tc understand a particular subject
-tter (staying «ith our example, say the philosophy of Kant, »oulc
seek out those considered to be authorities in that particuar field
(Kanfs philosophy), and consult the. regarding difficult aspects,
passages or points of Kanfs work. Our freedom to pursue the study of
Kant, and our understanding of it, is made possible by the authority
of academic traditions and ways of life. In su., the authority of
academic traditions and the individual authority that they give rise
to are the necessary requirements for our being free to pursue
academic life and the study of those fields that interest us. The
relationship between this authority and traoition on the one hand and
freedom and knowledge on the other is not a contingent relationship
but is internal; the former helps constitute the latter.
It would be a mistake to interpret Gadamer's account of authority
as an authoritarian defense of all de facto authority. Indeed, his
aim is, in some respects at least, just the opposite. It is precisely
the acceptance of the pronouncements of scientific authority, which he
sees as partially anonymous and therefore unaccountable, that Gadamer
believes to be one of the primary problems facing industrial Western
societies. He hopes to shake both the unconscious acceptance and the
conscious but uncritical acceptance of scientific authority in areas
Ill
'^^t axe
.e.cn. the legitimate
.eal. an. expertise or
science or where truth claims resulting fro. other forms of
understanding are denigrated. This concern is reflected in his
criticis™ of science's self-understanding and its reslutant position
towards doth social life and nature, m this respect Gadamer's wor.
can be interpreted as a continuation of the themes that Heidegger lays
out, particularly in "The Question Concerning Technology." Hence
Gadamer-s position places him sguarely at odds with the most dominant
form of authority existent in contemporary industrial society, i.e.
the authority of those who exercise technocratic control over the
everyday lives of individual citizens.
Second, Gadamer should not be interpreted as attempting to
resurrect older forms of authority that some conservative thinkers see
in decline in the twentieth century (e.g. the decline of the authority
of the aristocracy in political life). Such an interpretation fails
to take account of Gadamer 's expressed aim of rehabilitating
Aristotle's notion of practical wisdom as a resource with which the
common citizen could fight the encroachment of science as a standard
and way of organizing, conducting and controlling everyday life.
Gadamer 's defense of genuine authority and the challenge that it
constitutes to those who insist on interpreting authority as
antithetical to freedom and something which must therefore be limited
can be summarized as follows. Language and history do not just bind
us to a linguistic-historical situation but also make possible the
distanciation necessary for the critical understanding of our past,
and the possibilities for the present and our future. A necessay part
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Of that linguistic-Situation is constituted by tradition, the
authority that tradition holds for us, and those authorities that it
engenders. Authority itself, then, is not something that is
eli^inahle for beings whose iife is linguistically and historically
constituted. Whether or not social theorists and actors wish to ad^it
the ineyitability of authority, it persists.
Moreover, this is true no less for science as it is for other
for^s Of life and understanding, within science the increasing
tendency towards specialization has
.ade the pronouncements of
specialists in any particular field incomprehensible to their
counterparts in other fields. In .any respects the growing diyision
of labor in science has made laymen of us all. The result is that
even the most sophisticated researcher in one field must take the
statements of those in other specialized fields on authority.
Ironically, the division of labor that has resulted from the virtual
boundless growth of science, a science that once set for itself the
task of criticising and eliminating all forms of authority, has led to
the creation of new forms of authority within science as well as new
forms of authority between the scientific community and society as a
whole. Moreover the authority of science itself rests on a tradition
that it takes uncritically, a posture towards nature that science has
never openly challenged or scrutinized: the idea of objectivity that
reduces nature to a mere pool of natural resources, the instrumental
means to man's purposes.
Given this inescapability of authority, evidenced even within the
growth of science itself, it can be seen in retrospect that the
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Enlightenment attack on authority could only have resulted in the
creation of new forms of authority that mask themselves under the
guise Of freedom and reason. The task of the social theorist, then is
to come to a full understanding of genuine authority that would make
the existence of authority recognizable. Such an achievement would be
the first step in laying the foundation for the appropriate critical
evaluation of those in authority and thereby enable them to be held
publicly accountable.
Several parallels emerge between Gadamer's and winch's respective
accounts of authority. First, both insist that authority, because it
is tied to tradition (Gadamer) or a way of life (Winch), is an
ineliminable aspect of human social existence. It is not something we
could eliminate even if we wanted to.
Second, both see an epistemological basis to authority. Those who
are in authority are those whose superior knowledge, skill or insight
has been established. Hence, authority cannot be defined in
opposition to knowledge and reason. Authority is founded on the
exercise of superior knowledge and reason and subsequently helps to
detennine better and worse, good and bad instances, applications,
extensions or interpretations of a particular set of traditions.
Third, and related to the previous point, authority cannot simply
be defined in opposition to freedom. On the contrary, both winch and
Gadamer insist that the existence of authority is one of the
conditions for the exercise of freedom. For both, the authority of
established ways of life or traditions enable us to act in the world
and provide standards of criticism for the reflective evaluation of
those actions, enable us to determine good and bad, better and worse
reasons for acting and ways of proceeding.
..t.orit. enables rational
free choice.
In spite Of these similarities one subtle difference does exist
between the two accounts of authority. «nch is somewhat more
explicit in connecting the authority of individuals, those recognized
as authorities concerning a way of life, to the established standards
Of that way of life. A triadic relationship exists, he claims
amongst a way of life, those in authority, and those over whom
authority is exercised. The last remain in a position to hold the
second accountable by standards provided by the first. In other
words, a way of life provides those over whom authority is exercised
with a set df standards with which to judge the actions and
pronouncements of those in authority, even when those actions and
pronouncements are claimed to be interpretations of that way of life.
Gadamer. on the other hand, though he connects the authority of
individuals to knowledge of tradition and established standards of
conduct, is not quite so explicit about how those over whom authority
is exercised are able to check the pronouncements of those in
authority. At times he seems to give those in authority almost
complete hegemony in interpreting ways of life and underplays the
extent to which the recognition of individuals as authorities can
itself only be an act of reason if those placing themselves under
authority have themselves some insight into that traoition, some
notion (even if unarticulated or only vaguely articulated), of the
good and bad, right and wrong, better and worse applications.
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interpretations, adaptations and extensions of that traoition.
Philosophioal Hermeneutir. .n^ Self-ldPnti
The ontological priority that Gada.er olai.s for language has
several consequences for the concept of the autonomous inoividual. It
would, for instance, take issue with the concept of the individual
that emerges with the Enlightenment and the possibilities of
self-determined actions. Specifically, it would mean that "Language
maintains a kind of independent life over against the individual
member of a linguistic community and introduces him, as he grows into
it, to a particular attitude and relationship to the world as
well." What this means for human actions might best be
demonstrated by Gadamer's examples of conversation and play.
In a genuine conversation it is somewhat misleaoing, argues
Gadamer, to say that we conduct the conversation. A genuine
conversation is one that takes on a life of its own. It takes turns,
leads in directions and arrives at conclusions that are not within the
will of either partner: "the people conversing are far less the
leaders of it than the led. No one knows what will come out in a
conversation. Understanding or its failure is like a process which
happens to us . "^^
Similarly, in discussing the concept of play, both in the artistic
and non-artistic sense, Gadamer argues that the real subjects are not
the players of the game or the actors in the play, but the game and
play itself. In relationship to the author of the play as well as to
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the actors "the play has In relation to the. all. an absolute
autonomy... The possibilities for action by the players or actors
are determined by the play or the game.
Moreover, the self-knowledge that would be the basis for
individual action is itself available only through language. There is
no self-knowledge outside of the linguistic tradition that we inherit
and grow in. "Rather, in all cur knowledge of ourselves, and in all
knowledge of the world, we are always alreaoy encompassed by the
language that is our own. We grow up and become acquainted with men
and in the last analysis with ourselves when we learn to speak.""
Before we can be an I we must be the Thou that language constitutes.
This view of the relationship between language and self-knowledge
would lead Gadamer to dismiss the possibility of a self-identity that
is totally independent of the historical-linguistic situation that
individual actors find themselves in. The fundamental ontological
status that Gadamer claims for language and the prejudices that it
embodies implies that any actual, non-abstract account of personal
identity would have to recognize that the self-identity of the social
actor is constituted by some combination of these prejudices of the
particular historical period. In effect Gadamer 's rejection of the
so-called strong notion of personal identity, such as that defended by
Martin Hollis, would run parallel to his rejection of the
possibilities for understanding that are free of the effects of
effective-history. Mollis' version of self-identity is more
accurately described as self-deception, from Gadamer 's standpoint, for
Hollis requires the same objectivity, the same social amnesia, that
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advocates an. t.at
.a.a.e.
...sts .3
.poss..e.
-entU. is in fact Just the oppcsUe. a for. of social ioentity
w^ich. even i. achievable, wcui.
.a.e the scciai acto.
..ine.a.ie to
protect the individual from.
Hollis- project for autononnous self-identity, it will be
remembered, is that the autonomous man must be able to distance
himself from the social roles available to him in order to rationally
decide Which Of those roles is constitutive of his true identity and
embddies purposes, ends and a way of life that are consonant with his
real interests. The autonomous man, fom Hollis' standpoint, can
accurately evaluate the social rcles of his social-historical
Situation only if they no longer have any immediate effect on him. He
must be able to shed his roles in the same manner the historicist
insists we must shed our historical prejudices and values.
opposed to Hollis' rationalist account of personal identity the
Gadamerian would offer an account of personal identity that binds it
intimately to the language and traditions of one's historical
situation. Our personal identity is possible because of the constant
dialogue that we have with and within our language. It is our
participation within our language and traditions that allows us to
situate ourselves both historically and with respect to our
contemporaries, to reflect upon the situation and those relationships
and thereby determine and reflect upon who and what we are.
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our participation in this language, at ieast in its
.est
.eveiope.
ro..s, takes the for. of a conversation or dialogue. Each of the
partners of the conversation poses questions to the other, advances a
series of claims or pursues a line of questioning, reguiring the
partner in the dialogue to respond. This genuine conversation
requires that each participant re.ain open to what the other has to
say without giving up his own perspective. Hence, in the course of
the dialogue so.e ideas, arguments, beliefs, prejudices will cone to
hought and subsequently be discarded while others will be affirmed or
allow further understanding, it is out of this dialogue that one's
identity emerges. The dialectic of agree^nt, disagreement, questions
and answer result in a for™ of identity that is anchored in not just
one's subjectivity, but in the mutual recognition of the other.
Hence, my self-perceptions, my self-knowledge and self-identity are
all recognized (and thereby affirmed) as well as challenged by the
other in the dialogue.
The identity that each participant experience is not unlike that
described by Hegel in the master-slave dialectic. In both instances
genuine recognition, recognition that corroborates one's
self-identity, is dependent upon mutuality between partners.
Moreover, since the dialogue involves another, one with a different
horizon and set of prejudices, the possibility of a genuinely critical
evaluation of one's self-identity is always imminent. Interestingly
enough, the more socially inclusive the dialogue, the greater the
number of different horizons one is exposed to and therefore the
greater the possibilities for criticism.
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on the other hand, an identity that is rooted outsioe of ahy
on-going linguistic tradition (assuming for the ti.e being that suoh
an Identity were possible) would not experience the mutuality of
partners in a dialogue. It would be an identity that would have
difficulty sustaining itself if and when not corroborated by others
«hen the subject
're-e^erged' in social life, it would face the sa.e
problems that Hegel outlines for self-consciousness £rior to the
.aster-Slave dialectic. The self-ioentity of the incivioual. whatever
he determined it to be, would still lack the necessary requirement to
.ake it the social identity that Hollis pays lip service to. Hence,
the identity that would emerge from Hollis' ahistorical rationality!
lacking the confirmation of an other self-consciousness, would be
susceptible to a shattering upon contact with others whose identity
was firmly rooted in the mutuality of a dialogical relationship, m
the company of self-conscious individuals with a so-called weak
personal identity, weak because, according to Hollis, it is not
distanced from the social fabric it emerges from, the individual with
'strong' personal identity of Hollis- autonomous man would live a
precarious, fleeting existence.
CHAPTER III
PHILOSOPHICAL HERN€NEUTICS TO CRITICAL
The growth of science, the diffusion of scientific
.ethod, and the
concern for Ourgen Haber.as as they are for Gada.er. Moreover, both
cadaver and Haber.as use the Aristotlean
.odel of practical philosophy
as a contrast model for the relationship between theory and
practice. However, Habermas- concern with the growth of science and
technology appears to have had a slightly different emphasis than
Gadamer-
s. Whereas Gadamer 's concern with the growth of scientific
objectivism has focusea primarily, though not exclusively, on the
interpretation of texts and the evolution of German philosophy,
Habermas has been more explicit in his focus on the social ana
political implications of the development of science and technology.
Habermas agrees with Gadamer that the growth of science and
technology has been characteristic of modern society. Not only has
science become a primary and consciously applied factor of production
in industrial societies but the modern world has witnessed the
reflexive application of scientific methods to the study ana
organization of social-political life, resulting in a decline in the
classical doctrine of politics as a prudential art and skill and the
rise of a Hobbesian notion of a science of politics. Among the
positive outcomes of this phenomena, claims Habermas, was the
empirical knowledge it made possible. "The affirmative achievement of
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the
.cdern sciences consists in statements about empirical
uniformities...^ This empirical knowledge, in turn, enabled greater
technical control over nature and society.
^
A second positive achievement, and one that flows from the first
is that the critical capacity that scientific reason made possible
'
resulted in the rational challenge to and subsequent undermining of
traditional dogmatisms. At its inception,
..Reason takes up a partisan
position in the controversy between critique and dogmatism, and with
each new stage of emancipation it wins a further victory, m this
kind of practical reason, insight and the explicit interest in
liberation converge. The higher level of reflection coincides with a
step forward in the progress toward the autonomy of the individual,
and with the elimination of suffering and the furthering of concrete
happiness. Reason involved in the argument against dogmatism has
definitely taken up this interest as its own.... Reason has not as yet
renounced the will to be rational.'.^ Reason at this point still
aspires to the critical evaluation of practical questions.
However, the relationship between theory and practice changed
significantly, argues Habermas, with the positivist appropriation of
reason and its concommitant separation of facts and values. Reason
now is restricted to the realm of empirical statements. Statements
not reducible to empirical claims become mere value judgements, the
adjudication of which lies outside the boundaries of rational
argument. Consequently,
.'Every single value appears as a meaningless
agglomerations of meaning, stamped solely with the stigma of
irrationality, so that the priority of one value over the other - thus
the persuasiveness which a value claimc; w.>hdi C ims with respect to action -
cannot be rationally justified."^
In spite of the positivist ri^^-im fh.^M bXL clai that reason can no longer
address and rasclva questions of value, instrumental reason is
extended to .ore and more areas of
.odern life in an atte.pt to
rationalize the^ to achieve pre-deter.ined ends. Reason, in its
narrowly defined, purposive-rational for., is extended to .ore areas
of sooial life. But it addresses only those questions that oan fit
the narrow field of instrumental rationality or restates practical
questions so that they can fit that for. of reason, leaving the
.ost
fundamental, practical questions and issues untouched. Reason is now
installed in a different position with respect to the relationship
between dogmatism and practice:
^h^^
constellation of dogmatism, reason and decision
exacUvTtKp°H°"''^^'''^^ eighteenth century anSactly to the degree to which the positive sciences havebecome productive forces in social development! For asour civilization has become increasingly scientific thedimension within which theory was once directed towardspraxis has become correspondingly constricted. The lawsof self-reproduction demand of an industrially advanced
scalp n'f'
'' it look after its survival on an'escaLtinge of a continually refined administration of humanbeings and their relations with each other by means of
social organization. In this system, science,
technology, industry and administration interlock in a
circular process. In this process the relationship oftneory to praxis can now only assert itself as the
purposive-rational application of techniques assured by
empirical science. The social potential of science is
reduced to the powers of technical control - its
potential for enlightened action is no longer
considered. The empirical, analytical sciences produce
technical recommendations, but they furnish no answer to
practical questions.
^
The evolution of modern science, at least since its appropriation by
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PositiWs.,
.eans that the p.c.ise of the Ena,hten.ent that science
once hel. regains unfuinneo. ultimately, practical questions are
relegated to the real, of^ .alue Judgements and hence outside the
boundaries of rational argument. Consequently, reason no longer
serves as the guiding force in the enlightenment of citizens and the
development of their potential to ta.e control of and shape their own
history.
..Thus on this level the critipue of ideology involuntarily
furnishes the proof that progress of rationalization limited in terms
Of empirical science to technical control is paid for with the
corresponding growth of a mass or irrationality in the domain of
praxis itself. For action still demands an orientation as it did
before. But now it is dissected into a rational implementation of
techniques and strategies and a irrational choice of value-systems.
The price paid for the economy m the selection of means is a
decisionism set wholly free in the selection of the highest-level
goals.
However, what presents itself at this point as the neutrality of
scientifically grounded reason toward ultimate questions of social
practice is, claims Habermas, a facade. In fact scientific
rationality and control are now assumed as values in themselves.
Having gained a monopoly in the evaluation of rational action, science
can now undermine competing claims to the guioance of social action,
"Any theory that relates to praxis in any way other than by
strengthening and perfecting the possibilities for purposive rational
action must now appear dogmatic. The methodology of the empirical
sciences is tacitly but effectively rooted in a technical cognitive
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interest that excludes other interests: cohsepuehtly all other
relations to life-praxis oan
.e blocked out under the slogan of
ethical neutrality or value-freed™. The economy in the selection of
purpcsiva-rational
.eans which is guaranteed by conditional
predictions in the for. of technical reco™endations is the sole
admissible value, and it too is not seen explicitly as a value,
because it simply seems tc coincide with rationality as such."' Any
theoretical approach to social practice which does not fit within the
boundaries of purposive-rational action appears ipso facto irrational
and dogmatic.
Not only does the apparent value neutrality of scientific method
exclude competing approaches to social theory on the basis of their
inherent irrationality and dogmatism (i.e. value commitment), but,
moreover, within that scientific technique lurks the inherent value of
control and manipulation of the object of scientific knowledge and
organization. The original Enlightenment goal of the creation of an
informed, emancipated citizenry is replaced by the goal of systematic,
behavioral control by social engineers. In Habermas' words,
"Emancipation by means of enlightenment is replaced by instructions in
control over objective or objectified processes. Socially effective
theory is no longer directed toward the consciousness of human beings
who live together and discuss matters which with each other, but to
the behavior of human beings who manipulate. As a productive force of
industrial development, it changes the basis of human life, but it no
longer reaches our critically beyond this basis to raise life itself,
for the sake of life, to another level."
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one consequence of the unrestrained spread of scientific fcr.s of
rationaiit. to ail areas of social life is the foreciosin, of the ver,
possibility Of emancipation. Haber.as puts this point sharply
"...the danger of an exclusively technical civilization, which is
devoid Of the interconnnectipn between theory and praxis, can be
Clearly grasped; it is threatened by the splitting of its
consciousness, and by the sniiftinn of ku n pl t g of human beings into two classes -
the social engineers and the inmates of olosed institutions."^ The
installation of reason as a guide to social action, though it once
held out the hope of the creation of a society of autonomous
individuals, freed from dogmatism, ignorance and traditional forms of
authority, threatens to recreate the division of society into a
minority with access to the means of social control and the majority
that is the object of that control.
It is perhaps here that we should take note of the similarities
between Habermas- and Gadamer's views of the growth of science and
technology. First, both claim to detect an inherent value in the
scientific approach to knowledge and social organization: the
relationship between the knowing subject and the object of knowledge
is one of control or power. Second, there are similarities in their
attempts to unite theory and practice in and attempt to replace the
relationship of control and domination inherent in scientism and the
scientific organization of society. As we mentioned earlier, both use
the Aristotlean model of practical philosophy as a contrast model for
the relationship of theory to practice, though the tendency to
rehabilitate that practical philosophy is more pronounced in Gadamer
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than it is in Haber.as.
^netheless, oth do see an important role
for Philosophy in countering the growth and extension of scientific
for^s Of knowledge and control, either directly (Gada.er) or
indirectly through social theory (Haber.as)
. it is in the context of
this very general agreement that *ber.as appraises Cadaver's work and
finds several strengths in it.
Habemias' Apprerlation of Fhi in.nph
cs
Most fundamentally Habermas believes that Gadamer is quite correct
in his account of the historicity of understanding. The
inteipretation of the present will always and necessarily be made with
a reference to the past and an eye to the possibilities for the
future. This in turn has led Gadamer, again quite rightly claims
Habermas, to emphasize the objectivity of language through which our
history is transmitted. Language is not merely an instrument at our
disposal to Shape as we see fit. its objectivity requires that the
speaking subject recognize not only his freedom ftom language but his
dependence on it as well.-^°
Habermas further agrees with Gadamer that this objectivity of
language does not totally close off the possibilities of reflection:
"...reflexivity and objectivity are fundamental traits of language, as
are creativity and the integration of language into life-praxis."^^
In recognizing the inherent reflective potential of language Habermas
is acknowledging that Gadamer 's claim that natural language posseses
the means to eludicate the language itself or foreign languages is
correct. Natural languages possess the reflexive potential that
enable the speaker to confront and
.a.e sense of Poth opacities within
his own language ana external, Incomprehensible sy.Polic systems. In
Habermas. words, "the
.eans of natural language are. In principle
sufficient for elucidating the sense of any symbolic complex, however
unfamiliar and inaccessible It .ay Initially appear.... Hermeneutic
axperlenca brings to consciousness the position of a speaking subject
vis-a-vis his language. He can draw upon the self-referentiality of
natural languages for paraphrasing any changes
metacommunicatively...i2 Each natural language has, in principle,
the self-sufficiency for self-translation and for the translation of
other languages.
Moreover, the creativity of natural languages, the fact that their
grammar allows infinite number of combinations and formulations,
enables the speaker to comprehend new situations. "This productivity
extends,..., not only to the immediate generation of sentences in
general, but also to the long-term process of the formation of
interpretive schemes which are formulated in everyday language and
which both enable and pre-judge the making of experiences."^^
This reflexivity and creativity enable each natural language to
transcend itself. Philosophical hermeneutics emphasizes the extent to
which it is language itself that enables transcendence, that enables
each language to go beyond its immediate self. In doing so,
"Hermeneutics mistrusts any mediatizing of ordinary languages and
refuses to step out of their dimension; insteao it makes use of the
tendency to self-transcendence embedded in linguistic practice.
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Languages themselves possess the potential of a reason that, while
expressing itself m the particularity of a speoific gra^ar.
Simultaneously refleots on its limits and negates them as partioular
Although always bouno up in language, reason always transoends
particular languages; it lives in language only by destroying the
particularities of language through which alone it is
incarnated...^* By insisting on the embeddedness of reason in
language and the resulting tendency toward transcendence.
Philosophical hermeneutics serves as an antidote to those views of
language that see language as a prison-house or a monadically sealed
symbolic system.
In additon to its insights into the objectivity of language and
the connection between reason and language, Habermas believes that
Gadamer's work has several positive consequences for the sciences.
First, it demonstrates that science is only one way of understanding;
it does not have a monopoly on truth. Moreover, science itself is
dependent on natural language within which its is located.
"Hermeneutic consciousness also affects the scientific
self-understanding of the natural sciences but not, of course, their
methodology. The insight that natural language represents the 'last-
metalanguage for all theories expressed in formal language elucidates
the epistemological locus of everyday language within scientific
activity ."'^
Secondly, by focusing on the importance of intersubjectivity and
its role in structuring the social life world, it reminds the social
sciences that the social life-world cannot be exhaustively accounted
for through operationalized procedures; the intersubjective
pre-structuring presents unique problems to the study of the social
life, specifically, "If the access to data is no longer
.ediateo
through controlled observation but through co^unication in everyday
language, then theoretical concepts can no longer be operationalized
within the framework of the Dre-«^ripnti fin^n ^rie p scie fically developed language game
of physical measuring. "'^
Thirdly, and perhaps most importantly,
"Hermeneutic consciousness
destroys the objectivist self-understanding of the traditional
Geisteswissenschaften. it follows from the hermeneutic situatedness
of the interpreting scientist that objectivity in understanding cannot
be secured by an abstraction from pre-conceived ioeas, but only by
reflecting upon the context of effective-history which connects
perceiving subjects and their objects. "^^ Philosophical
hermeneutics shows that the objectivist understanding that is the goal
not only of positivism but also of historicism is merely an
abstraction. It misperceives the possibilities of understanding,
language and history.
In its analysis of language and the nature of understanding
Habermas insists that philosophical hermeneutics is a substantial
improvement upon phenomenology and, more importantly, the linguistic
analytic traditon that begins with the latter Wittgenstein, of which
Winch is a part. Wittgenstein, as Habermas reads him, characterized
understanding and the use of language as the application of the
pre-established rules of a language game into which one is
socialized. These language games are congealed in two senses. First,
there is little or no room fcr movement within the language game
itself or for its further development. Secondly, wittoenstein's
language games are, on Habermas' reading, monadical unities. Ttere is
no possibility of genuine translation between language games, "in his
(Wittgenstein's) hands the language game congeals to an opaque
unity
By emphasizing the historical dimension of language, Gadamer
demonstrates its reflexivity and the creative potential of language
and is thereby able to show that "language spheres are not
monadiacally sealed off but are inwardly as well as outwardly porous.
The grammar of a language cannot contain a rigid design for its
application. Whoever has learned to apply its rules has not only
learned to express himself but also to interpret expressions in his
language. Both translation (outwardly) and tradition (inwardly) must
be possible in principle."^^ What is at stake here is not a battle
between two esoteric views of language. Habermas' sensitivity to
practical questions enables him to spell out what the practical
implications of the competing views of language are. A completely
closed language game, one monadologically sealed from alien language
games and firmly congealed internally, would absorb individuals and
threaten the autonomous subject that Habermas wishes to protect:
Whosoever starts from the normal case of conversation- '
and not ftom the model of precision langluage - immediately
grasps the open structure of ordinary language. An
'unbroken' intersubjectivity of the grammar in force would
certainly make possible identity of meaning and thereby
constant relations of understanding; but it would at the same
time destroy the identity of the self in communication with
others Languages that are no longer inwardly porous and
have hardened into rigid systems remove the breaks of
13.
permit the vuln^r.hVrL °"^^™ther. They no longer
Which the idehtity of ?he'ego h2lo"di:^!cp"o"
"°
With no roc. fcr distanciatico, a ccpletely cicsed and ccngeaied
language ga^e, while providing ccmpiete icentity cf meaning and
undrcen cc^unicatich,
.culd ciose off the pcssiPiiity of autcncous
self-develcp.ent. One possible political ratification would be the
increased potential Tor systematic control of the way of life partly
constituted by the language game.
But Gadamer.
s account of language and history show how this
problem is avoided, claims Habermas. Gadamer, by accurately
describing the historicity of language, is able to account for the
space that is available to the speaking subject resulting from
.'his
specific freedom from, and dependence on, language . "^^ m short,
Gadamer
-s work is an improvement on Wittgenstein's analysis of
language, cr at least Habermas' reading of it, in two respects. It
takes account of both the translatability that exists between language
games and the nature of historical transmission of particular language
games, specifically the creativity inherent in language the enables
transcendence of that language.
The features of Gadamer 's account of language and
intersubjectivity that are the basis of its superiority to
Wittgenstein's notion of language games also provide it with another
strength. Gadamer 's work provides the foundation for understanding
which is translatable into social practice of those engaged in that
communication, claims Habermas. "I find Gadamer's real achievement in
the demonstration that hermeneutic understanding is linked with
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transcendental necessity to the articulation of an action ori f
self-understanding. "22
xhis .nn • ,
^" ^"^o-or entrng
i,,
''''''''' °' "^b--as. is particularly
interesting since one of the crltiVi^m. , .
.
^"ticis s Of interpretive or hermeneutictheory has been that its accnunt „f ^ .o of understanaing
short-circuits the
translation of that understanding into social practice
once again Haher.as sees positive political implications fro. this
feature of philosophical her.eneutics. u helps to provide the basis
Of a for. Of communication that makes the use of force less likely:
"intT^nl^TlllZi:^ roS^"^l"""^ -^-^^^ toward
self-under%tanSing Of sSciL'qroips ^?"°"-°^i^"tingform of consensus nn wM^k ; S"^""?^- " makes possible a
directions: verUcanv tn nn»?~"'"^"^ breakdown in two
elementary condition of servival is dis^u^Jiripossibility Of constraint
and^?e'cogni't\"n"'^:Shout'''
Hence, on Habermas' reading, philosophical hermeneutics goes part of
the way toward achieving precisely the explicit goal that Gadamer sets
out fdr it and that we mentioned at the beginning of the previous
chapter.
Finally, philosophical hermeneutics with its claim to
universality, hopes to mediate between the findings of science and the
language of everyday life. "Hermeneutic consciousness is, finally,
called upon in one area of interpretation more than any other and one
that is of great social interest: the translation of important
scientific information into the language of the life-world. "^^ The
growth and importance of science in the modern world has created a
-ed to .late scientinc
.nowle.ge to eve...a. are. nt is
With Its claims to universality ."25
Habermas' rriH-^ue of Ph nncnpK.-.,i
ijenrierieutics
It xs in Its clai. to universality that Habe^as detects two
related flaws in Gada^er-s account of Her^eneutic understanding. Thef-st flaw consists of an underestimation of the necessity of and
possibilities for controlled, methodical fo^s of reason and
reflection. The second flaw, flowing fro. the first, is an inability
on the part of he^eneutic understanding to detect and correct what
Habermas refers to as systematically distorted co^unioation.
Although Gadamer's critique of objectivism and the
self-misunderstanding of science that follows from it is correct
argues Habermas, Gadamer underestimates the efficiency of methodically
controlled reflection and overestimates the superiority of
understanding that occurs in unmediated natural language. The claim
for the superiority of unmediated understanding threatens to undermine
the very goal that Gadamer sets out for philosophical heimeneutics.
The task of mediating between the language of science and the language
of everyday life requires that philosophical hermeneutics must,
translate the findings of a monological system of communication
formulated in a language that is removed from everyday speech to the
dialogical system of communication that characterizes natural
language. This requires not a reflection within natural language but
134
mediation between different language systems my d , claims Habermas.
Formulated this wav i-ho ot.^ui
' ' that:
..a philosophical
-~...ola.l.,
.eco.iUo. To. the possi.ilit. to, as it
were, step outsi.e the
.ialo.ical st.ct.. or e.e...a. la.oa.e an.
tc use language in a
.onological «ay Tor the formal constroction of
theories an. for the organization of purposive rational action "^^
It is precisely this type of activity that
.ada.er shuns denying its
necessity (an. possibility) for intergrating the scientific «orl. an.
every.ay life. The i^unity Ca.a^er claims fro^having to engage in
n-ethcological
.isputes^^ allows the sciences to ignore the
implications that philosophical her.eneutios has for the stu.y of
social life. "The clai. which her^eneutics legitimately mates goo.
against the practically influential absolution of a general
.ethcology of the empirical sciences, brings no
.ispensation from the
business of methodology in general. This claim will, i fear, be
effective in the sciences or not at all."28 j„ 3^^^^^
ontological nature of Gadamer's claims, the oppositon between
hermeneutic experience and knowledge obtained methodologically, and
the claims for the superiority of the unmediated understanding
transmitted through natural language, succeeds only in securing the
irrelevance of philosophical hermeneutics in a society on the verge of
total scientific and technological control.
Accompanying this irrelevancy, and once again flowing from the
claim of the universality and ontological priority of language, is a
form of irrationalism. From Habermas' standpoint Gadamer has aaopte.
something like Hegel's view of history and substituted for Absolute
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Spxr.t the infinu. of language, m
.cing so he
.enies reason the
role Of a .oving force in history. Conseouent:,. the development of
language is the development of non-ratlonally founded tradition:
lu^'gent'absllutf
''it'.'?''";
'^"^uage beoo.es a
as absolute spirit- 'it comprehend itself
subjective\p1ru'as\'bs°ott:Towlr^!h'X""^°"H
Objective in thp hiQfnTii.IT Z ^^^V^- n^is power becomes
possible experience S^^^^^^ °^ ^°^i^°ns of
Shrinks to the awa?ene2^?ilt
experience of reflection
happening in' w^ic^'t^llon'dmons^'f ^° '
irrationally accordino to timp ^hh ^ ^"^^^^ "^^^^^e
transcending power of reflection thafis'afso operative
beyond iSSf'tr.n'oh' '^''^ ^° 1°^9^^ ^'^chu o Itself to an absolute consciousness whirh npretends to be. The way to absolute idealism is barredto a transcendental consciousness that is hermeneu?i^^?i.
r'a 'buT'' conti'ng1n?'c^^^^\'x'^
thTp^^of — --^n struck on
The inflated claims that Gadamer makes for language and
hermeneutic understanding are the complement to his underestimation of
the power and independence of reflection. The connection between
tradition and understanding does not protect that tradition from
changes that are made possible by the exercise of reason. Gadamer's
view that "understanding
- no matter how controlled it may be - cannot
simply leap over the interpreters relationship to tradition"^° is
correct. "But from the fact that understanding is structurally a part
of the tradition that it further develops through appropriation, it
does not follow that the medium of tradition is not profoundly altered
by scientific reflection. "^^ In new and unanticipated situations
tradition must be prudently developed in ways that are not simply the
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blind assertion fo previous ideas and ways of conduoting affairs It
-
in such Situations that reason
.est olearly shows its independence
fro. tradition.
..Cada.er fails to appreciate the power of reflection
that is developed in understanding. This type of reflection is no
longer blinded by the illusion of an absolute, self-grounded autonomy
that does not detach itself fro. the soil of contingency on which it
finds itself. But in grasping the genesis of the tradition fro. which
it proceeds and on which it turns its back, reflection shakes the
dogmatism of life practices.-^^ The capacity of reason to shake the
nature-like appearance of existing social practices and arrangements
is not altered by the fact that reason always confronts a particular
set of practices and tradition and hence is always situated within an
historical context.
In effect, Habermas interprets Gadamer as saying that the exercise
of reason is merely the appropriation and extension of tradition.
Consequently, Gadamer fails to appreciate the changes that are the
potential results of the exercise of reason. "In Gaoamer's view,
on-going traditon and hermeneutic inquiry merge to a single point.
Opposed to this is the insight that the reflected appropriation of
tradition breaks up the nature-like substance of tradition and alters
the position of the subject in it."^^ m fact it is only through
controlled reflection that philosophical hermeneutics could make the
transition from an ad hoc, non-systematic apprehending of tradition to
a genuine, critical science. "A controlled distanciation can raise
understanding from a prescientific experience to the rank of a
reflected procedure. In this way hermeneutic procedures enter into
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the social sciences. "^^
Habermas detects an additional eouallv . •
•
q y serious flaw in the claim
nas no unmediated access- (2) an fh 4-, (2) all that constitutes human reality is
somehow reflected in language i p i.-n •
^ ' l^^g^^stic in nature; and (3)an flaws in understanding are necessarily endogenous, if any or allOf the adove conditions are unmet, if structures of meaning or
structures that determine meaning develop outside and alongside the
structure of meaning available to natural lann-Lc language; if there is more
to human reality than what is reflected in n.f ^ .ri in natural language; or if the
barriers to genuine understanding are endogenous or the result of the
very organization of understanding, then the Gadamerian claim to
universality on behalf of philosophical hermeneutica cannot be
sustained.
Habermas believes that the development in linguistics and Piagefs
work in genetic epistomology are sufficient reason for calling the
hermeneutic claim to universality into question. But the most serious
Challenge to that claim to universality is posed by psychoanalysis.
Habermas formulates the challenge this way:
Irtnni """"^l the question whether a critical
Skillful'lntPrn.^'^''°'"''^^'^ ^^'P^^^ the wayinterpretation is tied to the natural competenceof everyday communication with the help of atheoretically based semantic analysis - and thereby
refute the hermeneutic claim to universality. Can therebe an understanding of meaning in relation to symbolic
meta-language.33 °^ ^^^^^^ ^^tural language as the last
In other words is it possible that there exist. .n s structures of meanina
there are and that psychoanalysis provides the example.
"l
Shan... consider the question whether a critical science such as
psychoanalysis can hy-pass the
.ay s.ill.ull interpretation is tied tothe natural competence of everyday co^unication with the help of a
theoretically based semantic analysis - and thereby refute the
hermeneutic claim to universality."^^
one Of the primary goals of psychoanalysis is the interpretation
Of a variety of phenonmena previously thought to be meaningless
unexplalnable, or accidental. Dreams, parapraxes, neuroses, as'well
as a variety of other common types of behavior became, with the advent
Of psychoanalysis, phenomena that could be explained by demonstrating
the hidden sense or meaning the such isolated and seemingly
unimportant phenomena had for the patient. "It was a triumph of the
interpretive art of psychoanalysis when it succeeded in demonstrating
the hioden sense or meaning that certain common mental acts of normal
people for which no one had hitherto attempted to put forward a
psychical explanation, were to be regarded in the same light as the
symptoms of neurotics; that is to say had meaning, which was unknown
to the subject but which could easily be discovered by analytic
means.
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.e.av.o. (as isone. t.e case wit. pPsessipns. fantasies or pa.apra.es,. A p.ecess
0 des..ppn.3tipn .as cccu^e.
..ic Pisconnects t.e criminal event
experience or cpnflict fro. public cp™pnication. As Haber.as puts
^t,
"...What is unccunscious is removed fro. puPiic co^unicaticn
insofar as It expresses itself in sy.Pols or actions anyway, it
-ifests itself as a sy.ptp™, that is as a mutilation anP pistortion
of the text pf everyday habitual language games. "^^
The exclusion of the meaning of the psychoanalytic text includes
the interruptiph of the patients dialpgue with himself.
"Because the
symbols that interpret suppressed needs are excluded frpm public
communication, the speaking and acting subject's communication with
himself in interrupted. The privatized language of the unconscious
motives is rendered inaccessible to the ego. even thpugh internally it
has cpnsiderable repercussions upon that use of language anp those
motivations of action that the ego cpntrpls. The result is that the
ego necessarily deceives itself about its identity in the symbolic
structures that is consciously produces."^' The subject himself
does not have access to the meanings of the symptoms and furthermore
may not even perceive them as symptpms pf anything.
Faced with this dilemma, the analyst attempts to draw out the
missing parts of the phenomena (dreams) or hidden drives, events or
wishes that the object of explanatipn is tied to . Through scenic
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to Show the connection to see frustrated wish or orive
TWO features of scenic understanding place it outside the process
c everyday understanding achieved through natural language, therehy
challenging the her.eneutic clai. to universality. Pirst. scenic
understanding ta.es place within the analytic relationship Petween
patient and analyst. It is a methodologically controlled artificially
created situation that Hater.as insists fulfills experimental
Cdhditions that Gada.er would characterize as a for. of ohjectivis™
Without this analytic situation the meanings of the dreams or symptoms
could not emerge.
Second, psychoanalytic interpretation depenos upon theoretical
assumptions that circumscribe the possibilities of meaning that can
emerge from the analytic situation: "the analyst's pre-understanding
is directed at a small segment of possible meanings: viz early,
conflictlve object relations. The linguistic material that emerges in
talks with the patient is classified within a closely circumscribed
context of possible double meaning. This context consists of a
general Interpretation of infant patterns of Interaction which is
correlated with a theory of personality that exhibits specific phases
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.ot
.3na.e to eve... spea.., sl.ectSimply because of his natural t • .linguistic competence. Habermas
specifies three dimensions of the analv.n.^ lyst's pre-understanding.
(1) The analyst entertains a pre-concentinn f ,j- p o of 'normal' or
a^stcrte. creation. Un.istone. co^unlcatlon is characterize,
by a congruence between levels of co^unication; is p.bUe, i e
follows intersubjective roles; allows the differentiation between
subject and object, appearance and reality; enable the subject to
secure his identity and that of others within th» ,uui the language community;
and finally enables the speaker to make a distinction between
Objective states of affairs and subjective experiences of speaking
subjects. This preconception of undistorted co^unication provides
the analyst with a basis for determining where and when distortion in
a patients communication exists, it throws into relief irregularities
in communication itself.
(2) The analysts' second assumption is that the organization of
symbols occurs in two distinct stages. "In the first stage the
process of symbolization does not rely on the intersubjective rules
that govern public communication.
"This layer of paleo-symbols
is... devoid Of all the properties of normal speech. Paleo-symbols are
not integrated into a system of grammatical rules. They are unordered
elements and do not arise within a system tt^t could be transformeo
grammatically. "^2 Hence, they are not part of public con^unication;
they are privatized meanings. Moreover, the organization of
1A2
palec-symbols does not follow any particular
.
- —-on. a 13
.losyjau.
"
THe second sta.e of symbolic organl.aton Is t.at
.le. I3 mediatedby linguistic rules and gra^ar. It is this . h
resv,.hn,- V
^^oond stage that enables
re-sy.bol.zataon through the translation of pre-linguistic
Paleo-sy*ols into recognizable linguistic egression. This
Of se.antic contents fro. he pre-linguistic stage to thel-.^ist.c state Of aggregation widens the sphere of co^unicative
action at the expense of the unconsciously motivated one. The
™ove.ent of successful, creative use of language is one of
emancipation."^-^
It is important to emphasize that the first stage is a
pre-linguistic stage, it genetically preceeds the linguistic stage of
symbolic organization. This helps account for the fact that when the
original symbclization emerges from the unconscious it is not
immediately completely translatable into normal communication.
"The
assumption that neurotic behavior is guided by paleo-symbols and only
subsequently rationalized by linguistic int^pretation also provides
an explanation for the characteristics of this form of behavior: for
its status as pseudo-communication, stereotyped and compulsive
behavior, emotional attachment, expressive content and inflexible
situational tie."*'*
(3) Finally, psychoanalysis relies on theoretical assumptions
about the structure of mind which itself is prior to language, i.e.
the structure of mind does not develop within language but rather
language develops thrdugh it. "Depth hermeneutical understanding
143
' P--.te..,
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.eteas he^ene.tioa.
..e.tan.ng a.a.s
for.s and changes itself within linguistic co^unication...^ The
structural theory of
.ino the Preuo articulated, consisting of the
ego. id and super-ego, does not itself have a linguistic basis
Hence, its existence is not ultimately explained in .=-iy terms of tradition
or language.
The organization of paleo-sy*ols and the structure of ™ind that
serve as the theoretical context for interpretation also provide the
analyst with a theory of systematically distorted co^unication. The
paleo-symbols of an individual's pre-linguistic background and the
dynamics of the constitutive parts of the mind systematically distort
the communication of the individual with others and with himself. It
is this systematic distortion that the analyst and patient aim to
remove when they enter into the analytic situation. "The omissions
and distortions that it rectifies have a systematic role and
function. For the symbolic structures that psychoanalysis seeks to
comprehend are corrupted by the impact of internal conditions. The
mutilations have meaning as such. The meaning of a corrupt text of
this sort can be adequately comprehended only after it has become
possible to illuminate the meaning of the corruption itself. This
distinguishes the peculiar task of a hermeneutics that cannot be
confined to the procedures of philology but rather unites linguistic
analysis with the psychological investigation of causal
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connection." Any attempt to explain or understand the types of
14A
-avior that psychoanalysis is concerned with an.
.hicn
.oes not
recconi. the structural prohie.s in.cive. in that understanding
.iii
f^nd itself wcefuiiy inadequate
.cth as a fc™ cf e.pianaticn and as a
means of remedying the symptoms.
Finally, the idea of systematically distorted communication, that
emerges from the theoretical presuppositions of the analyst, itself
pre-supposes a theory of communicative competence, argues Hahermas.
"I would say,..., that each depth-hermeneutical interpretation of
systematically distorted communication, irrespective of whether it
appears in an analytic encounteror infonnally, implicitly relies on
those assumptions which can only be developed and Justified within the
framework of a theory of communicative competence. "^^
Finally, the idea of systematically distorted communication, that
emerges from the theoretical presuppositions of the analyst, itself
pre-supposes a theory of communicative competence, aigues Habermas.
"I would say,..., that each depth-hermeneutical interpretation of
systematically distorted communication, irrespective of whether it
appears in an analytic encounter or infoimally, implicitly relies on
those demanding assumptions which can only be developed and justified
within the framework of a theory of communicative competence. ""^^ In
short, psychoanalysis implicitly invokes a notion of undistorted
communication, an idea of what is required for there to be normal
intersubjective relations between two speaking subjects.
Habermas believes that this account of psychoanalysis with its
emphasis on the structural theory of mind and the prelinguistic stage
of symbolic organization is sufficient to refute Gadamer's claim to
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universaut, of her.eneutic understanding,
.ot onl, are these
language,
.ut tHe
.eans of understanaing an. explanation that are
regulreo fox access to these phenomena are net available to the
speaking subject through the capacities developed within natural
language. In Haber.as. words,
..Her.eneutic consciousness regains
inccplete as long as it does not include a reflection upon the li.its
Of hermeneutic understanding. The experience of a her.eneutical
n.itation refers to specifically incomprehensible expressions. This
specific incomprehensibility cannot be overcome by the exercise
however skillful, of one's naturally acquired communicative
competence; its stubborness can be regarded as an indication that it
cannot be explained by sole reference to the structure of everyday
communication that hermeneutic philosophy has brought to light.
Ano again later, "Already the implicit knowledge of the condition of
systematically distorted communication which is pre-supposed in an
actual form in the depth-hermeneutical use of communicative
competence, is sufficient for the questioning of the ontological
self-understanding of the philosophical hermeneutics which Gadamer
propounds by following Heidegger."*' If language itself is subject
to systematic distortion, a distortion that is beyond the boundaries
of the reflexivity of that language, it follows that ordinary or
natural language is insufficient for rendering a complete account of
meaning; something beyond hermeneutics is required to give an account
of the distortions of that meaning.
Habermas' challenge to the hermeneutic claim to universality and
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its subsequent identificatinn nf fKT o of the complex of language traditionana authority with rea<.nn u i
With H h onlyw abermas' interoretafinn o^-
°' psychoanalysis, m addition to theChallenge posed by pychoanalvsl^ h.h
,
.
™ that the hermeneuticClaim to universalitv i^ fnr-i-h^T. •
' "rcu.scribed by our relationship to
nature and the arrangements concerning social control-
..An
-terpretive sociology tht hypostasizes language to the subject of
forms Of life and of tradition ties itself to the idealist
presupposition that linguistically articulated consciousness
determines the material practice of life But k-r r . the objective framework
Of social action is not exhausted by the dimension of
intersubjectivity intended and symbolically transmitted meaning. The
lihguistic infrastructure pf a society is part of a complex that,
however symbolically mediated, is also constituted by the constraint
cf reality
-
by the constraint of outer nature that enters into
procedures for a technical mastery and by t^ constraint of inner
nature reflected in the repressive character pf social power
relatipns...50 The techniques of production and the relationships of
power and dominatipn are not reducible to rules of intersubjectivity.
Moreover, developments in these two spheres have important
implications for the sphere of intersubjectivity. As was previeweo in
our discussion of the similarities between Habermas and Gadamer,
Habermas takes the developments of institutionalized science and
technology to be particularly important. "I suspect that the
institutional changes brought about by scientific-technical progress
indirectly exert an influence on the linguistic schema of
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world-comprehension not unlike th^t fa formerly exerted by chanoes in hho
mode of production Fnr •
n g the
.orces...-
"^"^ P--tive
one .
^^^^^^^^^^
^^^^^^^
^^^^^^^^^
-
--.n
. .n.,e
.3 .en the
.eo.g.a: J
at language has been put to In
.1.1.,
...eso.Mng. an. managing
-
awareness of social domination and tne ejects of developments In
for t.e intersubjectlve transmission of knowledge. Unguage
can be and Is used to distort, manipulate, decieve and mislead, m
this respect, language Is also a medium of domination and social
power, It serves to legitimate relations of organized force. Insofar
as the legitimations do not articulate the power relations whose
institutionalization they make possible. Insofar as these relations
merely manifest themselves in the legitimations, language is also
ideological. Here it is a questions not of deception within a
language but of deception with languge as such. Hermeneutlc
experience that encounters this dependency of the symbolic framework
on actual conditions changes into critique of ideology. "52 m
short, the systematically distorted communication that occures on the
psychologicai level has its analogue on the social level. Given this
capacity or use of language, it is naive to assume that the mere
appropriation of tradition can guarantee the breakdown of those
prejudices that do not contain truth or lead to greater understanding,
but rather which function to mislead and divert our understanding of
our actual social conditions and the possibilities ano alternatives
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available to us.
Ha.er.as further develops
.is crUip.e of t.e
...ne.tic clai™ to
-versanty an. Us
.prejudice ror prejudice, into a ctUi.. of
Oada.er.s defense of aut.orU.. Su^axi^ng aa.a^er.s positions,
.e
says. "Gadamer deduoed the rehabiiitation of prejudice fro. his
her^eneutic insight into the prejudgenentai structure of
understanding. He does not see any opposition between authority and
reason. The authority of tradition does not assert itseif hiindiy hut
only through its reflective recognition by those who. while being a
part Of traditions themselves, understand and develop it through
application. "53 Fron this Gadamer concludes that "true authority
need not be authoritarian."^^
What Gadamer ignores, according to Habermas, is that in order for
authority and tradition to merge with knowledge and reason it would
have to be the case that all authority and tradition could be
validated by reason. "That authority converges with knowledge means
that the tradition that is effectively behind the educator legitimate
the prejudices inculcated in the rising generation; they could then
only be confirmed in this generation's reflection, m assuring
himself of the structure of prejudgement, the mature individual would
transfer the formerly unfree recognition of the personal authority of
the guardian to the objective authority of a traditional framework.
But then it would remain a matter of authority, for reflection could
only move within the limits of the facticity of tradition. The act of
recognition that is mediated through reflection woulo not at all have
altered the fact that tradition as such remains the only ground of the
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validity of prejudices th.-J u^u . This amounts to thP n^-;,.
u^,
^'^^ Claim, argues
Habermas, that nothing new has Pvpr
^ ^^^^ Of reflection, that
reflection can only re-affir^n, u ^ .
,
'''^'^ ^^^^ Previously existed in
tradition, m making such a claim "Gph^. .
_
Gadamer-s prejudice for the
rights of prejudice certified by tradition h •°^ denies the power of
reject t.e c.a..
. t.a.U.on.
.enect.on
.U30.es su.stant.ant.
because it not only confirms but also break. „„ Ho s up dogmatic forces.
Authority and knowledge do not converge...^^ That reason and
renectlon have the potential to both reject ano af.lr. tradition and
prejudices indicates an Independence for reason th.f r h'^^^^O" fiat Gadamer seems not
can establish Itself outside of the contingencies of tradition or that
reason comes to tradition from the abstract heights of objectivity
"Reflection can, to be sure, no longer reach beyond Itself to an
absolute consciousness which it then pretends to be."^^
Nonetheless the power of reson does not leave everything as It
was. Its retroactive application to tradition which is inculcated by
authority can result in the rejection of that tradition or change the
nature of It.
..Reflection recalls the path of authority along which
the grammars of language games were dogmatically Inculcated as rules
fdr interpreting the world and for action, m this process the
element of authority that was simply domination can be stripped away
and dissolved into the less coercive constraint of Insight and
rational decision."^®
A second dimension of the Habermasian critique of Gadamer.
s
defense of authority follows fro. his view that lannV n i quaae olavc; ^
double role within our political life i e tha^
-f
truth an.
.nowle.ge hut it can also
'
""'^
H .
to manipulate and distortand hence is a
.eans of domination as well as enlirht
extfnf * • .
g enment. To the
-te t that institutionalized authority is dependent on the
systematically distorted communication, either for its existence or
or Its continued operation and policies, it can not he accepted as
" T"
^"""^
"""" ""^ -—Oe. indeed, in
such forms, it must rely on the containment of reflection and
understanding for one if its conditions of continued existence. But
Gadamer. argues Habermas, fails to aodress this problem seriously
enough, tending to minimize or underestimate the extent to which
authority has relied on obfuscation and untruth rather than
promulgating reason and knowledge.
Given the inadequacies that Habermas purports are inherent in the
Philosophical hermeneutics as detailed by Gadamer, Habermas rejects
the hermeneutic insistence that the commitment to enlightenment must
be brought under a self-imposed discipline by the social theorist.
"If then, such opposition between authority ana reason does in fact
exist, as the Enlightenment has always claimed, and if it cannot be
superceded by hermeneutic means, it follows that the attempt to impose
fundamental restrictions upon the interpreter's commitment to
enlightenment becomes problematic too."^'
Instead of insisting upon an unjustified limitation of the scope
of reflection, a hermeneutically informed social science should be
concerned with outlining the conditions under which critical
on and
reflection could be brought to bear nn
^ ^""^ °" prejudices of traditi
^eao to t.e critical ascenai™ent of t.th oni, to t.e extent to
w-c. it foiiows tHe
...iative p.i.cipie: to t.. to estaPiis.
-versa: a„t «it.in the f.a.ewor. of an unii^ite. co^unit, of
erpreters. Oni, this principle can
.a.e sure t.at t.e
.e^eneutic
effort Poes not cease until we are aware of deceptions wit.in a
forcible consensus and of t.e systematic distortion Pe.inP seemingly
accidental misunderstanding, if the understanding of meaning is not
to remain ajortiorl indifferent towards the idea of truth then we
have tp anticipate, together with the concept of a kino of truth which
measures itself pn an idealizeo consensus achieved in unlimited
communication, also the structures of solioary co-existence in
communication free from force...^° Habermas implies that it is only
the anticipation of such a radical understanding that can possibly
achieve the goals that Gadamer stakes out for philosophical
hermeneutics; i.e. the protection of everyday practical, political
judgement from the increasing influence of technology and scientific
control of society. For one of the purposes of that rdical
understanding is the laying bare of the social relationships and
relationships with nature that entail domination and false prejuoice:
"The idea of truth, which measures itself on a true consensus, implies
the idea of the true life. We could also say: it includes the iaea
of being-of-age (Mundigkeit)
.
It is only the formal antlciption of an
idealized dialogue, as the form of life to be realized in the future,
which guarantees the ultimatP c^nnnmima e supporting and counterfactu;.!
.n.
~ „ u „ „. „„:::
~
factual agreement, should it be a f^i.p nu alse one, as false
consents an. t.e...
.ones t.e
.,.,at.e p.oc.p^e c.
.t.na.
^-course... CaCa^er^s ver. participation in
.etaHe^eneutic
debates is itself testimony to the fact that Oa.a.er hi.self
anticipates the consensus reaulateri hv fh. • •g lated by the principle of rational
discourse, implies Habermas HenrP p.ho • .. ce, Gadamer implicitly recognizes the
strength of reason and its ability to distinguish false prejudices
and hence the potential it has for changing language and tradition!
The Gadamer j an Reioinaer
For the time being we will postpone Habermas' oevelopment of a
theory of co^unicative competence since that theory is intended to
answer many of the questions that arose in his debate with Gadamer and
is best understood in that context. Presently, being we will examine
Gadamer-s response to Habermas' critique of philosophicl hermeneutics
and Habermas' own rejoinder.
Gadamer 's response to Habermas' critique and project focuses on
four related issues:
1. the goal of critical theory as outlined by Habermas;
2. the universality of language;
3. the power of reflection and reason;
the Character and necessity of authority
,
''^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
Ca.a.er
begins his counter-critiaup nf mok•-j-xuxque or Habermas bv examininr, fKining the very goal ofthis latest version of critical theorv i p fh i •L" y, .e. the claim that is is
necessary to raise hermeneutic reflection k- .to a higher, more systematic,
seir-conscious activitv "tk^y
.
The modern social scientists
.... in so far
as they recognize hermeneutic refiection as unavoidable, nevertheless
advance the claim (as Habermas has formulated it) of raising
understanding up out of a prescientific exercise to the ranK of a
self-reflecting activity by controlled alie^tion - that is. through
•methodical development of intelligence. The assumption
underlying this claim is that only the distance that such controlled
alienation provides can make the reflective appropriation of tradition
possible. Hence, it assumes a conflict between ongoing tradition and
the rational evaluation of that tradition. This assumption cuts right
to the heart of the hermeneutic account of tradition and reason, and
displays, claims Gadamer, the same error and unredeemed faith in
objectivism that plagued the Enlightenment, historicism. and earlier
accounts of hermeneutics:
recomi'zfnn'thp'"' ' J"'"' ^ ^^^^^^^^V consequence ofgni i g e operativeness of history in our
conditionedness and finitude - that the thing that
assemm'Sn ^""^^^f.^^ ^o see through the dogmatism of
nT,rl] f ^^.°PP°^^tion and separation between the ongoing,
^"""^ reflective appropriation of it
distortr^hf'"
^s^^^tion stands a dogmatic objectivism thatstorts t e very concept of hermeneutic reflection itself.
In effect this objectivism denies the power or presence of
effective history with respect to the observer (or in Habermas' case,
the critical theor^Q•l-^ -.^
that thro .
^ope Of ohjectivis. is
cont^ne. anenatioo the theo.st
.s ah:e to ne.t.a.e
transmitted. But this view, whether it is held k" ™" social engineers or
'
Z -— thecr. .erei. demonstrates a naive
:
--^"-"es 0. controiied reason and
-thcd.
..etuan. the historian, even the one .0 treats
.istor. as
a cruicai scienoe-. is so iittie separated fro. the ongoing
tradition (for e.ampie. those of his nation) that he is^^in contrih^ to the growth and development of the national
* °" °' '"^"-^ ^^^t«ians; he helongs to the nation
Hence. Ha.ermas- faith in the possibilities of methodical, systematic
appropriation of tradition fails to escape the same problems of
earlier types of dogmatic objectivism, e.g. bistoricism, positivism
and scientism.
work, domination and the univer..,.., k„„....„,
^ ^^^^
seen, related to ^bermas- claims concerning the necessity for
methodical, systematic examintion of what is culturally transmitted is
the denial of the universality of he^eneutics. if it were the case
that everything that could be known was transmitted through existing
everyday language, the need for a methodical examination of tradition
would be either unnecessary or. as Gadamer claims, represent only one
relativity within language itself. But if there are areas of social
life, the truth of which lies outside the boundaries of everyday
languge and ordinary transmission of tradition, it follows that some
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Ha e^as attempts to s.ow t.at t.e.e a. sue. p.e-nn,.,3t. an.
extra-Unouistlo areas of .«n expenence an. that
.no«le.,e of t.ese
areas is available to us onl, through the
.etho.lcal, controlled
examination of social an. psychological life. Consequently.
hermeneutics must restrict i)-==if t ..^itself to the understanding of the
transmission of tradition and culture.
Cadamer ta.es issue with Hahermas. characterization of the problem
and the inferences that he draws, rirst, Gadamer does not deny that
there are pre-linguistic and extra-linguistic areas of human
experience, m agreement with Habermas he cites Piagefs work on
cognitive development as an example of the former and formal
mathematics as an example of the latter. Furthermore, a passage we
quoted earlier seems to indicate that Gadamer is sensitive to the
influence of technology on language and culture:
wUWnlhe'iife' rjH'""^!' industrial world is expanding
nJcl^^J^
wcrds°or with^f '"^^ comm n cat ng ? h
sign lamuaoe n? terms^rom thenguag of the modern industrial world Tt i«
a!so\'?f'%'?'' '''''''' '''' forms of the ndustrial age
vocabnL^v i"?9^^9^' ^^ct the irnpoverishment of the^bulary of language is making enormous progress.
.
..65
Hence, it seems clear that Gadamer is aware of the effects that
technology can have on everyday life.
What Gadamer denies is what he sees as Habermas- total separation
of the different spheres of social life from one another, the view
that cultural tradition is something distinct from work and
0^ ^o.s an. tec.n.,.es o.
'
,
'
""""
working, of forms and techniques of
domination, of ideals of liberty nf nh
•
, ..
'"'^y' Objectives of oroer ana thelike. Who will deny that our snecifin h
, ^
.
,
^^"^'^ possibilities do not
12
^"
" — . ...
domination could be set ^<^^Hc. f
^^"9-^90. "It woulo be totally
abstract to consider that It «as not through and In the concrete
experiences o. our h.an existence In domination and In .or., and onl,
here, that our hu.an understanding of ourselves, our evaluations, our
conversations with ourselves, find their fulfillment and exercise
their critical functlon..-^^ This fusion of language with wor. and
domination places the latter squarely within the reach of
hermeneutics.
..rem the her.eneutical standpoint, rightly understood,
it rs absolutely absurd to regard the concrete factors of work and
politics as outside the scope of hermeneutics."*^
This is not to deny that work and politics influence language and
tradition, but rather that they are part of that tradition as well and
hence, in order to come to know ana recognize their influence, their
impact must be articulatable in language. This is no less true for
psychoanalysis than for social phenomena such as work and politics.
In Gadamer's words, "I maintain that the hermeneutlc problem is
universal and basic for all interhuman experience, both of history ana
of the present moment, precisely because meaning can be experienced
even where it is not actually intended."*' work and domination
Gadamer.
ccunter-argu.ent is directed at what he perceives to be an
oversi.piincation of the power of reflection and the Haher^asian
-sxstence on an antithesis between reason and tradition. Gadamer
begrns b, denying Haber.as. characterization of his position, stating
that he does not insist that tradition is the only ground for
acceptance of prejudice, belief or social practice: "the idea that
tradition as such, should be and should regain the only ground for
acceptance of presuppositions (a view that Haber.as ascribes to .e)
flies in the face of my basic thesis that authority is rooted in
insight as a her.eneutical process.... Tradition is no proof and
validation of something. In any case not where validation is demanded
by reflection.
Habermas- mistake lies not just in misinterpreting Gadamer 's
position concerning the fallibility of tradition, argues the latter.
It extends to an over-estimation of the indqDendence of reason.
Gadamer interprets Habermas as saying that the exercise of reason
necessarily shatters the constellation of prejudices that we inherit
from our linguistic tradition. As Gadamer reads him, Habermas sees an
antithesis between language and reason. From Gadamer's point of view
this misses the intimate connection between the two: "our human
experience of the world, for which we rely on our faculty of
judgement, consists precisely in ^^,
,
' P°™ity Of our taking a
critical stance with renarri t„ga d to every convention, in realitv
this to the linguistic virtualitv of
therefn not,ore, present an obstacle to reason Th» ,. e linguisticallty of
^n'^-d. it is this linguisticallty that enables us to take up a
critical attitude toward our prejudices, nhe fact that it is in the
--t Of a linguistic world and through the mediation of an experience
the possibilities of critiaue nn th=q . On the contrary, the possibility of
going beyond our conventions and beyond all those experiences that are
schematized in advance, opens up before us once we find ourselves in
our conversation with others, faced with opposed thinkers, with new
critical problems, with new experiences. Fundamentally in our world
the issue is always the same; the verbalization of conventions and of
social norms^behind which there are always economic and dominating
interests."'^ Habermas' mistake, his unexamined prejudice from
Gadamer's standpoint, is to assume that reason is only active when one
confronts and rejects what alreaoy exists. But that is a one-sided
view of reason. "The real question is whether one sees the function
of reflection as bringing something to awareness in order to confront
what is in fact accepted with other possibilities - so that one can
either throw it out or reject the other possibilities ana accept what
the tradition is de facto presenting - or whether bringing something
to awareness always, dissolves what one has previously accepted . "^^
What Habermas fails to appreciate, according to Gadamer, is that
reason is operative in the examination ano acceet^
^true prejudice no less that in .k •
tradition and
,
Of false prejudice Thisfinal point carripq nc ^.u ^es us to the question of authority.
-
to the question o. tradition and prejudice. Cadaver, response to
r
critique or the Tor.r.s position on authority runs parallel
to his remarks concerning tradition. Pirst, Gada.er denies the
unpualified defense of authority that Hader.as attributes to hi.
..t
IS an inacissible imputation to hold that 1 sd.ehow meant there is no
decline of authority or no e.anciptlng criticism of authority
never stood in relation of domination to those over whom authority is
direction of his own work in trying to contain the growth of
scientific authority testifies to the importance of that issue for
him. In Gadamer's words, "Certainly I would grant that authority
exercises an essential dogmatic power in innumerable forms of
domination, from the ordering of education and the mandatory commands
of the army and government all the way to the hierarchy of power
created by political forces or fanatics."'^
What Gadamer ddes claim is that it is myopic to see authority as
opposed to freedom, an enemy of reason, or founded on and the advocate
of illegitimate prejudices. Such a view is itself a false prejudice,
one left over from the Enlightenment: "Here indeed is operating a
'"^
- renecuon
. not
Authority is not aiwa^s „ong. Vet Haber^as regards it as .
oeco-rf,-
^ a an untenable
assertion, and treason to the heritage of the Enllnhf
act nf H •
Enlightenment, that theO rendering transparent the structure of prejudgements in
uncerstanding should possibly lead to an ac^o.ledgement of
-t.orlty. authority is by his definition a dogmatic power. 1 cannot
accept this assertion that reason and authority are abstract
antitheses as the emanciptory Enlightenment did. Rather, I assert
t^at they stand in a basically ambivalent relation, a relation 1 thin.
Should be explored rather than casually accepting the antithesis as a
fundamental conviction Q,,t>,„--^
• «"tfority may or may not stand opposed
to freedom, be irrationality founded, or the prpponent of illegitimate
prejudice. But to assume that it necessarily is all these things is
to make the same type of mistake as the ungualified authoritarians who
believe that every act of authority is defensible.
Habermas- misunderstanding of authority, argues Gadamer, rests on
a misconception, inherited from the Enlightenment, of the relationship
between reason and authority. It is a view that sees a necessary
antithesis between the two, a "mistake fraught with ominous
consequences. In it reflection is granted a false power and the true
dependencies involved are misjudged on the basis of fallacious
77Idealism." if we wish genuinely to understand authority, argues
Gadamer, we must see that the key to authority, its essence, is not
obedience to arbitrary command but rather the recognition of the
superior insight of those with whom we place ourselves in a
reltionship of authority:
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legitimate, that is «hetS ?^ authority is
veiled disorder t^lt is c?LtPH h'T^""' " 'rue order or
P°»«er. It seems evident to me thL ^
arbitrary exercise of
acknowledgement is the decisivp th,^^F^^ "
authority... One need Sy stCd^ Jh» ^^^ationshlps ofand decline of authority (or its^ispl^"'"''"' °^ forfeitureIS and that out of which it grows u "^^^ authoritydogmatic power but frnm rt^nJ^° " ^^^^^ "°t from
dogmatic acceptance hL^eT' f ZTll^'"' "superiority in knowledge and insioh^ tn%h»
'
this reason one believes the an?hSwf • ^^''thorlty and for
this crucial concession thL be??fJ "^ht. Only on
Authority can rule on??'because u "Jf^P'^n-^^ foundeo.accepted. The obedience that hP^Lif f recognized and
neither blind nor sllvish.,^ ^° "^""^ authority Is
In sum, Gadamer Is arguing that td construe the relationship of
authority in terms of obedience is to misunderstand what is central to
authority. Authority rests not so much on oog.atic obedience but on
dogmatic acceptance that recognizes the superior knowledge of
another. Given this acceptance, it makes little sense from Gada^er's
perspective to construe authority as a form of domination.
Finally, any attempt at the critical evaluation of authority, at
determining its legitimacy, must Itself refer back to the language and
tradition that form the background of authority. This further ties
reason to language and tradition. There is no possibility of
abstracting oneself from one's linguistic background and confronting
authority in the manner that the Enlightenment aspired to. The
critical evaluation of authority is always and only made possible by
the shared understanding that a linguistic community inherits. Even
in the case of disagreement between those in authority and those
subject to it, there must exist commonalities that enable the two
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parties to recognize what they oisagree on "Thi. iy . s is something thathermeneutical reflection teaches us: that social^^ community, with all
tensions and disruptions, ever and ever again leads
.ac. to acc«n area of sociai understanding through «hich it exists •^^ Po.
authority no less than any other phenomena language is the
.etainstitution hy which
.e confront, examine and reject or accept
authority. There are, as Haher.as points out. illegitimate examples
and instances of authority. But It is only through language and the
co^onalities and arguments that is supplies to social actors that
these distortions of genuine authority can be recognized
Cdnsepuently. rather than completely rejecting existing tradition and
language in the critical evaluation of authority we .ust affir. the..
In sum. Gadamer persists in his argument that reason, truth and
freedom on the one hand are not inherently antithetical to authority,
tradition and language on the other. Claims to that effect, such as
Habermas', misunderstand the nature of these phenomena. In
particular, they represent a misunderstanding of the possibilities :f
reason and its relationship to language, tradition and authority.
The Habermasian Re.ioinder
Habermas' response to Gadamer's counter-argument is not simply a
reiteration of his original critique, summarized earlier, concerning
the role of reason as a liberating force, the necessity of a
methodical and self-reflective employment of reason as a aefense
against the growing technologization of contemporary society, and its
antithetical relationship to authoritv t»l.-
necessitv »nH • ^"""on of the
I ; ^"^^^""""^ " - s - 00^00
o..nat.n.
.nip.ltaion an.
..e, He^e^as in e.eot a,.s that
ada.e. is heg.ing the
,.estion. ro. the co«n understanding that
-.a.er insists is the necessa, require., for social oo™..nioation
^ay rtseir he the result of manipulation, coercion an. domination, and
^ence a false consensus. In order to insure that the underlying
consensus or oo™onalities are not themselves the result of
ideological domination, we have to go beyond that
.common
understanding, to the origins of that consensus that goes on
.hehind
the backs. Of social actors. In effect Habermas is arguing that
Gadamer fails to see that
..The dogmatic recognition of tradition, and
thrs means the acceptance of truth-claims, can be equated with
knowledge itself only when freedom from force and unrestricted
argument about tradition have already been secured within this
tradition. Gadamer.s argument pre-supposes that legitimizing
recognition ana the consensus on which it is founded can arise and
develop free from force. The experience of distorted communication
contradicts that presupposition.
Habermas goes on to point out that it us often only through false
or manipulated consensus that force becomes legitimized, and not
through voluntary recognition.
..Porce can, in any case, acquire
permanence only through the objective semblance of an unforced
pseudo-communicative agreement, force that is legitimized in such a
way we call, with Max Weber, authority. It is for this reason there
^as tc .e that principle process of a universal a,ree.ent free fro.
oo.ination In order to
.a.e the fundamental distinction between
dogmatic recognition and true consensus. Reason inr , the sense of the
principle of rational discourse, represents the roc. which factual
authorities have so far been more ll.ely to crash against than duild
upon." Gadamer.s underestimation of the extent to which authority
has historically rested on false consensus represents a serious flaw
in Philosophical hermeneutics and compromises its ability to protect
practical life from the encroachments of increasing technological
control and domination of social life. A social theory that would
measure up to this task must provide a theory of co^uhication that
would delineate the contours of rational discourse and uncoerced
consensus, and provide social theorists and actors with the means to
determine manipulated consensus and uncover distorted communication.
Habermas attempts to provide such a theory of co^unlcation with his
theory of universal pragmatics and communicative competence. In this
respect this project can be seen as the latest chapter of his response
to Gadamer.
Universal praomatics and cnmmunicative onmpptpnrp The importance of
the theory of communicative action for Habermas' project cannot be
overestimated. It represents his attempt to formulate the conditions
of rationality in oroinary, i.e. institutionally unbound, speech
acts. It represents Habermas' attempt to make explicit the conditions
of consenual agreement that Gadamer would insist must always remain in
the shadows of language or partly obscured. One sympathetic
co™entator has dascxihed Its importance this way:
Jo"nt\Xra?y1cSntL"^to'?hf ""ique of
-aterialsi.: rests' nte pS sibUUv'Tf""" °'of communication that is both JheoJ^?inI/''°"^^"9 ^^^"""tgoes beyond pure hermeneutics wUhm^ h ™™ative, thatstrictly empirical-analytic scien2e"82^"^ reducible to a
It represents an attempt to outline the criteria of rationality
against which individual systems of communication can be evaluated
The foundation upon which Habermas attempts to builo a theory of
co^unicative competence he calls universal pragmatics, a project cf
-ich it is the tas. to
..identify and reconstruct universal conditions
Of possible understanding...S3 Habermas begins his outline of
universal pragmatics by distinguishing it from logical analysis of
language, formal linguistics, and sociolinguistics. The failure of
the first two Of these approaches to the study of language is that in
their attempt to outline universal criteria for the formation of
logically or grammatically correct sentences, they fail to understand
the place of pragmtic conditions of understanding..' The logical
analysis of language that originated with Carnap focuses primarily on
syntactic and semantic properties of linguistic formations. Like
structuralist linguistics, it delineates its object domain by first
abstracting from the pragmatic properties of language and subsequently
introducing the pragmatic dimension in such a way that the
constitutive connections between the generative accomplishments of
speaking and acting subjects, on the one hand, and the general
structure of speech on the other, cannot come into view.'. 8" This
isn't so much wrong as it is an arbitrary restriction on what is
Ipe^cnlL^t^- ?;^.^"L"rwS»
t^^;- Of language In
and structuralist anaiysisof i^l ""^ "^"^h the logical
Nonetheless, this
™e?So'dologicalltS'i','' ^'^"^"Qful.
reason for the view that th= " sufficient
fro. Which one abstract L be™nd™' "r"''"" °' '''^"^Seof the successful, or at leas? n?nJ ""^^ analysis. The factlinguistic rule sCstemrcamnf P"™''^"9' reconstruction of
restricting formal analysis ?^ 11 ^ t^- ^ Justification for
the elementary units of lanolnp ?' "^J""*^ domain.... Like
units of speech (itte?ances) Sn if"^^'?^"'. the elementary
methodological attitudl"Sri
^^^^^J!^ 33
The logical analysis of language and structural linguistics, along
with a variety of other formal analyses of language developed from
logrc, linguistics and the analytic philosophy of language, are
subject to a variety of criticisms'^ claims Habermas, not the least
Of Which is the failure to understand the importance of the pragmatic
dimension to understanding.
TO remedy this shortcoming Habermas turns to the theory of speech
acts developed by Searle and Austin, and using their works as a
springboard, reconstructs the universal pragmatic conditions for
understanding. By reconstruction Habermas means the making explicit
"the intuitive knowledge of competent subjects. "'^ Habermas uses
Ryle's distinction between know-how and know-what in explicating what
he means by reconstructive science. In this respect reconstruction
attempts to make explicit the rules, criteria, and requirements of
understanding that the speaking subject employs in making himself
understood but of which he may or may not be conscious of or be able
to articulate:®'
To the extent that his utterance is correctly formed and thus
comprehensible, the author produced it incertain rules or on the basis of n t accordance with
understands the system ofI^Ls of^Is'^.n'''"'^^^^'
context-specific application hpL ^^^^uage and theirknowledge of this rule svs?p: k ^ P^^'theoretical
to enable him to produce'?he utterSnn''-"'
''''' sufficient
implicit rule consciousness is a\nn K'' ^^^^^ion. Thisin turn, who not only sha?P. h. ? ^^^r^o^- The interpreter
implicit knowledge 0 the comoetenT'' V°
^^derstano this
his know-how into a Lcond-SM^nn^'K^f ' "^"'^ transform
of reconstructive understandim th.T ^he task
explication of the sensfof r^tin f °^ "^^^^^^9
generative structures mHpIi °r?^ reconstruction of
formations. 89
underlying the production of symbolic
The Shortcoming of formal linguistics lies in the limiting focus
on comprehensibility, i.e. the requirement that the utterance by
grammatically correct. While linguistics might be able to tell us
what rules must be met to utter a grammatically correct sentence, it
does not tell us what is required for successful communication between
two agents. The meaning of an utterance is dependent upon more than
just the grammatical rules operative in language; it requires an
understanding of the interpersonal relationships that form the context
of an utterance and the substantive content of that utterance. Hence,
to understand what is required for successful understanding one must'
understand the double structure of speech, argues Habermas, i.e. "the
two communicative levels on which speaker and hearer must
simultaneously come to an understanding if they want to communicate
their intentions to one another. I would distinguish (1) the level of
intersubjectivity on which speaker and hearer, through illocutionary
acts, establish the relations that permit them to come to an
understanding with one another, and (2) the level of prepositional
content which is communicated... it is this aouble structure of
speech which enables the successful communication between two
subjects,
"in filing out the double structure nf
ir. ^- .
o speech particinani-c:in a dialogue communicate on t-wn i .
^icipants
-Lcat wo levels simultaneouslv tk
communication of a content with
'
^^o^t the role in whichthe communicated content is used Tf
,
^^ther of these dimensions
" ^
^^^^^^^ ^-^^
content or
.
the intersu.Ject.e
relationship het.een two actors
indeterminate, and surrpc;cf..i ^ccessful communication is threatened-
•c«nlc3tlcn in language can ta.e place onl.
.hen the participants.
-
~atlng with one another ahout something, simultaneously
enter upon two levels of co^unications - the level of
mtersubjectlvity on which they ta.e up personal relations and the
level of prepositional contents. "'^
Fro. this double structure of speech Haber.as Infers that there
are two possible uses that language can be put to. We can use
language to the.atize either personal relations or the prepositional
eontent of an utterance. To be sure both levels of co^unication ™ust
be present in every instance of successful communication. But we are
able to emphasize one or the other, "in the interactive use of
lanauaae we thematlze the relations into which speaker and hearer
enter
-
as a warning, promise, request - while we only mention the
propositional content of the utterances. In the cognitive use of
language, by contrast, we thematize the context of the utterances as a
proposition about something that is happening in the world (or what
could be the case) while we only Indirectly expresss the
93interpersonasl relations."
Each of these two different uses nf i=n
th .
language, the interactive andthe cognitive, raises a different type of vaiidit , •
redeemed or .et for successful h, undistorted communication. The
validity claim raised by the cognitive use of uu c language that makes
propositional content thpm=n^thematic requires constative speech acts that
Hobermas furthermore insists that the validity claim of truth ii
presupposed in all types of soeech i » •p , I.e. u is a universal validity
structure of possible speech in general. Truth is a universal
validity claim; its universality is reflected in ^h. hQ. ^ t e double structure
of speech."
Though truth is the universal validity claim, different types of
validity Claim are made thematic with uses of language other than the
cognitive, "in the interactive use of language, in which
interpersonal relations are thematically stressed, we refer in various
ways to the validity of the normative context of speech action...'^
Reference to the normative contexts raises validity claims other than
truth:
Truth is merely the most conspicuous - not the onlv
The n n'n'K'" '''I''''' '^'-^^ structures f'speech
legitimate or'i 11 nf?' 'I '''''' ^^^^^ produc'es a
pa?tLSnt^ in? ''"'^^^ interpersonal relation betweenarticipants, is borrowea from the binding force ofrecognized norms of action... In promises in
recommendations, prohibitions, prescription; *;nd the likethe speaker implies a validity claim that must, if the speech
means'bv
°
^^^^^f?'
^^^overed by existing no^ms, and tha
r?nhff 1 / ^^^^^^ ^^''^^ recognition that the^e normsrightfully exist. This internal relations between validity
norms implicitly raiseo in speech actions and the validity oftheir normative context is stressed in the interactive use of
language. Just as onlv cnn^^,^,in t,e cognitive use Sgtgr'sol^^f P-™"teaonly those speech acts arp n«^^7Z^ 2 interact!
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l TpSteri -' cuCr especific reiation that speater Jn^ h *aracterlze aof action or evaluation^ fcail ^hP.'f" "f" "^P* "°™sacts. "96 <=ail t ese regulative speech
constative speech acts; thev rai^P fho i •
.
^n y se the claim of rightness or
appropriateness.
The distinction between cognitive and interactive ianguge use
constative and regulative speech acts, and validity claims of truih
and appropriatness do not, however exha„=;t th.= , aus the range of use, speech
acts and validity claims that are required for successful
co™unication. There is a third validity clai., truthfulness or
Sincerity: The truthfulness with which a speaker utters his
-tentions can. however, he stressed at the level of co^unlcative
action in the sa.e way as the truth of a proposition and the rightness
(or appropriateness) of an interpersonal relations. Truthfulness
guarantees the transparency of a subjectivity representing itself in
language. It is especially emphasized in the expressive use of
ianauage."'^ Truthfulness, or sincerity, is as universal a
condition of successful communication as truth or appropriateness:
"truthfulness too is a universal implication of speech, as long as the
presupposition of communicative action are not altogether
go
suspended... if the validity claim of sincerity were absent from a
speech act, communicative action aimed at coming to an understanding
would be jeopoardized if not impossible. For we would then have
grounds for questioning a speaker's intentions and desire for
achieving an understanding that is the goal of communicative action.
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norms of (at Ippc;-!-^ fo^-jvileast) tactly recognized institutions, can have the
Uiocutionary force that they do when they are successfui.
..n the
case Of institutionaiiy unbound speech acts, however, iiiocutionary
normative context. The iiiocutionary force with which the speaker, in
carrying out his speech act, influences the hearer, can be understood
only if we take into consideration sequences of speech acts that are
connected with one another on the ha,i= nfb s s of a reciprocal recognition of
validity Claims."'' Moreover, these validity claims are the
foundation of the rationality pf speech acts, i.e. it is only because
speech acts raise these validity claims that the iiiocutionary force
of speech can rationally influence the hearer:
commitments are connected with cognitlSely typicalialidltv
rafional ^S^f
^^'.^ecause the reciprocal bonds haJe a
Inlr^ft ^^t ^"9^9^^ =P^aker normally commits thespecific sense in which he would like to take up an
i^n^ff""?"^ relationship with the thematically stressed
^otunlc'ation:iaS^
''^'^'^
^ ^Pecif- mo^del o1"°
The validity claims raised in speech acts, and particularly those made
thematic in the use of specific types of speech acts, provide the
basis for determining what types of reasons, evidence, and
justifications must be provided to legitimize the speech act that is
-ade; the type of evidence, reasons and Justifl^.^•diiu j ication considered
acceptable vary with the use Of language
..m the . .
0^ language, the speaker proffers a speech t
"
nrovl..
=P«sch-ac -i™inent
obliaation tom^^. Cohstative speech acts contain the off:;:^;::,-
-ssary to the ^ ^^^^^ ^^^^^^^ ^^^^^ .
-es not dispel ad hoc douht. the persistingly problematic trugh clai.
can become the subject of a theoretical discourse...^"l similarly in
t^e interactive and expressive uses of language the speaker incurs the
Obligation tp recur to the normative context, i.e. to provide
justification, and the obligation to prove trustworthy, respectively.
Here again, if doubt remains, further justification at a different
level Of discourse is available, m the case of the interactive use
Of languge this means engaging in practical discourse; in the case of
the expressive use of language the doubts concerning the
trustworthiness of the speaker "can only be checked against the
consistency of his subsequent behavior.
Ih sum, Habermas claims to have constructed a model of linguistic
communication, a model in which the tacit presuppositions ana
requirements for any successful communication are outlined:
"Institutionally unbound speech acts owe their illocutionary force to
a cluster of validity claims that speakers and hearers have to raise
and recognize as justified if grammatical (and thus comprehensible)
sentences are to be employed in such a way as to result in successful
communication. A participant in communication acts with an
orientation to reaching understanding only under the condition that,
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-
emon., co.p.hensi.,e sentences in
.is speec. acts,
.e
.ises
t
-
clai. in an accepta.e
... He claims t.t. to. atate p^oposUionai content o. to. t.e existential presuppositions ot
a mentioned propositional content Hp m •c . e claims lightness (or
justxf, an interpersonal relation that is to be perfor.ativeiy
established Pinali,, he ciai^s truthfulness tor the intentions
expressed."
in an, particular speech act one of these validity claims ™av be
addressed explicitly or the.atically while the others are temporarily
assumed. Nonetheless, each valioity claim is at least still raised in
in a particular speech act: "Of course, individual validity claims
can be the.atically stressed, whereby the truth of the propositional
Cdhtent comes to the fore in the cognitive use of language, the
Tightness (or appropriateness) of the interpersonal relation in the
interactive, and the truthfulness of the speaker in the expressive.
But in every instance of communicative action the system of all
validity claims comes into play: they must always be raised
Simultaneously, although they cannot all be thematic at the same
time." While one validity claim is thematized, the truth of the
others remains at the level of assumption unless and until they are
subsequently brought into question.
The theory of universal pragmatics represents the core of
Habermas' theory of communicative competence. There are other
features of his account of undistorted communication that require
mention in order to give a complete account of h-
theorv Tn communicative
--r.. in acdrtron to t.e t.ree vaii.it, ciaims oisccvereo in
—
^
—
s
an. t.e one ciaime. iin,,tics a e
ccmprehensibility), Habermas insists th«t f
to take n,=
""distorted communictlon
piace eacb actor
.ust bave e.uai cbances or opportunity toenoaoe rn communicative actions, u one or more actors is den ed tbeopportunity to engage in communicative action or if that
prejudiced by tbe actions of otbers then tu-n , he requirement of
distorted communication bas been violated, and any consensus tbat
-rges is suspect and may not be cbaracteri.ed as a legitimate,
uncoerced consensus.
The second requirement concerning communicative competence is that
each Of the actors must be committed to discussion until universal
agreement is reached. Only in the ra,o nf = k •^y c se of such universal agreement
can it be said that the consensus that emerges is a totally uncoerced
consensus. If speakers are not committed to dialogue until consensus
IS reached, they may begin to engage in strategic action that would
undermine the process of undistorted communication resulting in a
false consensus.
Universal Pragmatics and Authority
Habermas- theory of communicative competence and universal
pragmatics seems to deny the practice of authority any positive or
constructive role in the formation of a genuine consensus and the
pursuit of rational action that would emerge from that consensus. If
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the model of undistorted communioation
resultino in •icb i g universal
agreement is the paradigm or guioing ioeal of h
it would follow that the •exerorse of authority must represent an
a. revration, interruption and substitute for genuinely democratio
act.on. authority is that set of relationships that are substituted
™t, for When a dialogue has not deen allowed to
ccnunue to the point of universal agreement. Henoe, the e.eroise of
-thorit, is also a substitute for rational action. This point is
substantiated by what Habermas says oonoerning the public sphere The
Prcise Of bourgeois ideology «as the replacement of rule of authority
Of the absolutist state with the rule of reason exercised through
public opinion. The growth of scientific forms of social control has
eroded the public sphere within liberal capitalist societies and
replaced the rational, practical public decision making with a
technologically oriented decision making process. The point that is
relevant here for our purposes is that Habermas account of the public
sphere guided by reason seems to have no place for authority, or at
least would limit the duties of authority to the carrying out of
policies consensually arrived at through rational discussion in the
public sphere. Those in authority would have no independence and
limited responsibility.
Habermas has indicated that the ideal speech sitution, the setting
in Which undistorted communication is realized, is to be regarded as a
regulative ideal by which to measure existing patterns of
communication and consensual agreements. This seems to imply that a
recognition that the ideal of undistorted communication is not in
net a o.spen3..e aspect o. soc.a. H.e. „ . an acc.ete
c.aractenzaUcno.Ha.e™as...aaa.^^^^^
:i 7" -™ -cse .enaeauons .0.
---- 0^ a.t.omv, it see.
.nc..ent
.pon Ha.e^as to a...ess
:
7""" "
---^-0 t.at a.t..U. CO..
.e
™a.e de^ocatic or outliMno the relationship between the theor, of
universal pragmatics and the practice cf authority
.
one possible impact of Haber^as- theory of universal pragmatics
can be projected. His elucidation of the prag.agtic reguire^ents for
successful, undistorted co^unication could supply social actors «ith
a framework for analyzing the policies, pronouncements and directives
Cf thdse in authority. Habermas. account of the validity claims that
speech acts raise would enable thdse over whom authority is exercised
tc determine what types of arguments, evidence, reasons an appeals
™ust be provided or made in order to justify the vailidity claims
raised by the pronouncements of those in authority or by the
justifications for policies those in authority embark on. For
example, if an authority 'A' engaged in a communicative action
(justification for policy X) that raised validity claims that could
cnly be redeemed by reference to data on the performance of the
economy, but in fact relied for justification of that policy on claims
to sincerity of the individual in authority, Habermas' theory of
universal pragmatics would enable us to determine the inappropriate
justification for that policy as well as clarify what types of
evidence need to be offered but are in this instance missing. If this
authoritv if Qhn. u .
H^ciLxuns ory, It should be pointed out that precisely thic k
suh<;;tifnf.-
P-^ecis s phenomena ofbst tuting sincerity for truth in fho .the redemption of constative
speech acts is commonplace with i-h. o
, ,
^ '^^9^^ administration ano either
r -dents Of
P^ics, if correct about the p.gmatic requirements for successful
communication, would supplv extenripri =r,HPPiy tended and more specific criteria for
the determination of the rationaiity of particular policies
pronouncements, etc., than would Pe possible otherwise. It'would
enable us to determine when a particular action, polio, or course of
action by those in authoritv wa^ iiicfif.-,^^ ^ .ux y s justified and whether or not the
justification for what policy was appropriate.
The Habermas-n^^riampr n^K^te Evaluated
Having completed our exposition of the positions of both Habermas
and Gadamer we will now offer our evaluation and criticisms of their
respective positions. As we pointed out in the beginning of the
previous chapter, Gadamer sets the protection of practical and
political life from the potential total domination by scientific
method and technological control as the primary goal of philosophical
hermeneutics. In this respect he can be interpreted as taking up the
challenge that Heidegger outlines in The Question Concerning
Technoloqy
.
Moreover, Gadamer is aware of the magnitude of this
problem; he understands the possibilities of technologically
controlled forms of life siinnin^ graoually into our everyday
discourse, in linhi- nf fK^ght Of the magnitude and persistence of the prohle.
one must question, however, whether p.h .t^i, n Gadamer's philosophical
everyday life to resist the encroacn.ents of teo.nolocical control
At ti.es Oada.er see.s to place
.is fait, in t.e infinity of lan^.^e
and Philosophy, speaking of the capacity of modern industrial
societies to technologically substitute artificial language for
authentic or spontaneous language he says, "the impoverishment of the
vocabulary of language is making enormous progress, thus bringing
about an approximation of language to a technical sign-system
Leveling tendencies of this kind are irresistable. Vet in spite of
thrs the Simultaneous building up of our own world in language still
persists whenever we want to say something to each other. The result
is the actual relationship of men to each other. Each one is at first
a kind of linguistic circle, and these linguistic circles come into
contact with each other, merging more and more. Language occurs once
again, in vocabulary and grammar as always, and never without the
inner Infinity of the dialogue that is the progress between every
speaker and his partner. Genuine speaking, which has something to say
and hence does not give prearranged signals, but rather seeks words
through which one reaches the other person, is the universal human
task
-
but it is the special task of the theologian, to whom is
commissioned the saying further of a message that stands
written. The implication is that in spite of the perserverence
of technology, language will always provide us with a refuge, resevoir
and resource to enable us to elude th= =^""^
^"'^«3*^"'ents of technologicaldo..nat.on of everyday life. Given the infi^tv of l,n^'ir nity a guage, any
attmpt at the creation of a total] v t.nK . •ly, technologically controlled
language is futile.
in part what the questions co.es
.own to, I thin., is to what
extent does the threat of a technologically controlled for. of life
consist pri.arily or totally of artificially created language, a sign
art.frcially created meaning, coupled with the self-.isunderstanding
on the part of science, concerning its universality, is the
.ost
important dimension, if not exhanstiu,. „pustive, of the problems concerning the
relationship between everyday life and the ever increasing,
•irresistable' tendencies toward technological control. If these two
Phenomena are what are at question then the independence and infinity
Of language and the inherent disposition toward philosophy on the part
of science might be sufficient to guarantee the long run integrity of
everyday social life.
This Characterization of Gadamer's perception of the problem would
make two other positions of his more intelligible. First, it would
explain why he insists in the preface of the second edition of Truth
and Method that he is not, and philosophy has no business, telling
science what it should and should not do and why he claims not to be
prescribing methods for the human sciences, but that he is only giving
an account of what actually is the- case regarding language, truth and
science. Second, it would make his appeal to commonalitites, i.e.
common concerns that all of us face as human beings, as the basis of
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practical action,
.ere understandable. Forif th
df technninn- , ^
Pdlitical problemsb ologrcal societ. consist primarily in artificially created
-nrno and scientist, bot. . 3re resoluble b. features
:irt""""^^"""'^""^^^-^--' t.n questions
—
.
Political problems be.in to appear as
^^sunderstandin,
.icb are resolvable because of tbe universality of
accord between conflicting parties that will serve as the basis for
further dialogue. Moreover, the infinity of language would guarantee
that even in the face of a self-conscious attempt to create an
emerge that would constantly elude the net of technological control
and many older meaning would slip throught the net itself.
Even if we grant the accuracy of this characterization of the
problems confronting modern society from the growth of science,
questions emerge that challenge the optimism that Gadamer exhibits.
First, the infinity of language does not guarantee that the meanings
that escape the net of the technological sign system and the new ones
that emerge in response to the growth of science are necessarily
rational or sufficiently strong to resist or reverse the infiltration
of science and scientific control into everyday life. Counterculture
responses to the Americn way of life as well as those political
responses that borrowed from primitive societies or revolutionary
movements in pre-industrial societies proved either helpless in the
face of the technological society they confronted, or were themselves
co-opted by the institutions of those technological societies, or,
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dissappointed by the failure of those altPrn.f
•
e atives, dissolved when
their proponents realized the futilitv of fh'^'^^ °^ responses, and in someinstances became apologists for the very societies th.ci ey once opposeo
^e.g., former Maoists in Franno^ tFrance), m short, the infinity of language
.
and meaning
.oes not guarantee that the responses that emerge wiii
.e
rational responses. In this respect the accusation of irrationalis.
that Haber^as levels at Gada.er is, in so.e respects, correct.
second, it is not clear that the tendency to philosophy that
Gadan»er believes is inherent in science would itself serve as a
countervailing power regaroing the growth of tehcnological society
certainly in Angolc-A.erican philosophy the tendency has been for
professional philosophy, one without the German humanist tradition
that Gada.er see.s tc place so^e faith in, to become the hand-maiden
of precisely the tendencies that Gadamer wants to resist. This
problem is exacerbated by the popular view that the practical and
philosophical issues that philosophy must address are themselves not
subject to rational discussion and resolution. They appear as the
decisions of private individuals, mere value judgements that can clash
but never be completely adjudicated. Hence, the faith that Gadamer
places in the inherent philosophical tendencies of science or
scientific society seems misplaced in a society that has co-opted
philosophy, views it as irrelevant, or removed it to the realm of
private decision, immune to rational deliberation.
But Gadamer 's characterizaton of the nature of the problem facing
everyday practical, political life and its relationship to
technological forms of control is itself questionable. It is perhaps
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here that Habermas' criticic^mc . .
''''
'''' ^^P-t-t. If in addition tothe problems of meaning that emerge between evervn.u L yoay practical life
-
fo™s or tecHno:og.ca. control tHere a. st.ct.al p.o.le. pose,
y
t.e spheres of wor. an. pputical power, p.o.le^s that reao.
.eyon.
the resources available to a societv fho . iy, the resolution of these problems
would seem to require thp coif ^„e self-conscious, methodical application of
reason that Habermas advocates and thof r adu that Gadamer disparages. The
structural contradictions and constraints that face ™any liberal
capitalist societies today are not just problems of the conflict
between created meanings of technological for^s of control and the
meanings of everyday life. They represent conflicting imperatives for
action that either totally undermine other imperatives (structural
contradictons) or jeapordize the success of other imperatives
(structural constraints). The result, according to Habermas, is a
series of economic crises that are displaced to other spheres of life
and translated into crises of legitimacy, motivation, etc.^O' what
Habermas does in examining these crises is pay close attention to the
breakdown of traditional meanings regarding work, politics and social
life and show how changes in those meanings have potential impact on
other spheres of social life. In effect he has paid much closer
attention than Gadamer has to the relationship between work and
politics and traditional meanings that Gadamer makes so much of.
Although Gadamer insists that the problems of work and politics must
ultimately be articulated in language, Habermas offers us an account
of how this has happened and the ways that issues and meanings lose
their force, change, or become problematic in the process.
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were
Hcreove.. even if the
sel.^.s.n.erstan.ino of science
...
fact society coul.
.e ad.resse. without the interference of private
interests. Suppose, for the sake of argument it h
.
, became obvious that
the increasing pollution of the earth ^ .n was understood as the result of
a misconceived view of the earfht as a mere reservoir of disposable
resources and that this view hid ether perspectives of our possible
relationship with nature. The question regains as to whether those
Who stood the most to privatel, gain or lose, those organizations
Whose private wealth is dependent upon the instrumental approach to
harvesting resources and disposing of pollution, would comply with
demands for changes in the use of resources and disposal of
pollution. Gadamer seems to believe that the realization of
co^onalities and the change in misunderstanding of scientific ways of
thinking would lead to changes in our economic and industrial
relationships with nature. This is at best contentious. It threatens
to mark philosophical hermeneutics with a political naivite that would
condemn it to political irrelevance and manipulation. In this context
Gadamer 's positions on several other issues come into question and
thereby jeapordizes his account of authority. We will deal
specifically with the universality of language and his account of the
connection between reason and authority.
In some respects the most fundamental issue between Gadamer and
Habermas is the question concerning the universality of language.
Gadamer believes that Habermas falls to understand and appreciate the
extent to which language influences, affects, enables ana constrains
us even in our most reflect iuo m
fails to appreciate the power of reflection
regarding language, and ignores the ore , •
Dersnn=, h
P"^-^^"SU"tic dimension of ourp o al and social lives Tho ,•
What Gad
" ''''' ''''''''
- Clarifyw amer means when he says that i.nn •^d n language is universal.
The statement that 'Bp inn fhof
. ^
'"'"3 '"^^ understood is language can
-e two
.eanlngs. Pirst. it can
.e interpreted as a clai. of
radical, linguistic idealis. that onl, those things that enter
language can .e understood hecause language completely constitutes
face Of competing languages this position is pushed to linguistic
this
.ost radical for. nothing exists outside of language. It is
possible to interpret Gadamer this way at times, and at times I
believe Habermas does.
But the phrase 'Being that can be understood is language' can have
another meaning. It can be interpreted as claiming that
.hat
distinguishes
.an from other animals in his understanding of the world
is that understanding is, in principle, articulatable, that it fines
its most perfect expression in language. This view need not make the
linguistic idealist claim that the world per se is constituted
linguistically, but it might make the somewhat more modest claim that
only those things that find linguistic expression can be understood by
me and thereby enter my world as something I can act on, take account
of, avoid, discuss, deny, desire, etc. Other things may exist in the
185
'° '''''
- ^° ---tan. the.
„.st ente. ™,
language. :n this respect the
.orl. that is avaUa.le to .e is
available onl, through language, and understanding of other
cultures, other historical periods, or previous!, unnoticed dimensions
It is this last clai. that I take Gada.er to be .aking when he
says 'Being that can be underc;tnnH -.-o ^rstood is language- and that our worla is
linguistically constituted. But if this ic, fhoDUL 17 n is the case, then he must be
raalrty that is unknown to .e or
.isunderstcod by ™e because n,y
language is inappropriate for their understanding. One example of
thrs would be cargo cults of the South Pacific which mistook airplanes
for God's messengers. A second might be the paleo-symbols that
psychoanalytic theory claims come into existence in the pre-linguistic
stage of personality development. A third would be the political
tensions and dilemmas that citizens experience in contemporary society
but which do not seem to find expression in the political vocabulary
available to them.
But having admitted this, one of Gadamer's primary claims
regarding the universality of language remains defensible, i.e. that
these things must find expression in the language of actors before
they can be understood. Hence, even Habermas points out that in the
analytic situation the analyst must be able to translate, through
scenic understanding, the paleo-symbols that remain at the unconscious
level into language that is familiar to the patient. Only then is it
possible for the patient to act on f...
rh.n K- °^ attempt toc a ge his behavior. His worln h
, , .
°^ly when the analyst'sknowledge finds expression in the patient'. 1
^ ^ language. This I think is
as psychoanalysis does.
The issue concerning the universality of language
.len.s into the
questions involving the autonomy of reason with respect to language
and the force of reason vis a vis language. Haber.as hi.self argues
that a language ga^a that is congealed internall, and hermetically
sealed externally «ould per.it an identity of meaning,
.ut that this
Identity of meaning would prevent the auton^ous development of
ego-identity. Hader.as seems to be implying a connection here between
freedom and the indeterminacy of language, i.e. that the former is
dependent upon the alienation and distanciation enabled by the
latter. Vet this throws into question the status of the ideal speech
situation based on a theory of undistorted communication and the
redemption of validity claims that Habermas identifies as constituting
the pragmatic requirements of communication. The achievement of the
ideal speech situation would seen, to result in an identity of
meaning. If this is the case, and it the identity of meaning would
close off the alienation and distanciation required for autonomous
self-identity, the achievement of the ideal speech situation would
result in the type of repressive constraint on freedom that Habermas
aims at preventing. On the other hand, to grant the indeterminacy of
language, to allow that meaning embodied in language is greater than
187
the capacity to reflectively
appropriate th=t
=ada.er.s point that the li.it of
'° ^^^"^
^ m s reason are areatpr fhor. u .
sppmc: w-; n • .
y ei than Habermaseems willing to admit.
That the boundaries nf ianr,,o
capacity of langluage to clarifv
°
^'^^^^y ^^^g^age and redeem validity Claims
seems to be an implication of the nranm^i-.vi-ne p gmatic requirements of
communication that he so carefully details Tfr . I communication involved
only the sinole use of language, raising only one type of validity
c:a.. at a ti.e, one coul. conclude that the conditions for rendering
the
.eaning of any particular speech act totally transparent could
.e
met. But Habermas insists that =11all three pragmatic validity claims
truth, appropriateness, and truthfullness, are present in any speel
act, but that only one of them can be made thematic and redeemed at
any particular time. He says,
..individual validity claims can be
thematically stressed whereby the truth of the proposition content
comes to the fore in the cognitive use of language, the rightness (or
appropriateness) of the interpersonal relation in the interactive, and
the truthfulness of the speaker in the expressive. But in every
instance of communicative action the system of all validity claims
comes into play; they must always be raised simultaneoulsy, although
they cannot be thematic at the same tme.'''°^ This implies that the
redemption of even the validity claim made thematic might
provisionally presume that the other validity claims could be redeemed
as well. Moreover the redemption of the speech validity claims
themselves assume that the speech acts engaged In the redemption of
the initial communication can also meet these validity claims, ad
infinitum. But this n-r^. • ^IS preciseiy the type of restriction or li.it onreason that Gadamer insists that h.h •Habermas ignores.
it appears that this arrnnnf p
ad.Us two . ^^"^"^ ^^^i-
-stitutions an. nor^s that for™ the background of those other
other clai.s but U is possible only by assuming the redemptions of
previous validity claims remains in tact and is unchanged by the
redemption of or failure to redeem subsequent vallolty claims
second. Habermas. account of how each validity claim is redeemeo
further substantiates Gadamer's argument concerning the inescapability
Of language. Habermas argues that each validity claim is redeemed
differently. Truth, appropriateness, and sincerity ultimately appeal
to experiential sources, normative context, and subsequent behavior
respectively. But one of Cadaver's points is that what can count as
experience, what determines the normative context, and what in a
person's behavior will be taken as evidence of sincerity are all
influencao (determined is too strong a word) by the historical period
and linguistic traditions one finds oneself m short, no
matter how far one wishes to press one of the validity claims of
speech, that further scrutiny must always take place in the language
one has inherited.
The final issue between Gaoamer and Habermas, ano one that flows
from the previous issue u fh=
"
... ::. : r : -
recalled that Gadamer'c;
being ineliminable, it was an abstraction h. , •claimed, to imagine
ourselfes acting m ways that were not partlv inf,Nu y influenced by the
authority of tradition. Moreover thP h.o- •, e decision to acknowledge aPaniciar in.i.i..ai as an a.tbo.it. rests on the recognition o. bis
an exercise of freedom.
However, latter in his rejoinder to Habermas, Gadamer
Characterizes the relationship between those in authority and those
over who. authority is exercised as dogmatic acceptance rather than
dogmatic Obedience. Unfortunately, it is unclear how dogmatic
acceptance is any more rational that dogmatic obedience, and does
nothing to enable us to determine which instances of dogmatic
acceptance are rational and which ars nnt ri- „ ,"" n e o . It could even be argued
that it is precisely dogmatic acceptance that characterizes the
relationship between everyday practical life and technological
society. Hence, Gadamer' s account of authority threatens to undermine
the earlier case he made for the compatibility of authority with
reason. The problem could be resolved if he were willing to make the
~ve that Winch makes when Winch claims that the pronouncements of
those in authority can always be checked by those over whom authority
is exercised by reference to the way of life that gives rise to
positions of authority and of which the authoritative pronouncements
or actions are meant to extend ri=f ^
in.. .
' °" ^^^^i°P- But Gaaamer'sinsistence on dogmatic acceptance precludes thisi i a possibility. Itchanges Winch's triadic r=i=,nrelationship into one in which those in
authority are the only source of inf„
authors •
information that those pyer whomhority is exercised haye concernlnn
Questlnn T
i g the way pf life or tradition inq io . TO describe this type pf acceptance pf authority as
rational is to stretch the meaning pf reason beyond recognisable
^-rts. Hprepver. and cpntrary to Cadamer's purposes, it could
easny be used to legitimize the most complete forms pf tePhnplpgical
control of practical life.
Habermas. alternative account of authority is not, howeyer, a
satisfactory response. Habermas' account of reason leaves little room
for authority in rational discourse and the formation of rational
authority that are also forms of domination. Even his account pf
teacher student relationships is interpreted in these terms-
iiiflsfsirs
l^inkf^tl^TZ' prospect Of'
But this is one-sided vie« of authority in the educatipnal
'
relationship, pne that is characteristic of a distorted or perverted
educatipnal prpcess. It may be true that some forms of education are
systems of socialization. But surely other forms of education are
aimed at knowledge, at providing the student not with traditional
values or goals but with sun.Skills ana the development of critical
capacity that eventually make thP »Hy e educational relationship
unnecessary. To describe such a relatinn^h-'^^^^tionship as a system of
domination is something of a distortion.
interestingly enough, the example of psychoanalysis that Habermas
anguag and one
.hich he thinks provides the basis for rejecting
^adamer.s claims regarding the identity or reason and authority
Uself involves an authority relationship that Habermas seems t^
ignore. In the analytic situtation the analyst occupies an
episte.ologically privileged position regarding the structure of mind
personality development, and the dynamics of the analytic situation
'
that are necessary for the success of the analytic experience. The
analyst is 'an authority on these things. Although the ultimate
success of the psychoanalytic experience rests on the patient
acceptance or validation of the explanation offered by the analyst
the analyst is still in the position of determining which parts of the
raw material that comes to the surface in the analytic relationship
will be worked up and offered as an explanation to the patient. Hence
there is a dependence between the patient and the analyst made
possible by the analyst's privileged knowledge and skill.
This point has serious implications for Habermas, for he takes the
example of psychoanalysis and the analytic relationship between
patient and analyst as the paradigm of emancipatory knowledge and
application of critical theory. If the relationship between the
critical theorist and other social actors is analagous to that between
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accurately described as an error nf n™- •
°^ °™^^^°"- I" offering the theory
0 co™..,.3tive action as an ideai of
.distorted co^unication upon
whrch one would duiid genuine consensus, Hader^as ad.its that the
"eai speech situation that «oulo resuit in consensus is unii.eiy to
be achieved in practice. Hence, any poiiticai decisions that resuit
-
actuai poiiticai life,, even one guided by critical theory are
l^^ely to be less than the genuine consensus that Haber.as believes is
the
.ark of true democracy. Presumably, in the absence of genuine
consensus, sd.e type of political authority would be reguired to carry
out those decisions that were
.ade before genuine consensus could be
reached. This means that the probability that those decisions will
conflict with the political wills of at least some of the political
actors of that society will remain. Unfortunately, Habermas offers no
positive account of what this authority might look like, how it may be
made more democratic, or how it may be held accountable.
One final problem that both Habermas and Gadamer face is the
depoliticization of the problem both attempt to redress. There are
several aspects of Gadamer 's work that contribute to this
depoliticization. First, his model of the dialogue as the primary
form of social interaction, though it provides a number of insights
concerning hermeneutic understanding, does not reflect many of the
problems that emerge in political life. This was partly reflected in
our discussion of the promise of philosoDh,>=, h
the Drohi»™
P'lilosophical hermeneutics in solvingP cdle. concerning the growth of technological society. But it is
«th co^onalities. Though I thin, this is in part correct for
-at Will deco. Clearer in the next chapter, the examples he
hunger, and world-«ide pollution are problematic in a sense. There is
nc agreement on
.hat the nature and causes of these problems are and
seme contemporary political leaders, particularly those in the current
Reagan administration, deny the unqualified undesirability of those
problems. Indeed, on some political questions, one example being
abortion, one would be hard out tn fi^n ^"d o p o find any deep common accord that
would unite the interested parties in a dialogue.
Moreover, in Gadamer's example, the dialogue relies on further
discussion between the participants whenever agreement is not reached
or misunderstanding occurs. In politics such furhter discussion is
often cut off. (sometimes necessarily), if it is present at all.
Hence, though philosophical hermenuetics may contribute to our
understanding of social action in importantt ways, it falls short of
providing us with an account of political life. This inability or
failure to take accunt of the political dimension of social meaning
prevents Gadamer from being able to develop a theory of political
authority, democratic or otherwise.
If Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics includes an apolitical
strain, Habermas' version of critical theory is no less guilty of the
same flaw. For Habermas, democracy seems to be ianetical with
consensus agreement ana the process by which true rn n consensual
agreeement is reached. Only when .n ,,nW a uncoerced, total consensus hasbeen achieved has the ideal nf f .
process of •
'^^^ "^^^^^^ the
. co..ng to a consensus is interrupted defore genuine
truly democratic Rut if +.k
-nsensus is achieveahad the Characteristic that Haber^as clai.s it has; if ail the
validity Claims that are necessary for undistorted co^unication are
^u^mied; if actors alsc refrain fro. engaging In strategic action
and suspended their co^it.ent to action altogether while the process
Of coming to consensus works itself out, It is difficult to see what
role politics would play in the emancipatory i.eal. The interruption
Of the process of coming to consensual agreement can 5e interrupted
exther by the exercise of authority or by the political engagement of
some of the participants. Either route results in th=iu Lc l i the compromise of
the system of undlstorted communication and the ideal speech
situation. The Implication of this seems to be that political
authority per se is Indicative of the pre-emption of rational action
and consensus.
In spite of their disagreements several important similarities
emerge between Habermas and Gadamer. First, and most obviously, both
recognize the importance of language and the fact that it has assumed
a central place in social theory. Habermas, in the Postscript to
Knowledge and Humain Interests
, says:
The human interest in autonomy and responsibility is not
mere fancy, for it can be apprehended a priori. What
raises us out of nature is the only thing whose nature
we can know: lanauanp tk,^ u .
and responsibIlI?fffe posUed fn^' ^^tonomysentence expresses uneqSiW^^^ 0*^^ ^irst
^
universal ana unconstra^nlH ^ intention of
autonomy and res ons ITnlfll'J; ^l''''
^^^ether,
possess a priori in the sense of J^p k^^^ ^^^^tradition.
1^;^
^^^^^ °^ the philosophical
An exsew.e.e.
..Tc.a. t.e p.oble. of ,an,.age
.as
.place, t.e
tra.U.onaI p„..e. o. ccnsc.ousness; t.e t.anscen.enta: c.t,,. o.language supercedes that of consciousness ""2 Th» • .u . e importance of
language of H3.er.as is further eW.ence. the centraUt. of speach
-
his theory of co^unicative action an. his eiahoraticn of universal
Prag.atics. Ironicaiiy. the reguirements that Haher.as sets
.»n for
the successful completion of un.istorte.. institutionally unhoun.
speech acts are all requirements that would have to be met hy the
participants in Gadamer 's dialogue.
Second, though they may disagree about the efficiency of
reflection and its ability to neutralize, disperse and penetrate
established meanings, I think their disagreement is best seen as a
difference of emphasis rather than an unresolvable conflict. At times
Gadamer admits that meanings that we reflect on often no longer have
the same force that they previously had, but that this does not free
us from the language we inherit or the net of traditional meanings
that our language transmits. Habermas, on the other hand, admits that
we can no longer aspire to complete independence from our language,
that even the validity claims of universal pragmatics are dependent on
established norms and institutions, but that the exercise of reason
can be made methodical ana can engage traditional meanings in ways
that allows us to distance ourselves from them and limit the claims
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2 - - Ha.e™as 1. .ct intimates at one point that the
--.enoes that separate CaPamer an. himsei. are ones or emphasis-
n present conditions it ma. be more urgent to indicate the limits ofthe false claim to universal if v m.H u
'^''^
=""=i3m rather than that ofthe hermeneutic claim to universality wherp th« h- .e dispute about the
grounds for justification is concerned, however It n' "u , i is necessary to
critically examine the latter claim, too.""^
Thirdly, both seem to believe that the practice of authority is
'
such that it absolves those in authority from having to offer reasons
explanations, and justifications for their actions. Habermas focuses
on authority as a form of domination, as force that has legitimized
Itself, usually ideologically. Gadamer's insistence that authority is
that Which is dogmatically recognized threatens to preclude the
possibility of criticising authority. In this respect Gadamer differs
somewhat from his counterpart in England, Peter Winch. Indeed, it
could be argued that the dogmatic obedience to authority (a
Characterization the Gadamer explicitly rejects as being to
inconsistent with the exercise of reason), promises greater
possibilities for democratic authority. In the case of dogmatic
obedience I might insist on retaining my right of judgement while
obeying those commands or complying with those policies that I believe
to be wrong or misguided. But I at least reserve my right of
judgement. In the case of dogmatic acceptance, I surrender even my
right of judgement. Hence, my basis on which to hola authority
accountable, to chasten authority, is somewhat more restricted.
Finally, as we have pointed out, there are apolitical tendencies
in both t.in.e.s. Por Oad»er the
.odeX of the dialogue, his faith ^
Phiiosophy and the infinity of language, and the faith in
co^onaiities between participants/antagonists in the dialogue would
see. to leave substantial areas of politioal life that he would have
difficulty acoounting for. similarly, Hahex.as.
.odel of consensual
agreement as the
.odel of democratic decision
.a.ing would eliminate
politics fro. his View of true democracy, it implies that those who
would favor democracy must see politics and the imposition of
authority that results as the interruption of the formation of
democratic will or decision, it implies that a truly democratic way
of life, even if only an ideal, entertains no politics and that a way
Of life that celebrates politics will always fall short of democracy.
in spite of their shortcomings, both Gadamer and Haberaas advance
the debate concerning authority some distance. As Habermas points
out, Gadamer's project of philosophical hermeneutics provides an
important corrective to science's self-understanding, even if
Gadamer does underestimate the necessity df methodically applied
reason. In addition, Gadamer's focus on the connections between
language and reason emphasizes the extent to which the latter is
both constrained and enabled by established social meanings.
Habermas, on the other hand, provides the necessary counterbalance to
Gadamer's faith in the anonymous authority of tradition. Moreover,
Habermas' examination of the pragmatic reguirements of understanding
make explicit the tacit assumptions we all hold in our attempts at
communicative action, and he thereby helps to outline the foundations
of a form of rational discourse that could address the problems of
social practice.
CHAPTER IV
TOWARDS A THEORV OF OEMCCRATIC AUTHORITY
in the preceding chapters
.e have seen how the debates in
conte^pcrary phncsophv and pcUtical theory thc.gh they raise the
.estion or the nature o. authority and Us reiaticnship tc iang.ge
and reason,
.ai: to provide satis.actcrv answers to that question and
ParUcuiarly fail to resoive the prodie. of poiiticai authority Both
Of the interpretive theorists we have examined insist that the
relationship detween authority on the one hand, and reason and freedo.
on the other, is not an antithetical relationship that thinkers since
the Enlightenment have thought it to be. ^s clai. hinges on the
connection that reason, freedo. and authority have to language and a
co^on way of life. aada.er Insists that the internal connection
between reason and language, i.e. that reason is embedded in a
language that we are historically delivered up to, means that there
need not be a conflict between reason and traditional authority. But
Gadamer-s insistence on the dogmatic acceptance of authority would
make submission to authority rational only in an extremely restricted
sense of the term. Moreover, he downplays the coercive potential of
some types of authority, a result of his apolitical tendencies in his
examination of meaning, language and social life. Winch, on the other
hand, recognized the need for critical leverage regarding authority
and argues that the common way of life that those over whom authority
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is exercised and those In authority share, provides not only the
defining features of authority hut the standards for Justification and
critical evaluation as well. But his identity of those
.in authority
with those Who are 'an authorityitself attempts to resolve the
proble. of political authority by conceptual fiat. Like Gada.er.
Winch in the end downplays or underestimatpc fhoH y ui o es the coercive potential of
authority.
Hollis- notion of autonomous man, with its concept of objective
real interest and strong personal identity that is distanced from
language and traditions, leaves absolutely no room for the authority
of either tradition, individuals or institution, of the thinkers we
have examined Mollis comes closest to the Enlightenment account of the
relationship amongst language, reason, freedom, authority and
tradition. But in spite of his attempt to avoid the pitfalls of the
Enlightenment, and particularly the mistake of positing a pre-social
form of personal identity
,
Mollis fails to resolve the tension
between strong personal identity and an identity that is also social
identity. This failure is due primarily to an acceptance of a theory
of language that is insufficient for supplying the link between
autonomous personal identity and social identity that Mollis attempts
to make.
Habermas avoids the mistakes that Mollis makes by recognizing the
importance of language and the insight of the interpretive or
hermeneutic approach. But in the end he tends to construe the
relationship between authority and reason as purely antithetical and
hence focuses on authority as pure domination. Mence the possibility
Of developing a theory of authority that is consistent with democratic
practice is closed out for Habermas, particularly in light of his
seeming identity of democracy with total, genuine consensus.
in spite Of the failure of the thinkers in these debates to
resolve the problem of authority, and the problem of political
authority in particular, l think that these debates provide a
springboart^ from which we might reach a solution to the problem of
political authority. ^,e insights gained from these debates, along
with those provided by some of the work done in analytic political
philosophy on the concept of authority, will help to provide us with a
solution to the question of the relationship amongst language,
authority, reason and freedom (i.e. human agency).
Political Authority; 'In Authority" vs 'An Authnrity.
One of the most insightful treatments of the problem of political
authority has been Richard Friedman's distinction between being
-in
authority and being 'an authority.' Friedman claims that most
approaches to the study of authority treat the problem too narrowly by
focusing on the relationship of authority to conduct. This approach
only addresses one type of authority, claims Friedman. Authority is
exercised not just in the influence of behavior or conduct, it can
also be defined as the ability to influence others' ideas, beliefs and
opinions. "Concommitantly, a person may be said to 'have authority'
in two distinct senses. For one, he may be said to be 'in authority,'
meaning that he occupies some office, position or status which
entitles him to make dppicinr^c u ^decisions about how people should behave But
-con.l,, a person
.a. be sal. to be .n authoilt,. on so.ethln,
-nln, that his
.lews oi utterances are entitled to be believed'
-lu.1,.
.,.,,,,3,^
^^^^^^^ ^^^^^
^^^^^
-hers, priests, parents,
and experts (of various
.In.s) as having authority over beliefs as
-II as legislators. Judges and generals having authority over
some
Those Who occupy positions of .In authority do so because of
set formal rules defining the procedure for determining who shall be
in authority, ^ere existence Is a purely pragmatic feature
acccrdlr^ to Frled.an. „eant to create and insure organization and
crder that would otherwise be absent without the existence of
authority. Since the point of
-in authority is to regulate conduct
and prevent chaos, belief in the correctness, justice or morality of
the commands, decisions and policies of those in authority is
irrelevant to obedience. In rrledman's words, "the basis of the claim
to obedience made by a person
-in authority is of a very special
kind. TTiis claim does not derive from any special personal
Characteristic of the person invested with authority such as superior
powers of judgement or special knowledge (as in the case of the being
'an authority). His claims to be obeyed is simply that he has been
part put -in authority- according to established procedure, rather
than his decisions. What makes an act obligating is the fact the it
has been declared obligatory by the person invested with authority
over that class of actions... the merits and demerits of the actual
decisions are irrevelant to the ohHgation to obey, and therefore the
Claim to Obedience is not comprised b, showing that it is inferior to
some other decisions that might have been ta.en. (indeed the whole
point or setting up this sort of authority is to dissociate the claim
to Obedience from the merits of the particular decisions one is being
asked to accept. For as long as the claim to obedience is left
contingent on the judgement of merits, the disagreement among men at
the substantive level is bound to reintroduce the chaos the system of
IS not contradictory to defer to the decisions of this sort of
authority and yet also the case that his internal assent is also
irrelevant." ^ Hence, on this view those in authority need not
legitimate their actions, policies or commands. Those actions,
policies or commands are made authoritative because they originate
with someone who is established by some set of rules as being 'in
authority, and not because they adhere to or are consistent with,
some set of principles, goals or values of those over whom the
authority is exercised. As Friedman puts it, "This type of authority
produces a decision to be followed, not a statement to be believed.
Belief is both unjustified (since no decision can make something true,
but only obligatory) and unnecessary (since it is common action not
common opinion that constitutes the purpose behind the establishment
of this type of authority)." ' It is this type of authority that
is exercised in legal, administrative, and political authority.
The second type of authority that Friedman claims to detect he
describes as 'an authority.' 'An authority' relies on an
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ep.ste.o:csicaUv pavUege. posUioo Us Torce.
^.t.orUy in
'
t-s instance rests en see superior
.no«le.oe or insig.t t.at those
r
^'^^^
- ^" P-tioe.
.navaiXa.:e to
tHcse Who accept it or over who. it is exercise.. „ is the t.pe of
authority that both Gada.er and Winch emphasize or take as the
Paradig. of authority, in contrast to the first type of authority
an authority, produces statements to be believed and not Just
decisions to be followed.
Finally, the two types of authority are unrelated according to
median. The fact that someone is placed
-In authority has nothing
to do with their being
.an authority, on anything:
..But so„.one who Is
in authority, is not necessarily an authority on anything; his
decisions do not have to be presented as authoritative expressions,
deliverances, or interpretations of logically prior beliefs or
principles. On the contrary, it is precisely the key point about the
concept of
-in authority to be dissociated from any background of
Shared beliefs... * whereas
.an authority presupposes a background
of Shared beliefs,
-In authority, presupposes Just the opposite, an
absence of shared beliefs that threaten chaos.
The two types of authority do have one thing in common, claims
Friedman. He insists that both types of authority involve the
surrender of private Judgement on the part of those over whom it is
exercised:
.'to have authority is not to have to offer reasons in
behalf of what one has prescribed as a condition of being paid
obedience. In this sense, obedience to a command 'simply because x
gave it'... entails abdication of one's own judgement to the
particular act in question and the adoption in Its place of the
judgement of someone else as guiding one's conduct.. it is this
suspension of private judgement on the part of those accepting
authority and the absence of the need of those who hold authority to
have to offer reasons that distinguishes authority fro. rational
argument.
Friedman's distinction between
-in authority and
-an authority-
helps to clarify several issues that remained confused in much of the
literature concerning the concept of authority. But in spite of this
contribution several flaws in his account of the two types of
authority and the notion of authority in general remain, i will begin
by examining specific problems in his account of authority, later
tracing it to a misunderstanding of the nature of political life, i
will use this criticism as a foundation for an alternative theory of
democratic political authority.
Political Authority and the Surrender of Judgement
The characterization of authority as involving the surrender of
private judgement is not peculiar to Friedman, it is a fairly common
way of defining authority, particularly by those trying to distinguish
authority from rational persuasion. However, it is a
misinterpretation of what is involved in the obedience to authority,
mistaking what occurs in specific or isolated instances of authority
for a general characteristic of authority. In one sense the surrender
of private judgement occurs when, say, one accepts the pronouncements
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fo someone who is
-an authority- as in the case when we ask a
recognized authority on Hegel about the meaning of a specific passaoe
in the Phenomenology
.
But if we look at otner aspects or different
instances of authority it becomes clear that the surrender of private
Judgement cannot be said to typify authority relations as a whole or
to be a defining characteristic of them.
in the first place, as Richard Flathman points out/ the
acceptance of authority minimally involves the judgement that someone
or some institution legitimately holds a position of authority and
that the command, policy or action taken is consistent with the rules
and procedures that establish the authority. Hence, we would refuse
to take a traffic officer's advice on the meaning of a particular
passage in the Fhenomenoloqy
.
But there is a second sense in which the authority relation does
not require the suspension of judgement. Referring back to the
traffic officer, we generally obey his commands concerning the
regulation of traffic. But our obedience to those commands, our
acceptance of his authority, does not require us to surrender our
private judgement concerning how traffic should be managed. Indeed,
many of the less patient of us often develop quite explicit ideas and
make harsh judgements about the correctness of the traffic officer's
decisions. What we surrender in such cases is not our right of
judgement but our right of action based on our judgement.'^ The same
holds true for any number of other decisions made by those 'in
authority .
'
I may not believe in the soundness of a particular
government policy and even insist on my right to criticize it, but
consistent with Priedman. own characterization of .n authorit^ as
the making of a decision to be obevPri nnfOD yed, not the pronouncement of a
statement to be believed.
From here it is tempting to conclude that the surrender of
judgement is characteristic of ^an authority relations. But even
this must be qualified in important ways. Let us examine the
relationship between those who are taken to be .an authority on
something ahd those over whom that authority is exercised, rriedman
points out that in order for someone to be accepted as .an authority,
there must be what he calls an epistemological framework that is
Shared by those involved in the authority relation, mis
epistemological framework supplies the subject area over which those
Who are 'an authority, claim expertise, it defines the procedures
(formal or informal) by which one achieves recognition as an
authority, and finally the types of statements that will be accepted
as authoritative. *nce, Judgement is involved here in what Friedman
describes as second-order claims that provide the background for
authority .S Judgement is involved on the part of those over whom
authority is exercised then at least at this second-order level.'
But if we examine one of the paradigm cases of 'an authority I
think we will see that the exercise of judgement pervades the
authority relationship. Let us take the example of the academician
who is said to be .an authority on Hegel. One becomes an authority
on a particular subject matter, in our case Hegel's philosophy, by
being able to offer convincing interpretations of his work and
Philosophy. These interpretations are, quite obviously, not
arbitrary, ^ey are backed up by reason, argument and evidence
including references to texts, Hegel
.3 relationship to other thinkers
his historical situation, etc. One does net, in short, become
recognized as an authority on Hegel by si.ply dogmatically announcing
so.e interpretation. One is required to offer reasons why one should
be considered 'an authority on Hegel in order to gain that position
Having established oneself as an authority on Hegel one's opinions or
interpretations of Hegel or particular passages fro. his works would
generally be accepted with little or no rational argument needed for
their support.
But imagine that having established oneself as an authority on
Hegel, that one newly recognized Hegel expert consistently and
repeatedly refused to offer justification for interpretations of
particular works or passages of Hegel's. Perhaps in the classroom our
new Hegel expert insisted that students dogmatically accept his
interpretation without his having to justify it. When pressed by his
colleagues whose interests also included Hegel, he denied the
necessity of having to offer a reasoned argument as to why his
interpretation of Hegel was better than competing interpretations. If
this behavior continued, at some point the recognition of our new
Hegel expert would be withdrawn, and it would be withdrawn precisely
for his refusal or inability to offer reasoned argument for his
pronouncements. Put another way, the continued recognition of being
'an authority,' at least in some paradigm instances, rests upon one's
ability to demonstrate superior knowledge or insight. The refusal or
'an
us or
What it
lna.aity to
.e.onstxate that insight
.oui. iea. people to chalienge
that authority. The point here is not that reoognition of
authority, constantly involves justification of one's stat
expertise. That would surely indicate a loss of authority
does indicate is that those who are 'an authority
.ust. in principle,
be able to provide reasoned arguments for the correctness of their
interpretations or pronouncements. In the case of the Hegel expert it
requires that he be able to offer convincing grounds or arguments for
the correctness of his interpretations, indeed in the example we are
considering, the ability to offer more convincing arguments for one's
interpretation might enhance one's standing as 'an authority. '1°
That the surrender of judgement is not an inherent characteristic
of authority is further demonstrated by the fact that in any
particular subject matter people who are recognized as authorities can
offer conflicting interpretations of the same thinker, work of art.
play, political philosophy, etc.. and both still be recognized as an
authority
.
Those insisting that recognition of authority involves the
surrender of private judgement have yet to explain how one could
surrender private judgement simultaneously to two conflicting
authorities
.
Returning to the example of our traffic officer, I would like to
make a further point concerning judgement and authority. Friedman,
like many other writers on the subject, insists on the suspension of
judgement on the part of those over whom authority is exercised in an
attempt to eliminate the dependence of obedience to authority on the
merits or demerits of the particular decisions made by those in
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Of authority is that obedience to it is not dependent on the
correctness, validity,
.craiity or any other criteria hy which it
™.ght be judged. Pried.an is in .any respects typicai of this
position When he says that the whoie point behind setting up authority
xs "to disassociate the clai™ to obedience fro. the
.erits of the
particuiar decision one is being asked to accept."" if those 'in
authority, were required to give reasons to Justify their actions
authority would be indistinguishable fro. rational persuasion,
indeed, in instances in which those 'in authority are questioned, we
often say that their authority is being challenged.
If this point regarding the disengagement of the requirement of
Obedience fro. the merits or Justification for an action were correct,
and if this disengagement were total, three things would follow.
First, authority would unquestionably be the antithesis of
rational choice and autonomy. For now the obedience to authority
would preclude my acting according to my own rational purposes. It
may sometimes be the case that the decisions of authority coincide
with the decisions I would make if given the chance to deliberate and
exercise my choice according to that deliberation. But such
coincidence would be purely that, i.e. accidental. Second, the
exercise of authority would be purely arbitrary. Obedience would be
required simply because some one or group in authority made a decision
that required one to do this or that. If the requirement of obedience
is totally disengaged from the merits of the decision, I have
absolutely no basis on which to Justifiably disobey. The requirement
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Of Obedience cannot be suspended because of any criticisms I .ay ma.e
of the decisions of those in authority.
Third, this requirement would make all obedience to authority
authoritarian, obedience is required not because those in authority
^now What they are doing, have a better perspective, or are trying to
achieve some common good. Obedience is required simply because
authorities have made decisions that require obedience, it is
precisely this view of authority, that is common to Oa.eshott as well
that I wish to Challenge, i should like to do so by going back to our
example of the traffic officer, an example that is sometimes given as
the paradigm case of the requirement of obedience to authority being
divorced from the merits of the decisions.
NO one, I think, would disagree that obedience to the commands of
the traffic officer are obeyed in spite of the fact that some drivers
believe particular decisions to be wrong, idiotic or inefficient.
This is true even when we are inconvenienced by such decisions, when .
we are late for an appointment or when the ice cream in the grocery
bag is melting on a hot summer day. The fact that in such instances
our personal ideas about how traffic should be directed is at odds
with the decisions of the traffic officer, yet we still obey his
commands, is given as evidence that obedience is disengaged from the
merits of the decisions made by those in authority.
But imagine a situation in which the traffic officer, directing
traffic near an elementary school, has the habit of waving on
automobiles traveling simultaneously at perpendicular directions
toward an intersection; tends to ignore children crossing in school
:atrols; and at other ti.es see.s to ignore traffic altogether it
.
ould not ta.e long for motorists and pedestrians to notice that his
cessions concerning the directing of traffic were questionable
-cisions, so.eti.es hazardous to the health of those traveling near
'.r through the intersection. Consequently, they would obey the
cfficer-s commands selectively (if at all), feeling safe to proceed
rnly when it was obvious the officer was holding other traffic, but
-ry and even disobedient if the commands did not seem to take account
'^f other traffic and pedestrians, m effect the disobedience and
:.elective obedience that emerges does so because those over whom
^•^uthority is being exercised deem those decisions to be bad decisions;
^.hey undermine the very point behind having someone direct traffic,
-.e. the common puipose of the safe regulation of traffic amongst
Motorists and pedestrians (which may or may not coincide with some
other set of purely private, particular interests, e.g. getting the
-ce cream home before it melts)
. The point here is that obedience to
authority is not divorced from the merits or demerits of the decisions
•lade. Rather, the decisions that are made must be consistent with
iome common purpose or way of life that provides the point behind the
existence of that authority, delimits its sphere of control, the types
:f decisions it can and cannot make, and the standards by which those
Jecisions will be evaluated as good or bad, better or worse
Jecisions. We may say that there is a prima faciae assumption that
:he exercise of authority is in fact directed at achieving that common
:urpose. But that common purpose always stands as the background
igainst which we can evaluate and criticize the decisions of authority
commands and policies.
'
At ti,„es
.ae.™an al.ost se.s to
.cooni. this, in «s account
authority, he
.istin,uishes between n.st or.er
.eiie.s that X
so^e set 0. procedures that estahUshv as .in autho^t...
.
.^.es a
parallel distinction in his discussion of
.an authoritv •dii Tinor y,' arguing that
in addition tc the nrst order helief that there are pronouncements to
be believed, there are second order beliefs, consisting of an
episte.ological background, that those in the authority relation
Share. But he does not draw these connections thoroughly enough and
-
failing to do so fails to show the extent to which these so-called
second order beliefs establish the point behind authority, as well as
help determine how it will operate, what types of decisions and
pronouncements and policies it can legitimately make or carry out, and
how these provide the standards of critici^ and justification for
particular decisions, commands, pronouncements, and policies.
If our argument to this point has been correct, if the obedience
to those in authority is not completely disengaged from the merits of
their decisions, but rather if there exists a prima faciae belief that
the policies, decisions, etc. are consistent with the common purposes
or way of life that provides the Justification and standards of
criticism for authority, then the concepts of .in authority and .an
authority, are not completely unrelated, but rather the two notions
are variably present in all instances of political authority in a
democratic polity. TTiat is, even where those .in authority, are not
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for^all, established as ^an autHcrity on seething, there is the
assumption and expectation that their decisions, etc. wili achieve
see co™on purpose or be consistent with a way of iife. This is not
to .ake the extreme claim that winch makes that ali who are
.in
authority, are eo ipso
.an authority.. But it does impiy that the
notxon Of being
.an authority provides the background for evaluation,
criticism, and justification of those
.in authority.'
That this common way of life, or common good, is partly
constitutive of authority I want to demonstrate in another way, by
examining not isolated instances of authority but the practice of
authority extended over time. Imagine our questioning a group of
individuals about a particular person or group that stands in
authority In their culture or society, we ask them about a particular
pcUcy that those in authority pursue but which the group is critical
of and ask them why they comply with that policy. It is imaginable
that they would respond that they are complying in spite of their
criticisms because the policy was made by those in authority and the
former are obligated to obey it. Imagine further that we ask the same
question each time a new policy is announced, and each time the group
in question disagrees with the policy but complies anyhow. Imagine
finally that we survey everyone affected by those policies, i.e.
everyone over whom those in authority exercise authority, and everyone
to the last man and woman insists that the policies of those in
authority are always wrong but they obey them anyhow.
The first example is easily understandable. We could explain it
any number of ways. Perhaps the Individual group supports other
poUcies Of t.cse in power, per.aps t.e o.Jectiona.:e poUcy concerns
-tters Of relatively little importance, or perhaps the group in
question feels obligated to give the questionable policy a chance
The second example is somewhat less easily explained. The dissenting
group might respond by saying that in spite of its disagreement with
the policies of those in authority, it derived other benefits that
outweigh its objections to the policies in guestion. Or perhaps the
group in question saw no alternative to compliance, there being no
practical way to escape this authority relationship or to change those
in authority. THe former case might be still explained as a
relationship of authority, we would be tempted to describe the latter
as a relationship involving power or coercion, rather than authority.
Finally, in the last example, to say that everyone in a society
objected to all the policies that those who claimed to be 'in
authority pursued, and then to explain that this is an example of
authority and not power, total domination, or coercion, would be
unintelligible. For the question that would emerge would be why those
who objected to the policies did not replace those in authority. To
say that those in authority retained the instruments of violence, or
brainwashed the entire population, and to insist that what existed is
still a case of authority, is to eliminate the difference between
authority, manipulation and coercion. Yet for accounts of authority
that insist that obedience to authority is totally disengaged fJom the
merits of particular decisions, none of these examples would appear
unintelligible or anomolous. The last example is as consistent with
their account of authority as the first.
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in son,e respects the characterization of the authority
relationship as involving the suspension of Judgment on the part of
those over who. it is exercise, is the result of focusing on onl, one
type of activity that those who occupy positions of authority engage
in. I.e. the giving of commands. But in adcition to the giving of
co..ands. those in political authority also decide on i.ple.ent and
follow public policies, ^ese activities cannot be reduced to the
giving of co^ands without doing violence to the., m .any instances
the carrying out of policy does not involve the giving of co»ands.
even though those policies do have effects on others. For example,
When the Federal Reserve decides to follow a policy of high interest
rates, that decision is not strictly a command for me to obey.
Rather, it partly establishes the conditions or context for my
economic activity. In effect, the implementation of policies is more
a question of what happens to those affected by the decisions than a
question of obedience to a command to do this or refrain from doing
that
.
In such instances those affected by the decisions of those in
authority often make judgements about the wisdom or correctness of the
policies implemented. Moreover, the appeals of those in authority for
support of those policies is often baded on the correctness of those
policies. One recent example of this latter point is the appeal on
the part of the Reagan administration to the business sector to
increase investment in light of the Reagan administration's pursuit of
policies that were ostensibly designed to encourage investment.
In sum, the claim that the authority relationship involves a
surrender of judgement on the part of those over whom authority is
exercised misrepresents the relationship of Judgement to authority and
specifically fails to ta.e account of the role of Judgement in the
establishment and continued performance and acceptance of authority
The decisions made by those
-in authority- do depend on their merit
for their continued obedience; the decisions must be consistent with
the common way of life that is the basis for that authority. Those
over whom authority is exercised obey that authority because they
assume that the decisions could be legitimized if pressed for
justification, m political life this common way of life includes a
notion of the common good. Hence, the position of being
-in
authority is circumscribed by the idea of being
-an authority.'
What I would now like to demonstrate is that this concept of
authority is consistent with a notion of freedom that relies on a
strong theory of human agency, it is not to say that there is an
identity between freedom and authority, but that the common way of
life that is the foundation of authority is also the foundation of a
strong theory of human agency. I shall proceed by first summarizing
that notion of human agency and then the general features of the
common good.
The Strong Theory of Human Agency
The theory of human agency that I will rely on is one developed by
Charles Taylor. Taylor connects a theory of human agency to the
possibilities of evaluation that are available to human beings.
Whereas both human beings and animals have desires, it is a
distinctively human trait to be able to evaluate those desires The
"capacity to evaluate desires is bound up with our power of
self-evaluation, which in turn is an essential feature of the mode of
agency we recognize as human. "-^^
Taylor goes on to distinguish two types of evaluation. The first
Taylor describes as weak evaluation, and is typified by mere
preferences for things, such as certain flavors of ice cream, the
Choice between two types of pastry, or where I will vacation for the
summer. Two things characterize evaluation in tar~s
-f
-ere
preferences. First, in weak evaluation the fact that something is
desired is sufficient for calling it good. For example if asked why i
prefer to vacation on Cape Cod rather than in the Berkshires, the
simple answer that I prefer the ocean is sufficient explanation and
justification for my preference. The second characteristic of weak
evaluation is that the incompatibility between alternatives is
contingent. My preference for vacationing on Cape Cod does not
require that I dislike vacationing in the Berkshires. I may in fact,
pretending to be a Californian, spend time in both areas during my
vacation.
The second type of evaluation Taylor calls strong evaluation.
This type of evaluation does not remain at the level of mere
preferences; it describes alternative in a much stronger, richer
language, referring to the qualitative worth of the alternatives, e.g.
the nobility or ignobility, courage or cowardice, justice or
injustice, admirability or inadmirability of the desires entertained
or alternative offered. In contrast to weak evaluation, the mere
preferences or desires for something are not sufficient warrant for
doing or fulfilling it.
-.m weak evaluation, or something to he
Judged good it is sufficient that it be desired, whereas in strong
evaluation there is also a use of
-good, or some other evaluative term
for which being desired is not sufficient, indeed some desires or
desired consummation can be judged bad, base, ignoble, trivial,
superficial, unworthy, and so on."^^
connected with this first distinction between weak and strong
evaluation is a second distinction, ^ereas with weak evaluation the
incompatibility between alternatives is contingent, in the case of
strong evaluation the incompatibility between alternatives is of a
contrastive nature. The fulfilling of one desire precludes the
fulfilling of the contrasting alternatives. "That there should be
incompatibility of non-contingent kind is not adventitous. For strong
evaluation displays a language of evaluative distinction, in which
different desires are described as noble or base, integrating or
fragmentary, courageous or cowardly, clairvoyant or blind, and so
14
on." Although it is possible to re-describe weak evaluation in
ways that make it contrastive and strong evaluation in ways that make
it non-contrastive, Taylor insists that in the end with weak
evaluation the preferences and dislikes are independent of each other
and hence conflicts are contingent, accidental and circumstantial,
whereas with the contrastive language we employ in strong evaluation
our decision in favor of some alternatives over others is not
circumstantial or contingent.
This contrast between different types of evaluation has
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implications for the notion of the self (r.nh fcn ir
.
Each type of evaluation
implies a different type of subiert n no.pj c . A person whose evaluation of his
desires
.ere only evaluation in the weak sense would be unable to
articulate his preferences beyond saying that he merely preferred A to
B. Without recourse to the contrastive language of strong evaluation,
the weak evaluator can say no more than that he prefers one desire
(say a nuclear arms freeze) to another (chocolate ice cream). His
ability to articulate preferences stops at the point of this assertion
of the preference of one alternative over the other.
With. strong evaluation, on the other hand, there is a vocabulary
available to the subject that allows him or her to describe, explain,
justify and criticize the choice of alternatives, in contrast to the
simple weigher of alternatives the strong evaluator "is not similarly
inarticulate, "mere is the beginning of a language in which to
express the superiority of one alternative, the language of higher and
lower, noble and base, courageous and cowardly, integrated and
fragmented, and so on. The strong evaluator can articulate
superiority just because he has a language of contrastive
characterization."^^ The simple evaluator lacks the depth and
richness that is available to the strong evaluator.
Along with the articulacy that is available to the strong
evaluator comes a deeper form of reflection. The strong evaluator,
because he is not limited just to evaluation in terms of preferences,
is able to describe his desires, motivations and intentions in
qualitative terms that also describe the possibilities of his being in
the world. "A strong evaluator by which we mean a subject who
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rrt
'^""^^
-
--—3
-t.vat.n at ^eate.
.ept..
. c.a.cte.. one
.es..e or
-cHnat..on as
.on.,e. o. no... o. .0.
.nte,.ate.. eto. t.an
—
-
0^ -tains. I eschew the oowor.l, act,...
.eca.se
^
want to .e a courageous and honorable hu.an
.elng. whereas for the
Simple weigher what is at stake i.. fho ^ • uIS the desirability of different
consummation, those defined by his de fnrtn h •y n ac o desires, for the strong
evaluator also examines the different possible
.odes of helng of the
agent. Motivations or desires don't only count in virtue of the
attraction of the consu™ation but also in virtue of the .ind of life
and kind of subject that these desires properly belong to,-'S ^^.^
type Of reflection goes to the heart of the type of life or agent «e
wish to be. it "brings us to the center of our existence as
agents. The most basic questions of our existence are raised,
examined, answered and criticized, questions that are beyond the'
vocabulary of the simple weigher. It is in this sense that the strong
evaluator is more deeply reflective, has more depth, and is a stronger
subject, than the weak evaluator.
This connection between strong evaluation and human agency has
implications for the question of personal identity as well, our
identity is determined in laige part by the evaluations that we make
in this strong sense of the term. The strong evaluator, because he
sometimes is concerned with those questions that go to the heart of
what type of human agent he is to be, is addressing questions of
personal identity. "Our identity is therefore defined by certain
evaluations which are inspnarahio f^^,.ep ble from ourselves as agents, shorn of
these we would oease to be ourselves, by whioh we do not mean
trivially that we would be different in the sense of having some
properties other than those we now have - this would indeed be the
case after any change however minor - but that shorn of these we would
lose the very possibility of being an agent who evaluates, that our
existence as persons, and hence our ability to adhere as persons to
certain evaluations, would be impossible outside the horizon of these
essential evaluations, that we would break down as persons, be
incapable of being persons in the full sense. The elimination of
these evaluations without their being replaced with others would not
simply mean that I would have a different personal identity, it would
mean that I would have none at all. For I would have lost precisely
those characteristics of a human agent that enable me to determine the
meaning of things for me as a human agent, my relationship to them,
the role they play in the type of life I wish to pursue, etc.
Taylor's argument concerning strong evaluation, human agency, and
identity are part of a more comprehensive view of the nature of
language per se. Taylor's position is derivative of an expressivist
view of language, a view that contrasts with the designative theory of
language typical of empiricism, that holds that language cannot be
understood simply as a medium for objective description of the world.
Rather, language is the medium in which we achieve reflective
awareness. Reflective awareness is tied to the expressive potential
of language; subsequently a rich vocabulary enables reflection with
greater depth while the simpler vocabulary of mere preference limits
t.e speaker to shallower To^s or reflection. :n contrast to
deslonatlve theories of lan,.a,e characteristic of Hoh.es. toc.e an.
conte^pcrarv Ao,lo-^erlcan phUosophv. the
..presslve theory opens
.
new
.tension, xf language serves to express-reall.e a new
.in. of
awareness, then it may not only make nns.ihip ."-Ly K po s ble a new awareness of
things, an ability to describe them- but al.n n.n , o so ew ways of feeling or
responding to things, if m expressing our thoughts ahout things we
can co.e to have new thoughts, then In expressing our feelings, we can
co.e to have transformed feelings...^' This Intl.ate connection
between reflection and expression m language underscores several of
tre points Taylor
.a.es elsewhere. In particular. It emphasizes the
clal. that there Is a connection between the language available to a
speaker and the speaker's Identity, i can Identify, reflect and
decide on feelings, desires and ways of being only to the extent that
I can articulate those feelings, etc. They can become the object of
reflection and choice only If they find a place In my language. My
possibilities for reflective self-identity are thus circumscribed by
the language available to me. In this respect Taylor's position
resembles that of winch and Gadamer.
Taylor would also Insist, as do Gadamer and winch, that language
is not a private possession, but exists only In and through a
linguistic community. Because my language grows only in dialogue with
others, i.e. within a speech community, "The language I speak, the web
which I can never fully dominate and oversee, can never be Just my
language. It is always largely our language."^" It follows that If
I can express and realize my Identity only through language which Is a
socia: product, i.e. the language of a speech co^unitv, it further
cc^nity I grow up in. relations with others «iu ,e
.eter.ine.
by that language; language will both
.ake possible and oircu.scribe
relationships that I have with other
.embers of
.y speech
co^unity as well as those outside
.y i™ediate speech co^unity. m
raylor.s words.
..Speech also serves to express/constitute different
relations in which we .ay stand to each other: inti.ate, for.al
Official., casual, joking, serious and so on. Pro. this point of view
we can see that it is not just the speech co^unity that shapes and
creates language, but language which constitutes and sustains the
speech community ."^"^
in sum, the strong notion of human agnecy that Taylor ties to
strong evaluation and the strong notion of personal identity requires
an expressivist view of language. Moreover, due to the social
character of language that enables strong evaluation, the strong
notion of personal identity that results from strong evaluation is in
no small part a social identity, if Taylor's argument is correct, the
flaws in Mollis- account of autonomous man and his notion of personal
identity and rationality become somewhat clearer. The strong
evaluator that Taylor argues is dependent on the expressivist view of
language is precisely the strong personal identity that Mollis is
seeking. But it is also a type of social identity that Mollis
believes compromises the independence of autonomous man. in refusing
to acknowledge the connection between the expressivist view of
language and strong evaluation, Mollis fails to provide this
autonomous
.an with the depth ha requires for a strong personal
identity.
Against the background of Taylor's argument that a strong notion
of human agency requires strong evaluation which in turn is provided
by the expressivist nature of language and hence a common way of life,
I would like to aigue that the notion of a common way of life implies
a politics of the common good that we have shown to be the foundation
of political authority.
in politics, no less than in other areas of social life, language
provides us with the capacity for reflection about our political
life. It provides us not only with intersubjective meanings with
which to talk about that way of life, i.e. criteria of judgement,
identification, evaluation, praise, blame and so on. in addition to
these there is a set of common meanings which those in a community
share. These common meanings are "notions of what is significant
which are not just shared in the sense that everybody has them, but
are also common in the sense of being in the common reference world.
Thus, almost everyone in our society may share a susceptibility to a
certain kind of feminine beauty, but this may not be a common
meaning. It may be known to no one, except to market researchers, who
play on it in their advertisements. But the survival of a national
identity as francophones is a common meaning of Quebecois; for it is
not just shared, and not just known to be shared, but its being a
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co™on aspiration is cne of the co™on refaranoe points of ail debate,
communication, and all public life in a society. "22
Taylor goes on to say that "Common meanings are the basis of
community. Intersubjective meaning gives a people a co^on language
to talk about social reality and a co^on uhderstandlng of certain
norms, but only «ith common meanings does this common rafaranca world
contain significant common actions, celebrations, and feelings. These
are objects in the world that everybody shares. This is what makes a
91
community .
"
The common meanings that enter into political life, that form the
basis of shared aspirations, values, beliefs and actions, constitute
the common good. The common good is the "set of shared purposes and
standards which are fundamental to the way of life prized together by
the participants. It consists of the common reference points
that provide the criteria for determining the collective political
goals of the community and the legitimate pursuit of those goals.
The notion of the common good in modern society could not include
a notion of specific, unchanging political good, such as Plato's
forms, which once arrived at could be used for all time to evaluate
the policies of those in authority. The connection between language
and the capacity of actors to reappraise and re-evaluate even the
entral features of their society means that the common good will be
large part conventional, i.e. that it is the result of human social
ction and language and the possibilities of social organization.
This is not to deny that there may be what some thinkers have
described as quasi-transcendental dimensions to the common good: i.e.
c
in
a
social arrangements that we insist
.ust be present in any society in
strong evaluators an. compie.
.or.s
.r
..an agency are
.oun..
Neither
.pes this cpnventionai
.imensicn ™ean that the cpnstituent
that the co^on meanings around which we organize sociai life that
-form pur institutions and practices such as family Ufe
.or.
politics, and personal relationships, could be otherwise. For
'
political life this means ^h=^ i-k„that the common meanings that constitute the
goals and limits of ppiitical action in pur mpdern spciety cannot be
completely identical with the co^on meanings that help constitute the
goals and limits of other cultures ar^ historical peripds (e.g. feudal
Japan, the Azande, or the Lele)
.
one implication of this conventionality is that the co..on good is
subject to change, revision and modification. This is not to say it
is constantly in flux, but only that parts of it can come under
scrutiny in appropriate historical circumstances.
Second, the common good is not uni-dimensional; no single value
such as justice, equality, liberty, is likely to totallv make up the
common good or occupy an overriding position, in contemporary
American society I would say there are a variety of constituent
elements to the common good, among them are individual liberty,
equality of opportunity, due process of law, a certain degree of
political equality, a degree of personal freedom concerning
life-style, a stable, private family life and what William Connolly
has called the "civilization of productivity which brings affluence,
freedom and leisure to future generations."^^ The
common
-Ui.i.ensionantv of tHe oo«n g.o. .ces not guarantee t.at t.e
constituent elements of U wn: always co.ple^ent or reinforce the
others. «s interpretations of the constituent e:e.ents of the
aoc. Change, or as historical circumstances change, it ™ig,t
.a the
case that the constituent elements begin tc conflict. I think
seething like this has occurred concerning the dispute surrounding
abortion, the plethora of problems that exist between work and family
life, the conflict between the imperatives of the civilization of
productivity, and the value of a multiplicity of life styles. «.en
the conflicts between the constituent elements become so great that
every course of action available to those in authority underlines some
part of the common good, those in authority run the risk of being
accused by some constituencies of undermining that common good.
Hence, Judge Arthur Garrity's insistence that the Boston city School
committee employ busing as a means to desegregate the Boston School
System can be interpreted as a conflict between equality of
opportunity and the local sense of community that some citizens of
Boston claimed was being undermined. When the conflict between
important elements of the common good becomes so fierce and constant
that those in authority are unable to act without alienating
substantially large constituencies within the polity, a crisis of
authority may result.
fl third characteristic of the common good flows from the two
preceding characteristics. Due in part to its conventionality and its
multidimensionality, the conrnon good can never be perfectly
articulatable or made completely transparent. Conventionality
guarantees that it is subject to ™o.iricaticn an. cHanoe. an. the
process
,y «hich these changes cce about. incZu.ing the the, nn.
particular account of the co..on good is uniikely to capture it
antireiy. Si.iiariy, the
™ulti.i.ehsionality of the co^on good wili
-an that in so^e instances we will emphasize s»e of the elements in
one Situation and other elements of it in other situations.
An example
.ight be useful here. Equality of opportunity has been
one of the. longstandiing constituents of the co^on good in ^erican
political life. With the Supreme Court's decision in Brown vs. Board
of Education interpretations of what constituted equality of
opportunity began to change. By the late 1960's it had co.e under
fire from two directions, a. the one side were those members of the
black community who saw equality of opportunity as a facade, the
primary purpose of which was to justify systematically imposed
inequality between whites and blacks. At the same time some court
decisions insisting rules concerning seniority in the hiring and
firing of personnel be qualified because such rules systematically
excluded blacks from obtaining the type of seniority that would give
them the same Job protection as whites were attacked by some unions
and many white workers as a violation not only of the golden calf of
seniority but actually an attack on equality of opportunity itself.
Equality of opportunity is still one of the constituent elements of
the common good in the united States. But it is not the same equality
of opportunity that existed in 1953, and the changes that have taken
place have had implications for other dimensions of American life and
other e:e.ents of the co^cn good that underlies
^.erican poUtical
life.
Fourth, the very nature of language contribute, to the laok of
rules governing a «ay of life oan never be completely speoifle., or as
prejudices and
.ovlng between horizons, language Itself is never
completely transparent to us. This i« nn i=„ *mi s no less true of the language of
politics and the co^on good. Though we may be able to specify the
.ore important features of the common good, we could never completely
set down its details and interpretations once and for all. Before the
notion of the common good could be made transparent, we would need to
secure the external boundaries of the language of politics and congeal
the internal rules of political language and political life. But as
Habermas has pointed out, such a situation would eliminate the
possibilities for freedom. A policy in which the common good becomes
completely transparent would be a society without politics; the only
problems that would remain would be technical questions of
administration and dissenters from the common good would be the object
cf political repression and terror.
Finally, the common good, because it prescribes the right and
wrong, better and worse, good and bad ways of organizing political
life, is the likely object of political re-inteipretation and intense
disagreement. Constituencies often organize for the very purpose of
influencing and changing what a political community considers to be in
the common good. This does not necessarily mean that authority
beco.es un.er.ined in such circumstances, m.eed, it is precisely in
such instances that political authority is called upon to adjudicate
between competing notions of the common good. But the sometimes
tacit, Often explicit arguments of political authority are based upon
the Claim that in resolving such disputes ics decisions and policies
are those that reflect the common good, i thin., for example, that
the debate about supply-side economics versus Keynesian fiscal policy
is at heart a debate about the common good, it is a debate that is in
many respects fundamental to American political life and the future of
the American political economy. And the political arguments offered
on both sides have been in terms of the long range benefits that the
respective policies provide for the American polity }^
Even when there is agreement concerning the general notion of the
common good or where there is agreement that some collective action
falls within the loose notion of the common good, it still remains
that there are instances in which the common good conflicts with the
particular interests of individuals or groups. Whenever members of a
political community contest what constitutes the common good, or when
the interests of private groups or individuals conflict with what is
claimed to be the common good, the state has three sources of
compliance at its disposal. First, it can construct market-incentive
systems that channel behavior in ways consistent with the policies
designed to achieve or realize the public good. Second, those in
public authority can rely on force. In extreme cases, when groups or
individuals contest the legitimacy of the actions of those in
authority (or the state), public authorities can employ some type of
force or coercion to obtain compliance RmI- fo^u i . But few or no states have
relied totaU, on force; to clai™ that force is the only resource for
gaining compliance «th policies is to clai. that those in authority
ultimately rely on te
In fact the
ccmplete reliance on force would be indicative of the loss of
authority.
I wculd argue that any political co^unity if it is to avoid the
manipulation of its citizens through market incentives or the
intimidation of its citizens through political terror, must rely on a
third source of compliance with its policies, laws and pronouncements
and that is civic virtue. Civic virtue is the tacit belief that at
times individuals or particular groups must forego the fulfillment of
particular interest in favor of some broader notion of the common good
when the two are in conflict. It is civic virtue that explains why
citizens obey or comply with the dictates of authority when the
policies followed conflict with citizens' private interests.
Obedience and compliance resulting from the exercise of civic virtue
rests on the assumption that the policies in question somehow advance
the common good.
The military draft in the post World War II period can serve as an
example. It was expected that some young men were obligated to
military service (and in the sixties to thereby risking their lives in
Viet Nam) while other members of the same group avoided military
service either by college deferment or by medical disqualification.
It was assumed and recognized that even though some individuals were
able to avoid any military obligation, that a majority of others would
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fulfill that statuatory obligation without being compelled to do so by
force. Though not explicitly formulated, the policy of partial
selective service relied on a tacit notion of civic virtue. This is
not to say that the background possibility of force was not also
compelling. But the availability of force was insufficient to
guarantee the scope of the compliance with the selective service
system that was required during the I960's. Moreover, those from
working class families often never even considered refusing to fulfill
what they considered their military obligation even when aware that
those from more privileged families would escape the disruption of
their lives that military service presented. The widescale compliance
among those from the lower strata cannot be explained simply in terms
of the threat of force or the failure to understand the options that
provided escape; it was the result of the exercise of civic virtue
based on the presumption that those in authority were following a
policy that was somehow in the public good.^'^
Political Authority and the Celebration of Politics
The view that the exercise of democratic political authority is
tied to a notion of the common good has one other implication that
distinguishes it from the positions of Winch, Gadamer, Mollis and
Habermas. The critical basis that the common good makes available,
coupled with (a) the recognition that authority is unlikely to achieve
a purely epistemic basis in political life and (b) the recognition of
the connection between the theory of the common good and the theory of
strong evaluation
.ade possible the expresslvlst view of language
-Plies the pe^anenoe of politics In social life. unll.e Wlncn an^
cadaver, whose accounts of understanding focus away fro™ political
life, or Hollls and Haber.as whose views of rationality and respective
views Of real Interests and consensus leave little roo. for either
politics or authority, the view of the connection a.ongst the
expressivist view of language, strong evaluation, the co»on good, and
authority advanced In this chapter implies the permanence of political
dialogue concerning authority and lays the foundation for it in a
democratic society. Moreover t fhinu fK« 4.y. ivioreov , I think the stronger claim can also be
sustained that this view of political authority results in a
celebration of politics. The connection between the theory of strong
evaluation and the common language and way of life that give rise to
the common good and authority implies that one is most perfectly a
human agent when one is engaged in the fundamental questions of what
type of life is most desirable to lead. The expressivist character of
language that makes strong evaluation possible is that which provides
the possibilities for argument and discourse over the common good and
the Justification of the policies followed by those in political
authority. The justification of political authority is tied to the
possibility of political dialogue and critical scrutiny of authority.
To foreclose the possibility of political dialogue concerning the
common good would be, on this reading, to pre-empt the possibility of
evaluating those in authority or the legitimacy of their policies.
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Wa Shall no« consider two objections to our account of political
authority, language, human agency and the common good. The first
could be Characterized as the individualist response and is best
Characterized by Richard Friedman: "But someone who is 'in authority
is not necessarily an authority on anything: his decisions do not have
to be presented as authoritative expressions, deliverances, or
interpretations of logically prior beliefs or principles, the
contrary, it is precisely the key point about the concept of 'in
authority to be disassociated from any background of shared beliefs.
It is, then, in those circumstances in which a society has lost the
sense of a common framework of substantive moral beliefs and has grown
sceptical of the idea of a homogeneous moral community that the notion
of being
-in authority may present Itself as the appropriate fom of
authority for defining the general rules all men must conform
28to." Political life, according to Frieaman, is the area of social
life where commonalities or common shared meanings and beliefs are
absent, where irreconcilable interests dominate, and authority is
required to reinforce decisions that are inimical to the interests of
one or more parties.
It is precisely this view of political life and its relation to
authority that I want to take issue with, i shall argue that in order
to retain this view of political life as being without common
meanings, beliefs, and ideals, one would have to explain obedience to
authority in terms that either transform authority into some form of
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coercion or manipulation, or in
.ays t.at cannot
.e reocnciie.
„it.
developments in contemporary society
.
Thinners «.o interpret political life as simply the aggregate of
individuals With incommens.rahle interests, i.e. no shared set of
values, meanings and ideals that each citizen entertains simply py the
fact of his or her membership in polity, must interpret the actions of
the state as either arbitrary or. because of its role is to adjudicate
between the conflicting interests of its citizens, as satisfying the
interests that one of the contestants in a conflict advances as a
private interest. Hfence. the best that can be hoped for according to
this view is that the policies, laws. etc. of those in authority will
be in the net interest of most citizens resulting in the achievement
of What has been called the public interest. There is, of course, on
this reading no guarantee that the policies pursued will be in the net
interest of the majority of citizens. It may very well happen that
those in political authority succomb to the pressure to adopt policies
that are in the interests of only a small minority.
In practice this means there are three possible motivations for
acting in accordance with the dictates and policies of authority: (1)
they are consistent with my private interests (which I may have
pressed political authorities to pursue, subsidize or support); (2)
the dictates of authority are against my interests but the sanctions
and penalties for refusing to obey outweigh benefits I would gain by
ignoring them; or (c) I obey because those in authority are able to
construct a system of market incentives that 'encourage' me to behave
in ways that are consistent with the policies pursued.
Willia. Connolly has shown that a society that relies on (1) and
(3) to obtain obedience for its policies could not long endure. The
problem of the free rider would mean that those whose private
interests were at odds with the policies that those in political
authority attempted to enforce through market incentives and
bureaucratic control would seek avenues of avoidance and escape that
would only require more regulations and market incentives resulting in
still more avoidance. Those whose behavior is to be regulated, by
seeking loopholes, contesting laws and regulations in the courts,
conforming only to the letter of the law, engaging in various
illegalities and subterranean activities, launch a "dialectic of
dissolution". In short, "Men, women, ethnic minorities, consumers,
workers, parents, children, and owners are all encouraged to contest
creatively the boundaries of explicit rules regulating their conduct
once the tendency to do so acquires initial momentum. For to be left
out of the process is to be deprived of the benefits of general
compliance and to face the burdens of personal compliance. Employees
can work according to rule; owners can shift investments abroad to
evade domestic regulation; parents locked into an internal struggle
over the sexual division of labor, can rear their children in
conformity with the law while losing touch with the psychic economy of
child development. Controversies will proliferate over the precise
'stipulations' governing tax payments, welfare allocations, equal
opportunity, the rights of and duties of parents and children, the
discretionary use of public funds, job performance evaluation, and
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conflicts of interest in public life." In short the "polity
possesses limited resources to will policies in the public interest
to sustain allegiance to the letter of the law and to interpret the'
letter of the law in particular cases; the members possess powerful
incentives to oppose public interest laws to their private advantage,
to evade compliance and to contest the applicability of the law to
their particular case. Each of these sources feeds the development of
the others, and the dialectic which unfolds progressively thins out
the supply of public will, integrity and knowledge.-^^ without some
notion of civic virtue at work in society, argues Connolly, the order
threatens to duplicate the Hobbesian system in which compliance is
motivated only through fear of penalty and sanction.
There is a fall back position for those who deny a connection
between political authority and the common good. Those whose
interests conflict with the policies of those in authority obey out of
fear and terror. The first objection to this claim is that it
translates political authority into political terror, hence, those who
occupy positions of authority are obeyed out of fear of punishment.
But this fall back position thus transforms political authority into
political coercion or power. Indeed, it is often when those in
authority must rely on threats and the use of force that we say that
they have lost their authority.
A second objection, one that cuts somewhat deeper, is posed by
Michael Foucault. Foucault argues that in any given episteme^-*- sets
of discursive practices are established with two primary results.
First, these practices establish certain positions as positions of
authority and power. Individuals holding these positions are
empowered to .ake pronouncements concerning a range of topics
determined by the discursive practice that resuit in networks of
control over large segments of the population, one example is the
judge, whose pronouncements concerning the guilt or innocence or
length of sentence of a defendent has quite a different effect than
the same pronouncements made by someone not recognized as a judge in
the discursive practice, m modern medicine, psychiatry, and
criminology, the doctor, analyst and criminologist respectively are
the positions from which pronouncements concerning physical health,
mental health and criminal rehabilitation emanate. Second, and as
part of the process establishing some people as authorities to make
the types of pronouncements cited above, the discourses that establish
these discursive practices privilege some forms of knowledge while
hiding others. These latter form subjugated knowledges, "a whole set
of knowledges that have been disqualified as inadequate to their task
or insufficiently elaborated; naive knowledges, located low down on
the hierarchy, beneath that required level of cognition of
scientificity."^^ The impact of these privileged forms of discourse
and knowledge is the set of discursive practices that identify,
individualize and control populations caught in their discursive web.
The paradigm of the individualized object of knowledge for Foucault
would, I think, be the alcoholic. Diagnosed by modern reformers as
the victim of illness, treated by welfare workers as incapable of.
self-control, and held criminally responsible by the police and courts
of his or her 'illness' or psychological 'shortcomings,' the alcoholic
or the individual identified as such, is the perfect example of an
individual on who. these several discourses converge, albeit somewhat
independently
,
to identify a class of persons for treatment,
paternalism and punishment.
several characteristics of this network of control need
emphasizing. First, it is not a network that is at the command of any
single person or group; the techniques and micro-cosms of power and
control have a life of their own. Second, the problem is not simply a
question of freedom and autonomy on the one hand versus power and
authority on the other. According to Foucault those who are the
advocates of freedom and autonomy, with their notions of the self,
self-conscious reflection, and responsibility, are as implicated in
the extension of techniques of control as those who explicitly
advocate the extension of and tighter forms of authority.
Foucault 's response to any project that would attempt to make
authority consistent with strong human agency, and I think the project
presented here in particular, would be that the limits it sets on
authority and the case it makes for strong human agency are a trap.
What we have done, Foucault might argue, is enable the further
extension of the discourse of control and power. Indeed, he might go
so far as to say that the connection we have drawn amongst the common
good, political authority, and strong evaluation indicates the extent
to which the extension of authority is dependent upon notions of the
self and theories of strong human agency.
As an alternative to the privileged forms of knowledge with their
modem notions of the self which are part of the establishment of
techniques of power, Foucault offers what he calls, following
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Nietzsche, genealcgy. Genealogy is Poucaulfs attempt to provide a
link between those erudite forms of knowledge that were disgualified
by more systematic and specialized forms of knowledge with those
subjugated knowledges that he calls popular knowledge, i.e. the
knowledge of the patient, the delinguent, t^ mad, and the criminal.
"Let us give the term genealogy to the union of erudite knowledge and
local memories which allows us to establish a historical knowledge of
struggles and to make use of this knowledge tactically today. This
then will be a provisional definition of the genealogies which I have
attempted to compile with you over the last few years.
Central to this project is the demonstration of the
conventionality of our notions of self-identity and the language along
with which we construct our notions of self-identity. Foucaulfs
works on reason and madness, criminality, health and sexuality are
aimed at showing how the self-identity that these discourses provide
us with are themselves the foundation of techniques of control, htence
he seeks to dismantle those notions of self-identity, to demonstrate
their conventional nature. In one of his more radical formulations of
his project he characterizes his project this way: '"Effective •
history differs from traditional history in being without constants.
Nothing in man
- not even his body - is sufficiently stable to serve
as the basis for self-recognition or for understanding other men. The
traditional devices for constructing a comprehensive view of history
and for retracing the past as a patient and continuous development
must be systematically dismantled. Necessarily, we must dismiss those
tendencies that encourage the consoling play of recognitions.
Knowledge, even under the banner of history, does not depend on
•redisoovery,. and it emphatically excludes the
-rediscovery of
ourselves.. History becomes
-effective, to the degree that it
introduces discontinuity into our very being - as it divides our
emotions, dramatizes our instincts, multiplies our body and sets it
against itself. Effective history deprives the self of the reassuring
stability of life and nature, and it will not permit itself to be
transported by a voiceless obstinacy toward a millenial ending."^^
Neither our physical bodies nor a teleological view of history or
society can serve as the basis for identity according to Foucault. We
must come to see ourselves, and even this is perhaps incorrectly
phrased from Foucault. s perspective, as a group of emotions, feelings,
thoughts and ideas that are disconnected; inte
continuity, is the goal of genealogy (effective history)
attempts to dismantle the self. ..The purpose of history, guided by
genealogy, is not to discover the roots of our identity but to commit
itself to its dissipation, it does not seek to define our unique
threshhold of emergence, the homeland to which metaphysicians promise
a return; it seeks to make visible all of those discontinuities that
cross us...^^ Foucault uses the imagery of the carnival and
masquerade to convey the type of effect genealogy. No single
identity, either for social actors or for the subject of knowledge,
should be the goal of genealogy. Rather, the genealogist offers
alternate identities, a multiplicity of choice of identity. ".The new
historian, the genealogist, will know what to make of this
masquerade. He will not be too serious to enjoy it; on the contrary
he will push the
.aspuerade to its li.it and prepare the great
carnival of ti.e where
.as.s are constantly reappearing.
.0 longer
the identification of our faint individuality with the solid
identities of the past, hut our
-unrealization. through the excessive
Choice of identities
- rrederick of Hohenstaufen. Caesar, Oesus,
Dionysus, and possibly Zarathustra. Taking up these
.asks,
revitalizing the buffoonexy of history, we adopt an identity whose
unreality surpasses that of God who started the charade.... Genealogy
is history, in the form of concerted carnival. "^^
This dissipation of modern forms of identity is to be achieved
through the examination of the growth of modern forms of knowledge,
the growth of the will to knowledge that takes the form of
criminology, psychoanalysis, medicine and psychology: "the critique
Of the injustices of the past by a truth held by men in the present
becomes the destruction of the man who maintains knowledge by the
injustice proper to the will to knowledge. "^"^
Foucaulfs work presents the most serious challenge to any project
directed at showing that authority is consistent with a strong form of
human agency. The latter project itself inherently involves the
extension of modern notions of identity, forms of authority,
discourses of control, in short, an extension of the will to know that
underlies modern techniques of power, argues Foucault.
Response and Conclusion: Jn Defense of Political Authority
Foucaulfs works present a compeling case; the boldness of the
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theses, the imaginative deployment of language; the relentless pursuit
Of his the.es; and a style that draws the reader to new locations fr»
which to survey a range of phenomena in new ways, complement each
other to produce new perspectives and ways of thinking, it is
impossible to return exactly to old ways of thinking having taken
Foucault's work seriously.
Nonetheless there is a certain amount of resistance that emerges
to Foucault's work. Those who seek a critical perspective from which
to evaluate authority and protect autonomy find Foucault's account a
compelling description of those phenomena they are critical of and
those who would defend patterns of authority in contemporary society.
At the same time the critics of established authority patterns are
repulsed by the claim that they are as complicitous in modern forms of
control as the defenders of the system of discipline. This resistance
makes it easy to forget that the pictures of modern forms of
discipline that Foucault uncovers are not simply pictures, they are
mirrors as well. Having recognized this tendency toward resistance
there are nonetheless several counter arguments to Foucault's works
and specifically to his critique of those who attempt to rehabilitate
or strengthen strong notions of human agency.
Foucault's criticism of contemporary techniques of control and
discipline, coupled with his rejection of liberal and radical reforms
and alternatives, leaves open the question of what would be an
acceptable alternative for Foucault. He explicitly refuses to engage
in normative discourse, arguing that it results in complicity in
extending extablished forms of control: "I think to imagine another
syste. is to extend our participation in the present syste.
Reject theory and all for.s of general discourse. The need for theory
IS still part Of the syste. we reject.-^B
^^^.^
^^^^^^
wish to replace an offioial institution by another institution that
fulfills the sa.e function
- better and differently - then you are
already being reabsorbed by the dominant structure. "^^ And finally,
-The whole of society- is precisely that which should not be
considered except as something to be destroyed. And then we can only
hope that it will never exist again."^0 ^.^^^^ ^^^^
hope of the future in the type of order that inspired nineteenth
century anarchism, indeed, his harshest contempt, when not directed
at Marxists, is reserved for anarchists .^"^
Foucaulfs faith seems to be lodged in the emergence of a new
episteme, the emergence of which will be facilitated by the
proliferation of resistances through the rehabilitation of subjugated
forms of knowledge. Given Foucaulfs rejection of what he would
consider naive anarchism and his account of the way that epistemes
include limits to the way that language and knowledge develop, several
objections can be raised against Foucaulfs rejection of the strong
notion of human agency defended here.
First, Foucault seems to recognize that in the new episteme some
forms of order will exist. This flows from his rejection of naive
anarchism and his account of the way epistemes circumscribe the use of
language, the development of knowledge and ways of viewing the world.
This seems to be a recognition that, as Hampshire, Gadamer, Taylor and
Connolly have emphasized, any order implies a set of limits. By
new
e
-Plication we must be willing to believe that the li.its of the
Older will be more desirable than the li.its imposed in the
contemporazv episteme. without specifying how those li.its could b
Changed and in what ways they will be an improvement, I think
Foucaulfs faith in the future episteme may be unjustified.
consider the following. Bruno Bettleheim has chronicled how in
German concentration camps those most susceptible to breakdown in the
face of attempts at total forms of control were those with the weakest
forms of personal identity. Members of the middle class, whose
identity was tied to their status and personal possessions, succumbed
most quickly and completely under the weight of total control. The
question that emerges is what if Foucault is successful in weakening
or even shattering some forms of identity and yet some forms of social
control remain in place. Foucault assumes that the fracturing of
those modern fonns of identity will itself not lead to strengthening
of social control. This follows from his claim that that control
itself is dependent upon the notions of self, identity and
self-consiousness that pervade our discourse and discursive
practices. But if existing forms of discipline and control are only
partially tied to modern forms of identity for their efficacy, it
might be possible to destroy the foundations of personal identity and
leave (at least some) networks of control intact or in a somewhat
revised form.
A second point can be made regarding the possibilities of
criticism and the notion of human agency. Foucault clearly supports
the proliferation of criticism. At times he has, for example, called
for the politicization of the self. Moreover the languaae he deploys
or that deploys hi., clearly reflects the belief that there are better
and worse for.s of social life and of co.ing to know that social
life. Even though his vocabulary is not exactly the vocabulary of
Taylor's strong evaluator, it is the language of criticise. But it is
precisely criticism (beyond the mere preferences of the utilitarian
individual) that is consistent with human agency, that partly
constitutes human agency, Taylor argues. As the possibilities for
criticism and evaluation proliferate, so do our possibilities for
choice and action, it is precisely to that possibility of criticism
that Foucault has contributed; hence it is not clear that he has
escaped the problems that revolve around the notion of human agency
and the subject .^^
A third point can be made regarding the project of genealogy
itself. Foucault describes it as the rehabilitation and fusion of two
forms of subjugated knowledges, local knowledges and erudite
knowledges that are generally available only to the intellectual.
Foucault 's own work, particularly on the development of the penal
system, is a glowing example of how this project is to be carried
off. However, the relationship between the two types of knowledge
seems to establish a privileged space for the intellectual; it is the
intellectual who because of his erudition, is in the position to forge
the links between the various subjugated local knowledges. Yet this
privileged position of the intellectual would seem to place him in a
position of potential authority; it establishes the space from which
to speak, even if one rejects permanent occupancy of it. In light of
2A8
this, one is tempted to turn his own fo™ of interrogation on
roucauit: who is ailcwed to speak as the genealogist, what positions
does genealogy privilege; what for.s of knowledge does it subjugate-
why do the local, subjugated knowledges need the erudite knowledge of
the genealogists?
Finally, for those who seek a sustained political life, who would
celebrate politics, Foucaulfs work plays and ambivalent role, in
^any respects it represents the type of political criticism that cuts
deepest and extends political discourse in imaginative ways. Yet it
seems to preclude a sustained political action; politics is eposidic
(at least until the new episteme is ushered in); sustained political
action threatens to enable techniques of discipline to locate,
identify and individualize the opponents of contemporary forms of
control. But those who are not as confident as Foucault about the
possibilities of social life in the new episteme; those who believe
that crisis in the contemporary political economy may precede the
emergence of the new episteme that Foucault anticipates, and that
resulting changes may be for the worse, cannot afford the luxury of
episodic politics. They must feel compelled to engage in political
discourse in attempts to ward off new extensions of already existing
forms of control.
In light of these reservations, those who seek to strengthen human
agency, to lay the foundation of criticism of authority, and insure
the integrity of democratic authority, are unlikely to adopt
Foucault 's rejection of their project. Indeed, they are justified in
continuing the project. In spite of the fascination with and
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temptation to surrender to the Fcucauitlan challenge, Fouoault can at
best play the role of the lens through which those wishing to defend
human agency critically examine their own work.*^
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knowledge and power. But Foucault himself argues that there are
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"Even so we should speak not of darkness but of a somewhat blurred
light, deceptive in its apparent clarity, and hiding more than it
reveals: it seems to us, in fact, that we know all there is to be
known about the Classical knowledge if we understand that it is
rationalistic, that, since Galileo and Descartes, it has accorded an
absolute privilege to Mechanism, that it presupposes a general
ordering of nature, that it accepts the possibility of an analysis
sufficiently radical to discover elements or origins, but that it
already has a presentiment, beyond and despite all these concepts of
understanding, of the movement of life, of the density of history, and
of the disorder, so difficult to master, in nature. But to recognize
Classical thought by such signs alone is to misunderstand its
fundamental arrangement; it is to neglect entirely the relation
between such manifiestations and what made them possible." The Order
of Things (New York: Vintage, 1973) p. 303. It seems to me that
Foucault must be willing to agree that there is an evaluative
dimension to language that he is not totally in control of or that his
intentions as an author limit or control the evaluative impact of his
work. Neither is consistent with his views of the relationship of the
subject to language.
43. See for example Foucault, Discipline and Punish (New York:
Pantheon, 1977). Foucault would also deny that his intention or the
effect of his work is to systematize subjugated knowledges. Indeed,
he argues that the claim to speak for others is itself an example of
knowledge operating as power: "In the most recent upheaval, (May
1968; my addition) the intellectual discovered that the masses no
longer need him to gain knowledge: they know perfectly well, without
illusion; they know far better than he and they are certainly capable
of expressing
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themselves.... Intellectuals are themselves agents of this system of
power
- the idea of their responsibility for 'consciousness' and
discourse forms part of the system. Vr\e intellectual's role is no
longer to place himself 'somewhat ahead and to the side' in order to
express the stifled truth of the collectivity; rather it is to
struggle against forms of power that transform him into its object and
instrument in the sphere of 'knowledge', 'truth', and 'discourse'."
(Language, Counter-Memory and Practice
, pp. 207-208.) In spite of
this denial, works such as Discipline and Rjnish are not only very
systmatic, claiming to detect similar patterns of discipline in the
prison, school, workplace, etc., but also make available an
understanding that many who are the object of that control do not have
and would not have otherwise.
44. In order to maintain a political dialogue it must be assumed
that some questions are settled; there must be some shared meanings
and understandings. This is precisely what Foucault wants to contest
with his notion of effective history, i.e. genealogy. It is not clear
to me what type of political life would exist in this state of flux
that Foucault is pursuing, but one possibility does present itself.
In times of disorder, those who are the first to attempt to impose
order on others are often the most successful, examples being the
Bolshevik and Nazi successes.
45. This is the position taken by William Connolly, "The Politics of
Disciplinary Control," forthcoming.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Connolly William E. Appearance and ReaHt^^ in Politics. Cambridqe-Cambridge University Press, 1981.
^dinoriog .
.
"The Politics of Disciplinary Control." Mimeo, 1982.
'''^^i.?^?"^^^^- "Psychoanalysis," in Character and Culture, edPhillip Reiff
.
New York: Macmillan, 19637'pp7"230-^5r7
Friedman, Richard. "Cn the Concept of Authority in Political
Philosophy," in Concepts
_in Social and Political Philosophy, ed.
Richard Flathman. New York: Macmillan, 1973, pp. 121-146.
Flathman, Richard. Jine Practice of Political Autho_ritv: Authority and
the Authoritative
. Chicago: U. of Chicago Press, 198"o:
Foucault, Michel. Discipline and Punish. New York: Pantheon, 1977.
_.
Language
,
Counter-Memory and Practice
. Ithaca: Cornell
Univ. Press, 1977.
_.
The Order of Things
. New York: Random House, 1970.
Power/Knowledge
. New York: Pantheon, 1980.
Hans-Georg Gadamer. "Hermeneutics and Social Science," Cultural
Hermeneutics
. 2, February 1975, pp. 313-323.
.
Philosophical Hermeneutics
,
ed. and trans. David Linge.
Berkeley: U. of Cal. Press, 1976.
.
Truth and Method
. New York: Seabury. 1966.
Gunnell, John. Political Theory: Tradition and Interpretation
.
Cambridge, Mass: Winthrop, 1979.
Habermas, Jurgen. Communication and the Evolution of Society . Boston:
Beacon, 1978.
.
Legitimation Crisis . Boston: Beacon, 197A.
.
Knowledge and Human Interests . Boston: Beacon, 1968.
.
"Review of Gadamer' s Truth and Method ," in Understanding
and Social Action
,
ed. Thomas McCarthy and Fred Dallmayer. South
Bendl University of NDtre C^me Press, 1978, pp. 335-363.
267
268
Theory and Practice . Boston: Beacon Press, 1971.
Hampshire, Stuart. Freedom of Mind . Princeton: Princeton Univ.
Press, 1971.
Hegel, G. W. F. The Phenomenology of Spirit , Trans. A. V. Miller.
New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1977.
Hollis, Martin. Models of Man. New York: Cambridge Univ. Press,
1977.
"My Role and Its CXities," in Nature and Conduct , ed.
R. S. Peters. New York: St. Martin's, 1977, pp. 180-199.
.
"Winch and Winchcraft," Philosophy of Social Science ,
2, Spring 1972, pp. 89-103.
Hoy, David Couzens. The Critical Circle . Berkeley: U. of Cal. Press,
1979.
Kovesi, Julius. Moral Notions . London: Routledge and Kegan Paul,
1960.
Marcuse, Herbert. Studies in Critical Philosophy . Boston: Beacon,
1968.
McCarthy, Thomas. The Critical Theory of Jur^ Habermas . Cambridge,
Mass: MIT Press, 1977.
Palmer, Richard. Hermeneutics . Evanston, 111.: Northwestern
Univ.
Press, 1969.
Taylor, Charles. Hegel . New York: Cambridge Univ.
Press, 1975.
"Interpretation and the Sciences of Man," Review of
""
"Metaphysics
,
26, September 1971, pp. 3-51.
.
"Language and Human Nature," Alan B. Plaunt
Memorial Lecture,
""Tarleton university, unpublished manuscript.
. "A Theory of Human Agency," in The Self ,
ed. T. Mischels.
-~itowa, N. J.: Rowman and Littlefield, 1977, pp. 103-135.
Winch, peter. "Authority," in Political
R]i^^
Sp'Tlll.
Q^inton. New York: Oxford University Press, 1967, pp.
The Idea of a Social Scie^ London: Routledge and
Kegan
~ Paul, 1958.
269
.
"Understanding a Primitive Society," in Rationality, ed.Bryan Wilson. New York: Harper and Row, 19707^^77^111
.

